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A. Research context 
 
Abstract  
In light of the worrisome state of the seas worldwide, new policy approaches are urgently needed 
to regulate the marine environment (see Koivurova, 2009). There is widespread consensus that the 
primary cause for this state are direct and indirect anthropogenic impacts on the marine environ-
ment: pollution of coasts and the open sea through waste and sewage; the introduction of alien 
species which change the ecosystem and especially the food webs; overfishing, threatening the 
livelihood of many fish stocks; as well as the expansion of maritime transport and resource extrac-
tion ? these are just some factors which contribute to a declining biodiversity, species extinction, 
to eutrophication and to the warming of the seas (see Salomon, 2009). However, the value of the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? the 
biosphere is located in them (Hödl, 2006). Apart from being a value in themselves, healthy oceans 
are of great importance for the climate on the earth, they constitute the livelihood of millions of 
human beings and last but not least, they are also a major economic factor. 
Lately, the declining state of the oceans has recently become an increasing focus of attention of a 
broader public. In the political sphere as well, marine protection has been receiving more attention 
in recent years and initiatives to address the marine environment in a comprehensive way are 
emerging worldwide. This study analyzes the marine environmental policy of the European Un-
ion. It focuses on its most developed regulatory instrument, the Marine Strategy Framework Di-
rective (MSFD) (2008/56/EC), adopted in 2008. This Directive is supposed to be the environmen-
tal pillar of the developing Integrated Maritime Policy of the European Union. Its central feature 
is a novel, regional governance approach. The main aim of the Directive is for the European Seas 
to achieve good environmental status by 2020 (MSFD, Art. 1; see Irmer et al., 2010). Implement-
ing an encompassing regulation in the complex marine ecosystem despite the difficulties to 
achieve consensus between 27 different national interests in a contested topic area gives the 
MSFD the dubious reputation of being one of the most ambitious regulatory projects of the EU in 
the last years (see Long, 2011; Koivurova, 2009; Rätz et al., 2010; Salomon, 2006). This research 
analyzes three key aspects of the MSFD. 
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In the first paper, the MSFD is analyzed in detail. The paper summarizes ?????????????????????u-
latory activities in the marine field and analyzes ???? ????? localization in context of water and 
environmental policy. It also summarizes ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????y-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
follows. The last part addresses criticism concerning the MSFD. The detailed analysis of the Di-
rective shows that the EU does not (yet) follow a consistent approach in its marine policies. The 
differences of the MSFD and the Integrated Maritime Policy become evident with regard to the 
history of origins of the two policies, their location in different Directorate Generals of the Com-
mission and their inconsistent formal structures. Moreover, the nature and the scale of the chal-
lenges the Member States are facing when implementing the MSFD become clear; especially if 
conflicting goals with other communitized EU policies become relevant. The identified weakness-
es of the Directive, especially with regard to its ambiguous formulations, which leave substantial 
scope for interpretation for the Member States, as well as the precautionary principle only men-
tioned in the recitals, give reason to assume that the implementation of the Directive and its prac-
tical effects will ultimately depend on the commitment of the Member States. However, this does 
not reduce an important achievement of the MSFD: initiating a communicative and coordinative 
process, which can lead to common European methods and practices in marine environmental 
protection. 
The focus of the second paper of this thesis is the novel regulatory concept of European marine 
policies. Instead of one common EU approach, regional measures play a crucial role, especially in 
the implementation phase of the MSFD. Interestingly, similar approaches are also discussed with-
in the framework of reforming the Common Fisheries Policy. The paper examines the two varie-
ties as well as the intention behind their introduction, the functions they have in both policies and 
whether they alter the existing institutional set-up of the EU. It becomes evident that the reasons 
for introducing regional measures differ. While in the fisheries policy, the main aim is to reform 
an existing policy and to reduce its deficits, in case of the MSFD, the regional focus was an essen-
tial part of the policy right from the start. Accordingly, the measures vary in scope and in their 
function within the specific policy context. 
The last article compares the European and the US policy processes leading to the adoption of 
their respective marine policies. The analysis of the MSFD and the National Ocean Policy of the 
US shows that complex decision-making processes can positively influence policies which require 
extensive cooperation between centralized and decentralized levels. The Co-Management ap-
proach proves to be a useful tool to examine the cooperative elements of the two processes. The 
analysis shows that thanks to the complex decision-making structures in the EU, a number of 
problems could be addressed before the adoption of the MSFD, and an agreement on many of 
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them could be found. In contrast, the analysis of the policy process in the US suggests that finding 
consensus will mostly take place after the adoption of the National Ocean Policy. This lack of 
cooperation in the decision- making process could lead to protracted or deficient implementation.  
 
The research shows that ???? ?????????????? ???? ??????? ??????????? ????????? ??? ????????????????
environmental policy, a look in the past provides useful insights. It becomes clear that the devel-
??????????????????????????????? significantly influenced the framing of the MSFD, including its 
regional approach, its focus on regulating procedures instead of defining specific policy goals, as 
well as its aim of overcoming fragmented, sectorally organized policies. Apart from that, some of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????or developments at different levels in the 
field. For instance, the distribution of competencies as laid down in the Treaty prevents regional 
levels to play a more pronounced role in marine protection, and ???????????????????????????????
with the Water Framework Directive significantly restricted the margin for negotiating the MSFD, 
especially concerning the implementation process. Taken together, the analyses of the current 
work show that the EU seems to take up the challenge to promote encompassing regulatory ap-
proaches in an inherently national and complex (regarding the matter itself as well as institutional-
ly) policy field by setting an ambitious goal, but only a framework for action at supranational lev-
el, which has to be further elaborated at the Member State level. The discretion Member States are 
granted through this procedure is partly balanced by the requirement to cooperate at regional lev-
els, which could develop binding force by defining common measures within regions. This dual 
approach offers the EU the possibility to promote common European goals and understandings, 
while at the same time taking the growing socio-economic and regional diversity among the in-
creasing number of Member States into account. Within the given framework and the according 
distribution of competencies as per Treaty, the Commission develops more and more into a man-
ager of policies, while subordinate levels are more engaged in the further elaboration of the broad 
supranational legislation. Insofar, the MSFD can be understood as one answer to the question of 
the future framing of European politics. 
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Zusammenfassung  
Angesichts des schlechten Zustands, in dem die Meere sich weltweit befinden, werden dringend 
neue Policy- Ansätze benötigt (vgl. Koivurova, 2009). Es besteht weitgehend Einigkeit darüber, 
dass direkte und indirekte anthropogene Eingriffe in die Meeresumwelt als Hauptursache dafür zu 
verstehen sind: die Verschmutzung von Küsten und dem offenen Meer durch Müll und Abwässer; 
die Einschleppung fremder Arten, die zu Veränderungen der Ökosysteme und insbesondere der 
Futternetzte führen; Überfischung, die viele Bestände an die Grenzen ihrer Existenz bringen; so-
wie die Ausweitung von Schiffsverkehr und Rohstoffabbau sind nur einige Faktoren, die zu 
Rückgang von Biodiversität, Artensterben, zu Überdüngung der Meere und ihrer Erwärmung füh-
ren können (vgl. Salomon, 2009). Dabei ist der Wert der Meere kaum hoch genug einzuschätzen: 
sie bedecken über 70 % der Erdoberfläche, in ihnen befinden sich 90% der Biosphäre (Hödl, 
2006). Neben ihrem Wert an sich sind gesunde Meere von großer Bedeutung für das Klima auf 
der Erde, sie stellen die Lebensgrundlage von Millionen Menschen dar, und nicht zuletzt sind sie 
auch ein bedeutender Wirtschaftsfaktor.  
In letzter Zeit rückt der sich verschlechternde Zustand der Meere mehr und mehr in den Fokus der 
Öffentlichkeit. Auch auf politischer Ebene erfährt Meeresschutz in den letzten Jahren mehr Auf-
merksamkeit, und weltweit entstehen Initiativen, um die Meeresumwelt umfassender zu themati-
sieren. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht die Meeresumweltpolitik der Europäischen Union. Im 
Zentrum steht dabei deren am weitesten fortgeschrittenes Regulierungsinstrument, die 2008 ver-
abschiedete Meeresstrategierahmenrichtlinie (MSRL, 2008/56/EG). Diese Richtlinie gilt als Um-
weltpfeiler der sich entwickelnden Integrierten Meerespolitik der Europäischen Union und ver-
folgt einen neuartigen, regional fokussierten Governance-Ansatz. Ziel des Rechtsaktes ist es, die 
europäischen Meere bis zum Jahr 2020 in einen sogenannten guten Umweltzustand zu bringen  
(MSRL, Art. 1; vgl. Irmer et al., 2010). 
Eine umfassende Regulierung zu implementieren im Bereich des komplexen marinen Ökosystems 
trotz der Schwierigkeiten, eine Einigung zwischen 27 unterschiedlichen nationalen Interessen in 
einem umstrittenen Themenbereich, hat der MSRL den zweifelhaften Ruf eingebracht, eines der 
ehrgeizigsten regulativen Projekte der EU in den letzten Jahren zu sein (vgl. Long, 2011; 
Koivurova, 2009; Rätz et al, 2010; Salomon, 2006). Diese Untersuchung analysiert drei Schlüs-
selaspekte der MSRL. 
Im ersten Artikel wird eine ausführliche Analyse der MSRL vorgenommen. Diese umfasst zu-
nächst eine Bestandsaufnahme bisheriger regulativer Aktivitäten der EU im Meeresbereich, die 
Verortung der MSRL in den Kontext von Wasser- und Umweltpolitik und eine Zusammenfassung 
der Entwicklung der Richtlinie. Nach einer inhaltlichen Analyse folgt eine zusammenfassende 
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Bewertung der Herausforderungen, die während der Implementation der Richtlinie zu erwarten 
sind. Im letzten Teil wird auf Kritik an der MSRL eingegangen. Die genaue Untersuchung der 
Richtlinie verdeutlicht, dass die EU in ihrer Meerespolitik (noch) keinen einheitlichen Ansatz 
verfolgt. Die Unterschiede zur Integrierten Meerespolitik werden deutlich in den Entstehungsge-
schichten der beiden Politiken, ihrer Ansiedlung in unterschiedlichen Generaldirektionen der 
Kommission und in ihrer uneinheitlichen formalen Ausgestaltung. Zudem wird klar, vor welch 
großen Herausforderungen die Mitgliedstaaten stehen, wenn es um die Implementierung der 
MSRL geht; insbesondere, wenn Zielkonflikte mit anderen vergemeinschafteten EU Politiken 
relevant werden sollten. Die identifizierten Schwachpunkte der Richtlinie, insbesondere in Hin-
blick auf unklare Formulierungen, die Spielraum für unterschiedliche mitgliedstaatliche Interpre-
tationen lassen, sowie das nur in den Erwägungsgründen genannte Vorsorgeprinzip, geben Anlass 
zu vermuten, dass die Umsetzung der Richtlinie und die Wirksamkeit, die sie letztlich entfalten 
wird, zu einem großem Teil von dem Engagement der Mitgliedstaaten abhängen wird. Dies min-
dert jedoch nicht eine wichtige Leistung der MSRL: das Anstoßen eines kommunikativen und 
koordinierenden Prozesses, der zu gemeinsamen europäischen Methoden und Praktiken im Mee-
resumweltschutz führen kann. 
Im zweiten Artikel dieser Arbeit steht ein neuartiges Konzept europäischer Meerespolitiken im 
Mittelpunkt. Regionale Maßnahmen spielen insbesondere in der Implementationsphase der MSRL 
eine entscheidende Rolle, werden aber auch im Rahmen der Reformierung der Gemeinsamen Fi-
schereipolitik diskutiert. Das Paper geht der Frage nach, was die Intentionen hinter der Einfüh-
rung regionaler Maßnahmen sind, welche Funktionen sie innerhalb der beiden Politiken überneh-
men und ob sie das bestehende institutionelle Gefüge verändern. Es wird deutlich, dass die Grün-
de für die Einführung regionaler Maßnahmen unterschiedlich sind. Geht es in der Fischereipolitik 
vor allem darum, eine bestehende Politik zu reformieren und Defizite zu mindern, war bei der 
MSRL von vorn herein ein regionaler Fokus essentieller Bestandteil der Politik.  
Im letzten Artikel wird ein Vergleich der europäischen und der US-amerikanischen Policy-
Prozesse vorgenommen, die zur Verabschiedung der jeweiligen Meerespolitiken geführt haben. 
Mit der Untersuchung der MSRL und der National Ocean Policy der USA wird gezeigt, dass sich 
eine komplexe Entscheidungsfindung positiv auswirken kann auf Politiken, die hohen Kooperati-
onsbedarf aufweisen zwischen zentralen und dezentralen Ebenen. Der Co-Management Ansatz 
erweist sich bei der Untersuchung als nützliches Werkzeug, um die kooperativen Elemente der 
beiden  Prozesse zu erfassen. Die Analyse zeigt, dass dank der komplexen Entscheidungsstruktu-
ren der EU das Entscheidungsproblem zu einem großen Teil vor der Verabschiedung der MSRL 
adressiert und eine Einigung gefunden werden konnte. Im Gegensatz dazu legt die Untersuchung 
der Policy Prozesse in den USA nahe, dass ein Großteil der Konsensfindung erst nach der Verab-
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schiedung der National Ocean Policy stattfinden wird. Zudem scheint es wahrscheinlich, dass die 
fehlende Kooperation im Entscheidungsprozess zu verzögerter und unzureichender 
Implementation führen wird.  
 
Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass um den aktuellen Governance-Ansatz in der EU Meeresumweltpoli-
tik zu verstehen, ein Blick zurück wertvolle Einsichten bietet. Es wird deutlich, dass die Entwick-
lung der EU Wasserpolitik den Zuschnitt der MSRL deutlich beeinflusste, einschließlich ihres 
regionalen Ansatzes, ihres Fokus auf die Regulierung von Abläufen anstatt auf die Definition 
spezifischer Policy Ziele, genauso wie ihr Anspruch, fragmentierte und sektoral organisierte Poli-
tiken zu überwinden. Darüber hinaus können auch einige der Schwächen der MSRL auf vorherige 
Entwicklungen auf verschiedenen Ebenen in diesem Bereich zurückgeführt werden. So etwa ver-
hindert die Kompetenzverteilung durch dem Vertrag eine stärkere Rolle von regionalen Ebenen 
im Meeresschutz, und die Erfahrungen der Mitgliedstaaten mit der Wasserrahmenrichtlinie 
schränkten den Verhandlungsspielraum über die MSFD deutlich ein, insbesondere was den Im-
plementierungsprozess angeht. Insgesamt zeigen die Analysen der vorliegenden Arbeit, dass die 
EU die Herausforderung anzunehmen scheint, umfassende Regulierungsansätze in einem eigent-
lich inhärent nationalen und komplexen (was den Gegenstand an sich angeht, wie auch institutio-
nell gesehen) Politikfeld indem ein ambitioniertes Ziel gesetzt wird, jedoch nur ein Handlungs-
rahmen auf supranationaler Ebene, welcher weiter ausgeführt werden soll auf mitgliedsstaatlicher 
Ebene. Der Ermessensspielraum, der den Mitgliedsstaaten durch dieses Vorgehen eingeräumt 
wird, wird teilweise aufgefangen durch die Auflage, regional zu kooperieren, was Bindungswir-
kung durch die Formulierung gemeinsamer Ziele innerhalb von Regionen entwickeln kann. Dieser 
zweiteilige Ansatz ermöglicht es der EU, gemeinsame europäische Ziele und Verständnisse zu 
verfolgen, und gleichzeitig die wachsenden sozio-ökonomischen und regionalen Unterschiede zu 
berücksichtigen zwischen der wachsenden Zahl der Mitgliedstaaten. Innerhalb des gegebenen 
Rahmens und der dazu gehörenden Kompetenzverteilung durch den Vertrag entwickelt sich die 
Kommission immer mehr zu einem Politikmanager, während nachgeordnete Ebenen mehr invol-
viert sind in die weitere Ausarbeitung der breiten supranationalen Gesetzgebung. Insofern kann 
die MSFD als eine Antwort auf die Frage nach der künftigen Ausgestaltung europäischer Politik 
verstanden werden.  
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Introduction 
 
European marine environmental policy ? not too long ago, this term described a confusing con-
glomerate of sectoral measures which addressed anthropogenic activities related to the marine 
environment within different regulatory frameworks. Various legislation referred to single as-
pects, such as the Common Transport Policy and its provisions on vessel-source pollution and 
maritime safety (TFEU, Art. 80 (2)), or the Birds and Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC) and its es-
tablishment of offshore conservation areas. The different legislative measures were developed at 
different points in time, had different regulatory bases and were communitarized to different de-
grees (see Long, 2011 and 2007; Koivurova, 2009; Barnes and Metcalfe, 2010). Accordingly, 
each following different ends and interests, these policies also possessed different internal logics 
and cultures. The protection or conservation of the marine environment as an end in itself was not 
in focus of European legislation (see Long, 2011; Mee, 2008). However, the idea to protect the 
marine environment is rather old, at least in European terms. Marine environmental pollution was 
perceived to be an important environmental problem in 1973 already2. Yet, respective encompass-
ing legislative measures only emerged in the early 2000s.  
This lack of coherent legislation in the marine realm was not unique to the EU. Similar structures 
could also be found at national levels. One reason for the coexistence of different, often uncoordi-
nated frameworks can be found in the so-called ?creeping jurisdiction? (Koivurova: 2009: 171). 
This term describes the incremental progress of regulating the marine environment. Before WW 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ibid.). Since then, the 
policy environment changed considerably. Coastal states claimed authority over large parts of the 
seabed, and the concept of exclusive economic zones was developed3. Marine related activities 
expanded, tourism being a prominent example. These activities increasingly included 
transboundary action, as nations e.g. engaged more and more in fishing activities. In the course of 
this development, respective policies also had to be adapted or newly developed. One major ex-
ample for an international measure is the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, from 
1982.  
Parallel to the development of legal provisions and regulations in the field, the nature of the usage 
of the seas changed. To name just a few, marine transport, fisheries, oil drilling and, more recent-
                                                 
2
 See the First Environmental Action Programme from 1973, Chapter 6. 
3
 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 55. 
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ly, the expansion of wind- and tidal energy extraction all contribute to lasting interventions in and 
pollution of marine ecosystems. Prospectively, these activities are likely to increase. One trigger 
for recognizing the worrisome state of the seas and coastal livelihoods was the Brundtland report 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
threats are highlighted (see Our Common Future / Brundtland Report part III, chapter 10). They 
include declining biodiversity, most prominent in case of fisheries, the invasion of non-native 
species, which, among others, is influencing the composition of food webs, increasingly polluted 
coastlines, the negative effects of climate change, and excessive loads of nutrients introduced in 
the oceans via rivers or directly through coastal states (ibid.). According to the step-by-step ex-
pansion and intensification of activities in the marine environment, regulation aiming at protecting 
the marine environment developed incrementally at different levels. The result was a patchwork 
of different regulations at national and international levels, as well as multinational arrangements, 
which are often regionally restricted, such as the Trilateral Wadden Sea Cooperation4. They differ 
concerning the scope of their regulatory aim and their regulatory measures. Examples include the 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas from 1966, the 
London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Mat-
ter from 1972, or the Barcelona Convention for Protection against Pollution in the Mediterranean 
Sea from 1976. All of these target different aspects of the increasingly polluted oceans. 
Slowly, the insight was gaining ground that the previous efforts to protect the marine  environ-
ment were not sufficient. The sectoral organization of the field was perceived to be a main obsta-
cle: lacking coordination between different regulatory approaches, the resulting inconsistencies 
and duplication of work often lead to conflicting or even contradicting policy outcomes (see 
Frank, 2007). Accordingly, some authors blame ?? ???????????? ???????????? ?????????? responsible 
for the degrading marine ecosystems (Crowder et al., 2006, Freestone et al., 2010). 
Recently, nations worldwide are currently taking action to reform their ocean policies (Markus et 
al., 2011; Borja et al., 2010). Examples include Canada, Brazil or New Zealand (ibid.) The princi-
pal aim of these policies is to overcome the coexistence of separate regulatory measures and to 
achieve more coherent approaches to marine governance. As the first supranational actor, the Eu-
ropean Union started introducing measures to promote the protection of the marine environment 
in 2002 with the ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????5.  The 
following policy process finally resulted in the adoption of the Marine Strategy Framework Di-
rective in 20086 with the goal to achieve good environmental status in the European seas by 2020. 
 
                                                 
4The Trilateral Cooperation on the Protection of the Wadden Sea,  http://www.waddensea-secretariat.org/ 
5
 (COM(2002)539 final). 
6
 Directive 2008/56/EC. 
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The MSFD is of outstanding significance for the development of EU environmental politics and 
for political science research. This policy is not only the first European legislation addressing spe-
cifically the marine environment and one of the largest regulatory projects in the history of EU 
environmental politics, but also introduces a new governance approach. The main characteristic of 
this approach is that it is framed based on the subject of oceans, instead of its individual sectors. 
This new concept could develop to be a central new instrument to address complex environmental 
policy fields. ??????????????????????????????????? ????????????????key measure to improve marine 
environmental governance. It focuses on three major points: on the genesis of the MSFD and its 
delineation from other policies in the field; on its new approach in promoting tailored regional 
policies under a common European umbrella; and on the organization of cooperation and coordi-
nation among the different policy making and policy implementing levels of the MSFD.  
 
The three different perspectives within this thesis highlight key aspects of the MSFD relating to 
central debates in the scientific community. Due to their format, the information in these papers is 
condensed, references to the broader context or background are necessarily brief. The main objec-
tive of this introduction is to link these three publications by providing a common narrative thread 
and by providing supplementary information. It will examine the preconditions of the institutional 
setting of the MSFD, its regional approach and the possible obstacles for its implementation. The 
introduction shows that the MSFD is genuinely a product of previous and current developments in 
the field of European environmental policy which explains its limitations and possibilities; the 
genesis of the field defines the path in which the MSFD could develop. This insight is a central 
motive of ???? ???????????tutional involvement, its attempts to spread the financial and adminis-
trative expenses on more shoulders, as well as on the way the different levels involved in policy 
making and implementation interact. 
The overview provided in the introduction suggests that in case of the MSFD, the historical argu-
ment provides a deeper understanding of the tailoring of the MSFD, of its peculiarities, its short-
comings as well as its strengths. Previous developments also affect the distribution of competen-
cies and the regional focus of the Directive. For all three papers, the passages on the legal and 
institutional contexts at EU level provide the basis. They explain the contractual framework which 
limits the scope for innovative elements concerning for example the distribution of competences, 
which in turn limits the scope of regional arrangements.   
The introduction starts with providing relevant background information on the environmental 
policy field and according provisions and then, each section following a chronological structure, 
narrows down the specific developments leading to the adoption of the MSFD. It is organized as 
follows: after a brief summary of the major developments in the ??????????????????????????? ???
1.1.1, the contractual basis for environmental policy is explained. Section 1.1.2 deals with the 
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distribution of competences between the EU and the Member States in the environmental policies 
field. It especially focuses on Directives, the legal form of the MSFD, and the function of the 
??????????????????????????????????????which frequently initiate new policies. Section 1.2 pro-
vides an overview over ???? ????? ?????? ??????, which strongly influenced the framing of the 
MSFD. The political situation accompanying the policy making process and the adoption of the 
Water Framework Directive is subject of section 1.2.1 and leads directly to the central topic of the 
thesis, the Marine Strategy Framework Directive in 1.2.2. The following two sections focus on the 
standing of the MSFD in the field of marine policy and the institutional context in which the 
MSFD was developed.  
Whereas these parts provide the basis and context for the three publications of this thesis, the fol-
lowing focus on the structure and approach of the thesis. First of all, the research rationale is pre-
sented in section1.3, which then lead to the objectives research in 1.4. The methodology used is 
outlined in 1.5, followed by the limits of the research in1.6. Finally, 1.7 introduces the structure of 
the thesis. In the following paragraph, the theoretical background of the publications is presented, 
starting with the Historical Institutionalism in 2.1, followed by the multi-level governance- ap-
proach in 2.2 and the Co-Management concept in 2.3. Paragraph 3 summarizes the results and 
provides an outlook.  
 
1.1 The EU??????????????????????? 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????in sight in the early days of the then European 
Economic Community.7 The Treaty of Rome from 1957 did not provide for any competences in 
the field of environmental policies, but mainly focused on establishing a common market. How-
ever, environmental issues soon gained momentum at the EU level. The roots of this development 
are to be found at the national level in the 1960s, when polluted rivers and air became subjects of 
public debate (see Lenschow, 2005). These problems required transboundary action in order to be 
adequately addressed, and inter alia led to establishing respective organizations, such as the Inter-
national Commission for the Protection of the Rhine8 in 1950. This also explains the following 
dynamics at the supranational level (see Gwosdz, 2004). However, introducing environmental 
measures was not easy, because of the lacking basis for the protection of the environment in the 
treaty. As an auxiliary tool, such measures were justified by their function to abolish barriers to 
trade and to complete the common market (Wolf and Stanley, 2010): Article 100 of the Treaty of 
                                                 
7
 Numerous thorough discussions of ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Jordan and Fairbrass, 2005; and Lenschow, 2001 ), which is the reason why this passage focuses on only resuming the mile-
???????????????????????????????????as a background for understanding the basic dynamics in the field. 
8
 See http://www.iksr.org. 
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Rome allowed taking measures ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly affect the establishment or  func-
?????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????reaty allowed Community action and 
adopting measures necessary for attaining the objectives of the Community. In 1973, environmen-
tal policy officially came into focus of the then EC with the mandate of the Commission to pre-
pare the first Programme of Action on the Environment (EAP).9 These Programmes can be under-
stood as declarations of political intentions or aspirations, and outline the policy programme for 
the upcoming years (Wolf and Stanley, 2010). Before 1973, few measures had been adopted relat-
ed to environmental protection in the Community.  
After the first EAP, environmental legislation continued to develop incrementally, yet steadily 
(Lenschow, 2005). The process was often slowed down because of the requirement to adopt new 
legislation unanimously. This gave every Member State the opportunity to block or veto unwant-
ed legislation and also prevented approaches calling for more comprehensive regulatory measures 
(Jordan, 2005). However, despite these unfavorable circumstances, over 200 legal acts in the envi-
ronmental field were adopted until the mid 1980s. Thereby, the European Court of Justice also 
played an important role. With its jurisdiction, the Court repeatedly advanced European environ-
mental measures and declared environmental protection to be an essential goal of the Community 
(see e.g. Case 240/83 on waste oils10).  
In 1987, environmental policies were put on a new legal basis. The changes of the European Sin-
gle Act in 1987 officially introduced an environmental competence for the Community. Also, for 
proposals concerning the single market, the decision rules were changed to qualified majority 
voting in the Council of Ministers. This complicated blocking of legislative proposals by small 
numbers of Member States and allowed for easier adoption of new policies (Hildebrand, 2005). 
?????????????????????????? ???????????? ???????????????????? also extended by introducing the 
cooperation procedure, which allowed the Parliament to influence legislative proposals from the 
Commission in a second reading (Art. 6-8). The next major step for EU environmental policies 
was the Treaty of Maastricht11, signed in 1992, which provided for an environmental policy of the 
Union, and also introduced the integration principle. This principle foresees that requirements to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
policies and activities??????????????????????????????? and therefore declares environmental pro-
tection to be a cross-sectional task. The Treaty of Amsterdam12 from 1999 further extended the 
decision making powers of the European Parliament by introducing the co-operation procedure 
                                                 
9
 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
measures to the environment (see Aubin and Varone, 2002). 
10
 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:61983CJ0240. Last access 3.8.2014. 
11
 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/treaties_maastricht_en.htm. Last access 3.8.2014. 
12
 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/institutional_affairs/treaties/amsterdam_treaty/index_en.htm. Last access 3.8.2014. 
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for environmental legislation and the integration principle. This principle requires the considera-
tion of environmental protection to be integrated in all EU proposals and implementation activi-
ties (Wolf and Stanley, 2010; Jordan and Fairbrass, 2005). This amendment of the Treaty also 
constitutes the legal basis for the decision on the MSFD, as the latest amendment, the Treaty of 
Lisbon13, only came into force after the adoption of the MSFD in 2008. 
 
1.1.1 The sources of environmental legislation in the Treaty on the Functioning of the Europe-
an Union 
 
Lenschow ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n-
????????????????????????????????????????? the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
builds the framework within which European policies are developed, this paragraph briefly and 
succinctly summarizes the paragraphs on which environmental policy is currently based.  
??????????????????????current environmental policy is determined by the legal requirements of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)14, which authorizes the Union in gen-
eral to develop and adopt secondary environmental law. ?????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
European Union. This is taken up again in Art. 114 (3), which stresses that the high level of pro-
tection should take into account ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???Art. 191 
TFEU allows the EU to take action in the field and further states that the environmental policies 
of the Union ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????preserving, protect-
ing and improving the quality of the environment, protecting human health, prudent and rational 
utilization of natural resources, promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or 
?????????? ?????????????? ?????????? ???? ??? ??????????? ?????????? ???????? ???????. The Treaty 
further characterizes the principles the EU environmental policy should be based on: the precau-
tionary principle, the principle of rectification at source and the polluter pays principle (TFEU 
Art. 191 (2)). While the Union shall aim at high levels of protection overall, the Treaty explicitly 
mentions that the diversity of regions should be taken into account (TFEU Art. 191 (2)) ? a highly 
relevant point for marine environmental protection as addressed in the MSFD. Art. 192 describes 
the legal basis and the decision-making process of the legislative procedure. Art. 193 states that 
Member States are allowed to adopt more stringent protective measures at the national level as 
long as they are compatible with the Treaties.  
 
                                                 
13
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:TOC. Last access 3.8.2014. 
14
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT. Last access 3.8.2014. 
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1.1.2 The distribution of competencies in the EU?? environmental policy 
 
When European environmental legislation is based on Article 191, then Article 2 (2) TFEU ap-
?????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????Union 
and the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts in that area. The Member 
States shall exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised its compe-
tence. The Member States shall again exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????This implies that the European Union and the 
Member States can in principle both legislate legally binding acts to protect the environment. 
However, Member States are restricted in taking action if the Union has already exercised its 
competence in a particular case (Frank, 2007; Wolf and Stanley, 2010). The two cases in which 
the Union has the exclusive competence are the Common Fisheries Policy (see Art. 38 TFEU) and 
the conservation of marine biological resources (Art. 3 (d) TFEU). Here, the Member States trans-
ferred their competences to adopt measures to the supranational level almost completely.  
Furthermore, the ?????ability to act is subject to the principle of subsidiarity, which specifies that 
????????shall act only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level????????? 
par.3 TFEU). The principle of subsidiarity plays an important role in environmental legislation, as 
measures addressing ecosystems often have transboundary effects and therefore require coordina-
tion between at least two, often more, Member States. In case of the marine environment, this 
becomes particularly evident. The coastlines of the European seas all border more than one Mem-
ber State. The subject itself and all species living in it are highly fluctuate in nature. If one Mem-
ber State takes action in his Exclusive Economic Zone, transboundary effects are almost inevita-
ble. In turn, this means that only if all Member States sharing borders act in concert, policy 
changes can become effective. The ????????????????????The marine environment does not ac-
cord with existing geo-political boundaries. It is by essence transboundary and therefore re-
quires co-operation and common principles. In these conditions, applying a purely national 
approach to the marine environment is doomed to fail? (COM(2005) 505 final: 6). This justi-
fies supranational action in the marine field while respecting the principle of subsidiarity. 
However, the principle of subsidiarity is also often used by the Member States in order to avoid or 
mitigate undesired policies. Accordingly, subsidiarity is used to expand national discretion in the 
implementation of EU policies as a condition for agreeing on new policies (see also Kallis and 
Nijkamp, 1999). As reported on the ground, with regards to the MSFD, Member States argued 
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that the national level would be better suited than the European level to address specific problems 
in order to prevent these partly unwanted policy projects.  
Directives are the legal instruments primarily used in environmental policy. Directives ????????d-
???????? ??? ??????????? ??????????????? (Art. 288 TFEU), however, the choice of form and method 
how this result is to be achieved is left to the national authorities of the Member States (ibid.). 
This means that the Member States are left with a certain leeway in implementing Directives. 
They have to be transposed into national law, and usually set a timeframe for achieving a specific 
goal, but allow for sometimes considerable freedom in choosing the specific means.  
An important source for legislation in the field of environmental policies are Environmental Ac-
tion Programmes (EAP). They are adopted by the Council of Ministers, specify guiding principles 
and set strategies for the upcoming period of time ??????????????????????????????????????????????i-
ronmental policy. They are not legally binding, but ?????????????????????????????????????????????
contemporary environmental thinking and problem perception, as well as strategic policy orienta-
?????? ??????????: 18). Their development reflects the changing perception of environmental is-
sues in the EU. While the first EAP focused on the protection of single media, such as soil and 
water, the following EAPs gradually incorporated more comprehensive approaches to environ-
mental protection (ibid.). EAPs are decisions sui generis, which are used by the EP and the Coun-
???? ??? ?????? ??? ?????? ????????????????? ??????????????????????????? ????????????????? ?????????
can become legally binding for the European institutions (Art. 175 (3) EC). The MSFD also re-
sulted from an EAP. The 6th Programme summarizes the decline of the marine environment and 
its main threats and calls for ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-diversity 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n-
??????????????????????15).  This marked the first official step towards a common European 
marine environmental policy. 
 
1.2 The EU??????????????? 
 
The MSFD is strongly influenced by the developments of the European water policy, which is 
why an overview of its genesis will be provided here. Not very flattering, the field has a reputa-
tion of being one of the most expensive, most ambitious and worst implemented of the EU poli-
cies (Jordan, 1999) ? but at the same time also obtained positive effects in the Member States by 
raising public awareness for water pollution and initiating important changes in the national regu-
lations, institutions and administrations (see Aubin and Varone, 2002). Although initially mainly 
                                                 
15
 The EAP can be found under http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52001DC0031:EN:HTML.  
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concerned with fresh water policy, the main challenges, conflicts and interests in the field also 
influenced and characterized the EU marine policy.   
To be precise, European water policy should actually be called water environmental policy ? not 
only is water the sector covered most by environmental regulations (Kallis, Butler, 2001), but also 
???????????????????????????????????tors of environmental concern to which the European Commu-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????. The ????????????????????????????????????????
until the early 1970s. At that time, the EU did not officially have a mandate for environmental 
policy. However, at the Member State level, the increasing industrial growth, accompanied by 
increasing levels of air and water pollution led to a call for supranational agreements16 (see Has-
san, 1995, and Aubin and Varone, 2002). Despite the lacking formal mandate, this consensus al-
lowed the Commission to promote a new policy area and, because of its right to initiative, to con-
cretize it legally17???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????were 
adopted (see also Kallis and Butler, 2001). The reasons for this success can be found in the fact 
that water policy developed mostly unnoticed by the other Directorate Generals - environmental 
policy was not considered to be an important field, and the influence of water policy especially 
was thought to be almost non-existent. Accordingly, there was little opposition to many regulative 
projects (see Hassan, 1995). In addition, EU water policy found strong proponents in environmen-
tal movements at the national level, which gave imp?????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Although the Member States were generally in favor of joint action in the water sector, they had 
different ideas about the specific measures. This was mainly due to the significantly varying con-
ditions the Member States faced concerning their waters and their administrative structures at the 
time18. For example, the levels of contamination of rivers and drinking water varied greatly 
among ??????????? ????????waters. Also, the status of the national water laws differed vastly: 
whereas in countries including the UK and France, waters were mainly perceived as economic 
factors, in other countries, such as the Netherlands and Germany, waters were considered to be 
habitats worth protecting. This was reflected in national laws as well. The former Member States 
favored the immission principle, with qualitative goals. These refer to the state of the waters, and 
thus allow flexible measures in environmental protection. For the UK, this principle was much in 
line with ?????? ??????? ?????????????? ?????? ???????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ????? ?????? ??????????
????? ??? ????? ?????????? ??? ???? ????? ????????????? ????????? ??? ?????????????? ???????? ?????????????
1999: 5). The latter countries, in contrast, favored the emission principle, which focuses on the 
                                                 
16
 This led to the emergence of a number of international agreements, such as the Convention or Ramsar for the preservation 
of wetland from 1972 or the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine in 1950. 
17
 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????mental rules to avoid market 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
18
 Apart from the examples mentioned here, other lines of conflict have been identified, such as the North- South divide 
between Member States with strong and weak administrative structures or between rural and more urban States. See Ward et 
al., 1997, for further discussion. 
 10 
 
discharges and their sources instead of the medium in which they are introduced in. Accordingly, 
these countries were interested in promoting technologies which prevented pollution at the origin. 
For water law, this resulted in favoring exact standards, and only limited flexibility. These oppos-
ing concepts could still be found during the interviews conducted about the MSFD. 
Yet, these dissents did not stop the EU water law from its rapid development. However, the fun-
damentally different views on the subject often resulted in regulations with only weak provisions, 
which left considerable discretion to the Member States in implementing the legislation ? which 
they, to varying degrees, exploited to their advantage (Kallis and Nijkamp, 1999). In any case, 
implementation was largely deficient (see Hassan, 1995; Kallis and Butler, 2001). In the UK, for 
example, despite a general consent to a common water policy, the need to actually enforce EC 
legislation was perceived to be low ?????????????????belief that ???????????special geography ren-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. In Germany, as another ex-
ample, further development and implementation of EU water law had for a long time been largely 
neglected, because the national standards had been perceived as progressive and strict enough 
anyway (see Kallis and Nijkamp, 1999).  
A new impetus for environmental policy was imparted in the late 1980s with the European Single 
Act, when competencies in the field of environmental policy were officially assigned to the su-
pranational level. At the same time, the Brundtland-report stimulated public debates about the 
dealing with natural resources, green parties emerged and the support for environmental NGOs 
increased (see Aubin and Varone, 2002). The Zeitgeist seemed right for ???????????????????????i-
ronmental policy. In the 4th Environmental Action Programme from 1987, a stronger focus on 
preventive measures had been demanded, just as well as the integration of environmental criteria 
in other policy fields. Also, the Commission realized that the effects of the existing measures had 
been poor due to deficient or lacking implementation. It therefore announced stricter controls (see 
Hassan, 1995).  
By the end of the 1980s, a ministerial meeting on the future of EU water law was held at which it 
???? ???????? ??? ????????? ???? ????? ?????? ??????? ????? ????????? ???????? (see Kallis and Butler, 
2001). A number of Directives followed, such as the Directive on Urban Wastewater (91/27/EEC) 
and the Nitrates Directive (91/676/EEC). The implementation of these Directives was mixed, and 
so was the perception of the effectiveness of water policy in general, as the state of the environ-
ment kept deteriorating despite the measures taken (Aubin and Varone, 2002). The situation 
worsened as the Member States increasingly complained about the financial burden that accom-
panied the growing body of water policies and the enhanced pressure from the European Court of 
Justice for more compliance with water Directives (see Jordan, 1999). At the same time, there 
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were growing calls for more decentralization, deregulation and subsidiarity19, which were reflect-
ed in the Treaty of Maastricht (Art. 3b) as a prime objective (see Kallis and Nijkamp, 1999). This 
climate resulted in the revision and re-assessment of some of the existing water legislation, which 
again led to mixed results20. The planned Directive for the Ecological Quality of Water provided 
impetus for a broader revision of the water sector. At first leading to more questions instead of 
answering them, it then ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
centered mainly on the lacking integrated management at river basin level and on the question of 
the standing of the Directive in relation to the existing legislation (Kallis and Nijkamp, 1999). In 
response, the Commission started an open consultation process on the future framing of its water 
policy, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? the 
Water Framework Directive. 
Overall, the impact of the EU water policy on ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
considered significant despite its turbulent development?????????????????????????????????????????
water directives, in particular, have had a paramount importance in shaping European approaches 
and investm?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and Butler, 2001: 127). Despite the fact that the effects on water quality are evaluated differently 
depending on the individual regulation, the overall effects on public awareness, the changes in the 
?????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
European objectives gained in the Member States underline ???? ???????????????? ???????????????
policy (see Kallis and Butler, 2001, Hassan, 1995). 
 
1.2.1 The Water Framework Directive  
 
The WFD was supposed to achieve the seemingly impossible task to include such different claims 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ??????????????????? ??????????? ???????????????????? ??????????? ????????? ????????????????
(Kallis and Butler, 2001: 129). These contradictions were resolved by introducing a novel ap-
proach which defines the role of the EU in a new way: while at EU level, common processes, 
organizational structures and objectives are defined, their implementation is left to the Member 
State level. This allowed to promote environmental protection while taking subsidiarity into ac-
count ?????????????????????????????????????at a European level ? standards/measures at a national 
                                                 
19
 The UK and France were particularly prominent proponents of this argument as they especially suffered under the high 
implementation costs of the drinking, waste water and bathing Directives (see Kallis and Butler, 2001). 
20
 ??????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????????????????????? ????????????????p-
parently led to higher, instead of lower implementation costs and the revised parameters were highly disputed (Kallis and 
Nijkamp, 1999). 
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[level]? (Kallis and Nijkamp, 1999: 14). This division marks a major step in the development of 
?????????????????????. ???? ???? superordinate goal is twofold: first, to include all water man-
agement requirements into one system, and second, to achieve good ecological status of all Euro-
pean waters (freshwater, coastal water bodies and groundwater) by 2015. Developing this frame-
work took 12 years, and in 2000, the Water Framework Directive was adopted. In total, seven of 
the existing Directives in the water sectors were replaced with the WFD.21 
The WFD introduced a new concept for the regulation of ecosystems. It focuses on natural geo-
graphical and hydrological units for the management of the EU waters and therewith turns away 
from the previous management concept characterized by nationally defined administrative bound-
aries. This means that Member States along the same river basin should cooperate in implement-
ing the Directive. The implementation process consists of several steps, including setting up a 
typology of the waters, a monitoring program, as well as planning and implementing a program of 
measures to achieve good ecological status (Irmer et al., 2010).  
Despite the new elements the WFD introduced, feedback on the Directive was divided. While the 
Directive represented an innovative framing of the responsibilities of the Commission and the 
Member States and achieved to redefine water policy in a heated political climate, the prospects 
for the environment were not entirely ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Member States to take the necessary action?????????????????????, 1999: 21). And, probably be-
cause of the comprehensive efforts needed to implement the Directive, the authors conclude that 
???????????????? ????????????????????????????ibid.).  
As reported ??? ???????????? ???????????????? ?????????? ??????????????? ??????????? ???????????
States were underestimated by most national representatives during the policy-making phase. The 
????????????common implementation strategy (CIS) foresees detailed procedures for characterizing 
the waters and identifying pressures. Coordination between different levels, mostly EU and Mem-
ber State institutions, at EU level via the bi-annual meetings of the water directors, as well as at 
Member State level has to be organized, attended and managed. Moreover, the interwoven struc-
ture partly limits the discretion that Member States often have in implementing environmental 
legislation. These costs and time consuming procedures of the WFD retrospectively reduce the 
satisfaction with the new approach. These experiences also impacted the MSFD: interviewees 
from Member State institutions and ministries almost unisono agreed that the experiences with the 
implementation of the WFD substantially limited the willingness to negotiate the MSF???????m-
                                                 
21
 They include the surface water directive, the directives on measurement methods and sampling frequencies and exchanges 
of information on fresh water quality, the fish water, shellfish water, and groundwater directives; and the directive on dan-
gerous substances discharges. See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-framework/info/intro_en.htm, last accessed 
November 8th, 2012. 
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ing in an open-ended and unbiased way. The general tenor was that structures similar to the 
???????????????????????for the marine environment and had to be prevented.    
 
1.2.2 The Marine Strategy Framework Directive 
 
Both with regard to the timeline as well as regarding its structure, the Water Framework Directive 
can be seen as the direct predecessor of the MSFD; one could call he WFD a policy window for a 
new approach in ?????????????????????????????????????ce of the MSFD in decisive ways: First of 
all, the WFD introduced an ecosystem approach for the EU rivers. Not individual Member States 
were to develop individual policies, but rivers had to be considered in their entirety. This requires 
close coordination. This, secondly, includes that instead of individual contaminants, the WFD 
addresses all factors influencing an ecosystem. These two principles are paramount for the WFD 
and are also main characteristics of the MSFD. In both regards, the MSFD seems like a logical 
extension of the WFD to the marine environment. Also, the main objective of the MSFD resem-
bles the intended good ecological status from the WF????????????????????????????? ?????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????? 
policy procedures in the implementation phase follow similar lines. Enforcing the MSFD also 
requires a multistage process, including an assessment of the status quo of the marine waters and 
developing action plans and programs of measure on a regional fit (see MSFD Arts. 5 and 6). 
However, the WFD did not only facilitate the development of a EU marine environmental policy, 
but also constituted a limiting factor for the shaping of the MSFD, as will be described below. 
Three key factors characterize the genesis of the MSFD. First of all, the Commission acknowl-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
????????????? ?????????????? ??????? ?????urgent action is required because of the deteriorating 
state of the marine environment (ibid., par. 2). The growing knowledge on the interactions of the 
marine environment and climate, on the consequences of human action on marine life and not 
least on the effects on economic growth increase pressure to take action (see Frank, 2007). The 
MSFD can be understood as the EU?? response to this pressure. In order to stop the pollution of 
the seas and its diverse harmful effects, a legislation with strict requirements, tight deadlines and 
rigorous monitoring of the implementation would be required.  
However, and this is the second factor, a major obstacle for developing such clear legislation is 
the piecemeal regulatory framework in the marine area at EU level (see Long, 2011, see also 
COM(2002)539 final). Competencies in the field are distributed among different Directorate Gen-
erals of the Commission in which different logics, objectives and legislative frameworks coexist. 
Moreover, agreements to protect the marine environment also exist at national and international 
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levels, equipped with different competencies22. At a functional level, this patchwork hinders the 
development of a comprehensive approach. In order to develop a comprehensive marine environ-
mental policy, these competencies would have to be consolidated and streamlined towards a 
common goal in order to give the new policy a strong mandate.  
A third major influencing factor for the MSFD can be subsumed under the term prior policy expe-
riences: this describes the known conflicts in the water policy field between different Member 
States and their different regulatory styles, the calls for deregulation and subsidiarity, and the dis-
suasive effects of the WFD regarding the financial as well as institutional costs comprehensive 
regulations require (see Jordan, 1999; Kallis and Nijkamp, 1999). These experiences would result 
in calls for a regulation with limited scope and costs as well as considerable discretion in its im-
plementation. This illustrates the complicated starting situation of the MSFD. 
Considering the requirements the Directive was supposed to meet, it is not surprising that the pol-
icy process leading to the adoption of the MSFD took six years. The resulting Directive shows 
traces of all three factors. The main ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
oceans and seas and ensure that human activities are carried out in a sustainable manner so that 
current and future generations enjoy and benefit from biologically diverse and dynamic oceans 
and seas that are safe, clean, healthy and pro???????????????????????????????????????????????m-
munication, (COM(2005)504 final: 4). According to the Di?????????????????????????by 2020 at the 
latest good environmental status of the marine environment shall be achieved (MSFD Art. 1). It 
should be noted that the Dir????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? the Directive itself does not prescribe 
any concrete measures for the Member State levels. The MSFD establishes marine regions as 
???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
developed by the Member States within one region, whereas at the supranational level, only 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ?????? ?????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????6).  
 
1.2.2.1 The policy context at EU level 
 
The ??????????????context at EU level is rather confusing. Whereas for the longest period of 
time, the EU had no policy specifically dealing with marine matters, recently, two different poli-
cies, the MSFD and the Integrated Maritime Policy, are being promoted. Thematically as well as 
                                                 
22
 These agreements include the London Dumping Convention, the OSPAR Convention, the Helsinki Convention and others. 
See Frank, 2007 for a detailed overview. 
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terminology-wise, both show overlaps. These become clearer when taking a closer look at the 
context in which they were developed.  
Somewhat delayed in time compared to the development of the Marine Strategy Framework Di-
rective in 2002, the European Union started taking action for promoting the so-called Integrated 
Maritime Policy in 2005 (COM(2005) 12 fin.). The background of this policy was the insight that 
the maritime economy and other sea-based activities are important factors for achieving the goals 
of the Lisbon Strategy from 2000, which aims at developing the EU into the most dynamic eco-
nomic area in 2010. The envisaged maritime policy was intended to address all non-military uses 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-related policies 
in order to promote economic development and sustainability (Juda, 2007). A Green Paper fol-
lowed in 2006, dealing with different governance options and different topics related to the future 
policy. A White Paper was presented in 2007, based on the insights from the consultation process 
following the Green Book. 
Both the MSFD as well as the IMP claim to pursue comprehensive approaches to regulate marine 
matters. The IMP has a more distinct focus on job creation and economic development than the 
MSFD; however, it also contains the notion that all actions are to be taken in a sustainable way 
(Juda, 2007). The different emphases of the IMP and the MSFD become evident with regard to 
the Directorate Generals in which the policies were developed. The initiative for the IMP stems 
from the Directorate General for Maritime Affairs, whereas the MSFD was developed in the Di-
rectorate General for the Environment. It seems as if the communication between the two Direc-
torate Generals had not been very lively: After realizing the thematic overlaps with the MSFD, it 
was decided to incorporate the MSFD under the umbrella of the IMP ? the MSFD was officially 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
IMP, it was subsumed into the broader framework; or, ????????????????????????????????, subordi-
nated. The rather paradox result is that the environmental pillar of the IMP is an adopted Di-
rective and therefore subject to implementation and according proceedings in the case of non-
compliance, whereas the IMP is, at least up to now, a declaration of intent with yet no legal force.  
 
The internal relation between the two responsible Directorate Generals cannot be evaluated con-
clusively. While one interviewee from DG MARE claimed that the advocates of the MSFD were 
little ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????e-
gial atmosphere among the different DGs. Most likely, varying from individual to individual, the-
se relations are more or less cooperative and do not permit any final statements. The fact remains 
that there are now two approaches with similar content but with different foci. 
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1.2.2.2 The institutional context at EU level 
 
One reason for the complex coexistence of different policies related to the marine environment is 
that they are developed and managed within different Directorate Generals (see Long, 2001). The 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????amples, but in total, there 
are about 17 DGs involved in marine affairs. They include diverse services such as DG Research, 
DG Mobility and Transport, or DG Justice, Freedom and Security (see Cavalieri et al., 2011: 18). 
In some fields, the competences are shared, in others exclusive; and obviously each DG follows 
different policy goals and uses different means to implement them. Developing and successfully 
promoting comprehensive approaches, which aim at overcoming institutional boundaries, would 
require adjusting the logics of the different departments of the Commission.  
On paper, the coordination between the different DGs is given high priority. The principle of col-
legiality23 inter alia foresees that any new legislation developed in a DG is presented to all other 
DGs before its adoption, which is supposed to ensure that no major concerns at this level prevail. 
However, as reported in several interviews, some DGs are considered to be more equal than oth-
ers. DG Environment, for example, is a rather small department. Their work is considered to be 
well-researched and valued for its quality. However, when it comes to assessing the importance of 
conflicting policy goals, the voice of DG Environment often has to compete with such focusing 
for example on economic development. In such cases, often, not the better argument has the upper 
hand, but the economically relevant one. For the MSFD, this means that the need for coordination 
with other DGs is high because it is in competition with other goals.  
 
1.3 Research rationale 
 
So far, EU ocean policies did not play a prominent role in the political science field. Whereas the 
Common Fisheries Policy has gained considerable attention, the policies related to marine protec-
tion had mainly been dealt with peripherally, e.g. through the Habitats- Directive (such as Lee, 
2002)24. Now, the EU promotes a specific marine environmental policy, and it can be understood 
as one of the major innovations in environmental policies concerning its content as well as its 
policy approach. Analyzing this policy can contribute to comprehend the present state of EU envi-
ronmental politics and the dynamics of the integration process in the field. 
 
                                                 
23
 See Governance Statement of the European Commission 2007, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/synthesis/doc/governance_statement_en.pdf. Last access 20.7.2014. 
24
 A few exceptions exist, such as Underdal, 1980. From a legal perspective, the policy framework and the legal provisions 
are comprehensively examined in Frank, 2007. 
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The study was motivated by the question how the European Union with 27 diverse Member States 
and the different conditions in their marine waters would meet the challenge of promoting one of 
its biggest regulatory projects, namely a common marine environmental policy. Experience from 
earlier policies in the field suggest that comprehensive regulatory policies were often either 
equipped with only low or imprecise standards, enabling the Member States to deviate from the 
intended regulatory goal, or with incomplete monitoring of the implementation efforts (see 
Lenschow, 2005). The new approach the EU is promoting with the MSFD could be groundbreak-
ing for future regulations in the field. Towards the goal of understanding the MSFD and its chanc-
es of a better fit of the policy, for an integrated governance of the sector and better implementa-
tion, it is argued in this thesis that a look in the past explains the present framing of marine envi-
ronmental policy.   
Regional measures are a remarkable feature of the new European approach. They address a new 
level, which so far had not been addressed in marine policies. A second important motivation of 
this study was to analyze the nature of these measures and to examine their effects on the existing 
institutional interplay in the EU. This includes understanding the reasons behind their introduction 
? whether they are introduced for functional or matter-related (in this case: ecological) reasons. 
This is an urgent topic in light of the growing number of Member States and thus growing diversi-
ty of social and natural conditions and the accompanying increasing difficulties to reach consen-
sus on new policy frameworks. Will new decision-making levels, such as regions, gain momen-
tum in the EU? What are the reasons for their consolidation? These questions challenge our un-
derstanding of European integration. Analyzing them can provide guidance on the future devel-
opment of European policies and indicate whether common European goals will prospectively be 
given up in favor of regionally defined objectives. This also refers to the discourse on whether it is 
possible and sensible to promote common EU policies in an enlarged Europe, or whether the 
claim "United in diversity"25 has worn out, because there is no unity anymore, only diverse ap-
proaches.  
Strengthening regional measures also reflects the call for more subsidiarity in EU policies. In case 
of the MSFD, subsidiarity is used ambivalently: on the one hand, it is used as an argument to jus-
tify Community action in the field of the marine environment. ????????????????????????????[t]he 
marine environment does not accord with existing geo-political boundaries. It is by essence 
transboundary and therefore requires cooperation and common approaches among Member 
States and third countries bordering European seas and oceans. In these conditions, a purely 
national ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? par. 4). On 
the other hand, the Commission acknowledges the fact that common measures would not do jus-
                                                 
25
 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-eu/basic-information/symbols/motto/index_en.htm. 
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???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????detailed objectives and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (ibid.) Therefore, in 
the (then proposed) MSFD, ?implementation would be decentralised to the level of marine 
ecosystems to take into account their specificities and particular contexts to tailor action to 
regional needs?????????? This means that while the Commission first argues in favor of a common 
EU approach, it (in the same paragraph) contradicts this claim by highlighting the differing re-
gional conditions. It was assumed that this tension would also be reflected in the policy process of 
the MSFD. A third motivation therefore was to understand the coordinative procedures between 
the supranational and the national levels, which should result in agreement on common goals, but 
different regional standards. It was assumed that establishing an EU wide comprehensive new 
??????? ?????? ?????????? ?????????? ??????????? ???? ???? ???????????? ???????? ?????? ???????? ??????
cooperation between Member States and Commission in order to achieve a common understand-
ing. As worldwide, such approaches are emerging, a further question was how the political sys-
tems influences, favors or hampers the development of such policies. 
  
1.4 Objectives of the research 
 
The objective of the research was to achieve a comprehensive case study in the field of EU envi-
ronmental politics in order to better understand the structures and dynamics leading to the adop-
tion of the MSFD. More specifically, the intention was  
? to analyze how the EU frames one of its most encompassing policies and which measures 
the Union introduces in order to implement it;  
? to analyze which mechanisms the Union uses in order to achieve common European goals 
while also taking into account the different conditions of the Member States is an im-
portant goal of this research, which is  
? directly related to the broader question in which direction the EU as a whole will develop: 
will Member States become less important and increasingly transfer powers to the supra-
national level?  
? to examine how such encompassing approaches affect the existing institutional interplay 
at European level.  
? to get an idea of how environmental policies will be addressed and framed in the future. 
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1.5 Methodology  
 
As the MSFD is a recent Directive and the implementation process is not very advanced yet, 
lengthy theoretical discussions did not seem expedient, as they would have to make a lot of as-
sumptions concerning future developments. The emphasis of this thesis therefore clearly lies on 
an empirical analysis. However, each part of the research is theory-driven.  
The data for this thesis were obtained through comprehensive literature and documents review, 
which include scientific papers and analyses. In order to gain a general understanding on the 
background of the MSFD, in addition to texts on general EU environmental policies, the literature 
review focused on the development of the EU water policies, and here especially on the Water 
Framework Directive and according scientific debates.  
As to understand the specific circumstances and developments related to the MSFD, the docu-
????????????? consisted of the analysis of primary sources, mainly from the EU, such as minutes 
of debates, legal texts and communications26. In order to differentiate the two precisely, a major 
part of the research constituted of an encompassing analysis of the documents accompanying the 
policy process of the IMP and the MSFD. The respective documents are almost entirely accessible 
via the electronic documentary of the EU and allow reconstructing the different positions, reserva-
tions and amendments of each institution. Also, the consultation processes were tracked which 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? from NGOs and other interest- 
and lobby groups.  
Another major source were qualitative interviews with key actors from governments, NGOS and 
the EU, as well as participatory research through attending conferences and workshops at nation-
al, EU and subnational level through the course of three years. Based on the documents review, 
key issues were identified which either seemed irrational based on the available documentation 
and gave raise to questions, such as sudden changes from one Communication to the next, or 
which had been subject to ongoing debates. One example for such an issue is the question of 
which level should best be addressed in order to achieve effective marine environmental protec-
tion (see SRU, 2006). Based on the documented policy process, expert were identified, who were 
either authors of or members of organizations issuing papers, reports or comments on the MSFD; 
or who as staff member belonged to political bodies, such as ministries, the European Parliament, 
or the European Commission. By necessity, the research had to focus primarily on the policy 
making process, because the implementation process was still in its early stages. Therefore, inter-
viewees from relevant European institutions and NGOs which had been active and integrated in 
the policy making, regional bodies and regional sea conventions were selected. 
                                                 
26
 Accessible via http://eur-lex.europa.eu/homepage.html. 
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All of the conducted interviews were qualitative, and included open or partially structured ques-
tions and target specific knowledge from the interviewees gained in their professional context (see 
Meuser, Nagel, 2009). Only a small number of interviewees asked for the questions to be sent by 
mail beforehand, which then was done, but they were always supplemented by additional or more 
detailed questions during the conversation. The interviews mainly focused on experts from the 
UK, Scotland and Ireland, as well as from Germany and its different Länder, and the European 
level. It was assumed that due to their decentralized structure, the UK and Germany would consti-
tute especially interesting cases for the current research. 
The main goal of the interviews was to gain a deeper understanding of the motives and underlying 
interests of the interviewees in their functions as representatives of specific bodies. The interviews 
usually had a duration of 1-2 hours and often included further enquiries per email or via the 
phone. Accordingly, interviews with similar foci and individuals were also conducted in the US. 
If possible, the interviews were recorded; otherwise, memory minutes were taken. In total, 28 
expert interviews at European and national levels as well as with representatives from non-
governmental and scientific bodies were conducted. Furthermore, conferences, workshops, dis-
cussions and expert group meetings on the topic were attended in Brussels, Germany, the US, and 
the UK. 
In case of the analysis of the US NOP, an accordingly encompassing official documentation of the 
policy procedure was not available. The research therefore focused on reports and documents 
accompanying the process, and most of all on interviews and conversations with staff from differ-
ent units of NOAA and expert interviews with scholars and other relevant experts in the US from 
NGOs. Moreover, conferences, work meetings and sessions on marine policy were attended. 
The interviews greatly contributed to an in-depth understanding mainly of the genesis of the 
MSFD and of the major disputes during the policy making phase. The research significantly bene-
fitted from the most often very open and unadorned conversations, which added to identifying the 
key aspects of the directive and accordingly to framing the major problem areas addressed in this 
work.  
1.6 Limits 
 
European policy processes often develop over decades and frequently comprise protracted opin-
ion-forming and a lengthy ping pong between different supranational institutions. Reflecting on 
EU policies therefore often requires considerable power or perseverance. The only way to be able 
to conduct such studies is to limit the subject matter and to reduce its complexity. Accordingly, 
only certain aspects can be addressed within the framework of a dissertation. In case of the 
MSFD, the undertaking was further complicated by the complex subject, including interactions 
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and influences of various sea- and land based sources. Necessarily, a dissertation project in the 
field has to focus on key aspects and neglect others. In the current case, the limits comprise four 
major points: 
 
1) Limiting the number: analyzing key developments instead of 28 individual cases. 
2) Limiting the scope: Focus on empiric research 
3) Limiting the methods: qualitative instead of quantitative. 
4) Limiting the level of discussion: focus on the subject matter instead of hypothesis-driven 
discussions. 
 
First of all, in order to do an encompassing analysis of the development of a EU Directive, the 
positions and preferences of all the Member States would have to be examined. This would in-
clude an analysis of the existing laws, identifying the important actors in the field and their politi-
cal agenda, analyzing strong lobby groups and NGOs working on the topic and their possible 
ways of influencing policy outcomes. In short, it would exceed the scope of a thesis. As a rather 
early publication on the MSFD, the present study mainly focuses on the processes, positions and 
preferences at the EU level. This proceeding assures a precise analysis of the policy procedures at 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
interests and preferences in future publications in the field. Subsequently, what lies beyond the 
scope of the current research is a thorough examination of the MSFD in relation to other policies, 
conventions and international treaties. At EU level, a number of policies are closely related to the 
MSFD. The CFP certainly is the most obvious example, but also the Common Agricultural Policy 
and the Flora Fauna Habitat Directive are directly linked to the MSFD. As marine policies are 
transboundary by nature, in addition to regional conventions and related policies at EU level, in-
ternational laws also apply, such as the London Convention and UNCLOS. The direct or indirect 
effects the MSFD can have on these legal acts and vice versa will be of high relevance for the 
success of the Directive and for the development of marine environmental protection in general. 
However, first of all, in order to be able to analyze these effects, the structure and content of the 
MSFD have to be understood; and second, examining the interrelations between the various poli-
cies and treaties would be a scientific work in its own. Furthermore, many influences and effects 
will only become obvious once the MSFD is in a later stage of its implementation. For this reason, 
this point is not part of the thesis. 
   
Second, an encompassing discussion of theoretical concepts in the field of EU environmental pol-
icies with regard to the MSFD was deferred in favor of a thorough analysis of the content of the 
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Directive, its localization in the EU policy environment and its effects on the existing institutional 
order at EU level. The main reason for this decision was the fact that publications on the MSFD 
and its new approaches were scarce when the dissertation project started. Therefore, it seemed 
advisable to emphasize the development of the MSFD and to analyze its content, which has to be 
considered as a prerequisite for any further theoretical discussions. In each paper, to varying de-
grees, connections between the empirical results and theory are made. However, the classical 
structure of a lengthy theoretical discussion followed by a rather brief reference to empirical find-
ings in order to substantiate the theoretical argument was deferred in favor of a more thorough 
analysis of the matter itself, the MSFD. 
 
Third, quantitative analyses were not part of the research. The primary reason is that the focus of 
the dissertation lay on understanding and analyzing the development and the framing of the 
MSFD instead of examining e.g. its perception in the public or collecting data on attitudes to-
wards marine environmental protection. Therefore, an explorative design with qualitative expert 
interviews seemed more suitable. Neither did it seem advantageous to use standardized question-
naires in conducting the expert interviews.  
The aim was a differentiated assessment of the interview partners from their own perspectives and 
knowledge on various aspects of the MSFD, instead of testing the coherence of answers given in 
the expert interviews or establishing statistical correlations between different attitudes. Also from 
a methodological point of view, the decision to use a qualitative instead of quantitative design 
seemed appropriate. Because the scientific reception and discussion of the MSFD was limited, 
testing established hypotheses in the field did not seem to be a promising endeavor. Instead, de-
veloping new hypotheses was required. Therefore, an explorative research design was favored 
which would allow to adapt the research to new information gathered in the expert interviews and 
to generate hypotheses while conducting the research.  
 
Lastly, beyond the limits of the research were the details of the discussion on sustainability. More 
specifically, in this context this primarily means an evaluation of the eleven environmental de-
scriptors of the MSFD. According questions include whether the marine environment is suffi-
ciently described with the descriptors mentioned in the MSFD, whether the scientific basis is 
broad and sound enough to allow statements on the respective aspects of the marine environment 
in each marine region, and whether the explications to the descriptors are explicit enough to func-
tion as a reference point for good environmental status. Answering these questions would require 
extensive interdisciplinary research as well as reproducing specialist discussions and beliefs from 
multiple sources. However, the focus of the research was understanding the Directive as a piece of 
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European legislation, including the policy procedures and institutional hurdles, instead of primari-
ly contributing to the debate on sustainability. Therefore, the starting point of the analysis was the 
status quo, thus the legal text of the MSFD and the accompanying policy documents. A research 
design focusing on questions like ?What is the basis on which environmental policies should be 
oriented?? or ?which concept of sustainability underlies EU marine environmental policies?? 
would follow a normative approach and require a different procedure.  
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis  
 
The thesis contains three major parts. The main research objective of the first paper was to 
achieve an in-depth understanding of the MSFD, its structure and links to the IMP In several re-
gards, the MSFD introduces novelties to the prior approaches in EU environmental policies, 
which are examined and evaluated. This comprises the role of marine regions and regional 
measures. Second, the implementation process of the MSFD assigns considerable discretion to the 
Member States. They conduct encompassing analyses, define programs of measures and action 
plans and to define the good environmental status for their seas to be achieved in 2020. A third 
novel aspect addresses the envisaged cooperation with regional sea conventions. The context in 
which this Directive was developed is described, the relationship to other policies in the field is 
analyzed, and an overall evaluation follows.  
The second paper focuses on a specific concept introduced in ocean related policies of the EU. 
Not only in the MSFD, but also in the Common Fisheries Policy, regions play an increasingly 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ight of the complex varie-
ty of contexts in which it is used????????????????????????????????????????????????the aim is to 
clarify the different contexts in which the concept of regions is used, its different meanings and 
effects on existing institutional structures. Furthermore, the link between regional measures in the 
CFP and the MSFD and the multi-level governance approach is investigated in order to answer 
the question whether regional measures indicate a governance shift in EU ocean-related policies.  
 
The third part of the research aimed at thinking outside of the European box. While the first two 
papers focus on processes within the European system, the last article takes an international per-
spective and compares the MSFD to processes outside the EU, in this case, the US National 
Ocean Policy. Both polities follow the global trend of developing more comprehensive marine 
policies and aim at similar goals. They also face similar challenges, because responsibilities and 
competences are shared between a centralized level ? the EU supranational level or the US federal 
level- and decentralized levels ? the EU Member States or US states. However, due to different 
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governance approaches and structures, the specific interactions between the two levels share few 
similarities and the according policy procedures vary considerably. The last paper examines these 
policy procedures and draws conclusions on their effects on implementation. 
 
2. Theoretical framework  
 
Theorizing EU environmental policy created a number of popular ?????????????fs?????????????
almost mantra-like appearance in various publications in the field. These beliefs include that  
 
? regulatory measures rarely exceed the lowest common denominator. This is also called 
race to the bottom, and strongly influenced by an intergovernmentalist view (see e.g. 
Golub, 1996);  
? a ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
agenda setting to their favor and push other states to adopt their strict standards in order to 
mitigate competitive disadvantages (see e.g. Héritier, 1996); 
? the implementation depends on the institutional fit of the supranational and the Member 
????????????????????????????????????????????on, thus public administrations. The better the 
institutional fit, the more likely it is that policies will be implemented in time and as in-
tended (see e.g. Haverland, 2001). 
 
While these hypotheses do not necessarily correspond with empirical findings (in some cases only 
very rarely, see Lenschow, 2007), they are deeply rooted in scientific debates on environmental 
policy. Yet, such general statements on how environmental policy making works in the European 
Union should be treated with caution, as each policy has its own context and history. In addition, 
the regulatory style in the field changed considerably over time, which also limits the validity of 
the above theoretical explanations. Roughly three phases can be mentioned:  
 
? In the early days of the Community, harmonization of Member State standards was as-
pired. For environmental policy, this meant that mainly product-oriented regulations were 
adopted. This entailed considerable negotiation efforts at supranational level, as the deci-
sion-making problem was to be solved at Community level. Also, monitoring costs were 
high, as harmonization was only beneficial for all Member States if compliance was high. 
 25 
 
? A second important trend comprises so-called soft forms of governance, and include turn-
ing away from top-down approaches towards voluntary instruments, also called open 
method of coordination27. In this case, coordination efforts at the supranational level were 
limited, as no agreement on common measures had to be reached. Also, monitoring costs 
hardly applied ? the lack of concrete measures required little monitoring.  
? Lately, the MSFD being a good example, procedural measures are gaining ground. Instead 
of the product oriented focus, these regulations are distinctively process oriented ? the 
main aim is to set rules for the procedures of the policy process, instead of declaring a 
specifically defined goal to be achieved. Here, as only a framework is set at supranational 
level, the decision making problem is in large parts delegated to lower levels, which also 
limits the efforts at EU level. 
 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????fs????????????????????s-
pecially in case of the MSFD, their explanatory power is low so far. The Directive should, despite 
obvious shortcomings, not be considered an agreement on the lowest common denominator, as in 
some respects, the MSFD is quite far reaching28. Neither can a clear first mover be identified, 
driven by the endeavor to impose strict standards on other Member States, as similar legislation 
had not existed at the national level. Lastly, it is too early to draw conclusions about the institu-
tional fit and implementation of the MSFD; but again, since it is a novel instrument to all Member 
States, clear advantages for any one state are unlikely. This means that theorizing on the MSFD 
has to start more or less from scratch. In such cases, it is advisable to start with an analysis of the 
subject matter, thus, the Directive itself. This is why this thesis in large parts closely follows the 
text of the legislation, and contributes to, but does not aim at developing new comprehensive the-
ories.   
Historical Institutionalism constitutes the underlying argument of the first paper, revealing lines of 
developments and explains why policies are sometimes doomed to follow a given direction, even 
if circumstances change. Understanding the significance of prior developments is also crucial for 
analyzing the changing locus of governance (see van Hoof et al., 2012), the main topic of Multi- 
level governance scholars and subject of discussion in the second paper. The historic perspective 
also shaped the perspective in the last publication, which argues that procedural decisions contrib-
                                                 
27
 There is no common definition of open methods of coordination (OMC), but good approximations, such as this one: ?To 
achieve convergence [towards EU policy goals], the OMC is designed to help Member States to develop their own policies 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????e-
velopment and use of indicators and benchmarking; translation of goals, guidelines and timetables agreed at the European 
level into national and regional policies; periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review; and partnership/networking with 
Member State authoritie????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Ten Brink et al., 2005). 
28
 E.g. in its inclusion of underwater noise, which requires a lot of research and touches novel ground (which could admitted-
ly also be regarded as imprudent to include such a widely imponderable factor in the legislation). 
 
 26 
 
ute to the proper implementation of EU policies, but also especially focuses on the coordination 
procedures between the different policy levels. 
 
2.1 Path dependency and the Historical Institutionalism 
 
The focus of the first paper is the analysis of the development and the implementation of the 
MSFD and the according challenges the EU faced in the policy process. As the integrated ap-
proach the MSFD follows is new to EU ocean policies, otherwise common references to prior 
policy developments could not be given?? ???? ????? ???????? ???? ???????? ?Legal Implementation of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (The International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 26 (2011, 1-32) aims at giving an extensive approximation to 
a topic new in the EC context. The paper reproduces the history of the MSFD, related policies in 
the field, its structure and possible policy outcomes. Necessarily, the paper is largely based on 
primary sources and in wide parts closely oriented at the text of the MSFD and accompanying 
policy documents from the Commission. Instead of giving an interpretation of the Directive in 
light of theoretical approaches in EU environmental policies, the aim is to analyze the different 
parts of the MSFD, their implications for implementing the Directive and the tasks and duties of 
the actors involved.  
Besides taking a close look at the legal text of the MSFD, the paper emphasizes the influence of 
prior decisions on this Directive. By taking into account that existing institutions and previous 
policy decisions have direct and indirect impacts on the framing and the genesis of the MSFD, the 
analysis follows a Historical- Institutionalist perspective. Historical Institutionalism, developed in 
the 1980s, emphasizes that ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ??? ???????? ?????????? ?????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ???? ????????? ????
previously determined structures influence policy outcomes and assumes that institutions can in-
fluence or hamper each other in their modes of action. Instead of collecting as much data as possi-
ble, the main aim of Historical Institutionalism is to analyze the context of different events as pre-
cisely as possible (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). Compared to understanding processes as a straight 
and purposeful line of development, they are perceived as a sequence of events. To find out what 
happens between the single events and how they come about is a main focus of the concept.  
Historical Institutionalism ???????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
same results everywhere in favor of the view that the effect of such forces will be mediated by the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ylor, 1996: 9). 
This past-oriented perspective is considered to provide insights on specific present framing of 
policies, as decisions previously taken can have significant effects on the development and out-
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comes of current processes. Thereby, path dependency plays a major role in explaining subopti-
mal institutions: a decision once taken, such as the introduction of the QWERTY keyboard (see 
David 1985), sets a standard and puts a process in motion from which it would be more costly to 
deviate instead of complying with it, even if setting new standards would be more favorable. Ad-
vocates of path dependency used the approach to explain the stability of institutions over time by 
emphasizing the concept of increasing returns???????????????????????????????????????usly discarded 
???????????? ??????????? ????? ?????? ?????????? ??????????????? ??????? ????? ???? ????? ???????? ???????
2007: 37). Although with regards its age29, the path dependency concept is not an innovative ap-
proach, its sobriety and plausibility do not lose their appeal. Looking at the past can elucidate why 
certain policy goals could not be achieved despite a favorable policy environment, why subopti-
mal policies are not changed into more optimal ones, or why standards once set do not fall beyond 
a certain threshold although their outcomes are questionable. Newer Historical Institutionalists 
further developed and modified the concept, emphasizing the fact that institutions may (and in 
fact do) very well change (see Thelen, 2003). They introduced new concepts such as conversion 
(institutions change because they are to serve new purposes) or layering (incrementally, new rules 
are introduced to an existing institution, which add up to more fundamental change) as mecha-
nisms leading to institutional change (ibid.).  
In case of the EU water policy, both arguments ? stability and change - have their place. While for 
decades, the outcomes were considered to not be optimal, as water quality only partly improved, 
legislation continued to develop widely unchanged. Due to the weak regulations and lack of con-
sequences for deficient implementation, each Member State was able to follow its interest and 
benefitted from the incoherent policies. However, as ??????????????????????? ???????????? ?????????
institutions played in the de??????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? ??
?????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????This development only changed 
due to external circumstances as described in chapter 1.2 and 1.2.1 ? increased awareness in the 
Member States for environmental issues, the strengthened role of the European Parliament, and of 
course the pro-subsidiarity wave following the Maastricht Treaty. Subsequently, the European 
approach to water policy changed in several ways: at the institutional level, as previously separat-
ed Directorate Generals had to coordinate; concerning the content, as water basins were addressed 
with the WFD instead of singular matters; and concerning its implementation, as Member States 
now had to coordinate their implementation activities. The developments leading to the adoption 
??????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the EU led to the introduction of a whole new policy approach (see Kallis and Nijkamp, 1999). It 
marked a cut from the previous national implementation of water policies towards a more regional 
                                                 
29
 Rooting in economic history, the QWERTY ? typewriter example for a path dependent development shaped political scien-
?????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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and cooperative implementation. This paved the way for the further development of the sector, 
especially the MSFD. 
Pierson (1996) describes the cumulative nature of policy processes as path dependent in the way 
that prior decisions can limit or pave the way for future developments, and therewith influence the 
agenda-setting. At an institutional level, the observation that institutions can influence each other, 
strengthen their modes of action or hinder their effects (Pierson, 2000) is especially important for 
the analysis of the water policy: In chapter 1.2.1, the ambiguous links between the Water Frame-
work Directive and the MSFD are examined: on the one hand, the WFD can be seen as a window 
of opportunity for further encompassing policies with a regional focus, such as the MSFD, as the 
WFD promoted an approach more encompassing than any previous legislation. As the WFD 
comprises marine waters up to one nautical mile from shore, an extension of the approach to the 
marine environment seemed straightforward. 
However, despite this enabling momentum, the experiences of the WFD also limited the MSFD in 
an important respect. After the adoption of the WFD, the Member States became aware that the 
detailed provisions of the Directive resulted in costly and extensive coordination and implementa-
tion processes. In the preceding debates on the MSFD, there was general agreement among the 
Member States that while the cooperative approach of the WFD should be expanded on the ma-
rine environment, the implementation process should be much less specified. Comparing the two 
Directives, this is clearly reflected in the provisions on the implementation strategy which are a lot 
less detailed in case of the MSFD. What happened prior to the adoption of the MSFD had a major 
influence on its development: the WFD functioned as a window of opportunity and at the same 
time as a restricting factor for the MSFD. 
For further research on the MSFD and its relations to other relevant policies and existing agree-
ments ????????????????????????????????????????????????????significant. For example, how do the pro-
visions of the Common Fisheries Policy influence the goal of reaching good environmental sta-
tus? Can the goal of achieving good environmental status lead to adaption in the Common Agri-
cultural Policy? At an international level, could the turn to more encompassing marine environ-
mental policy approaches in many countries of the world lead to more international cooperation 
within different contractual frameworks? 
 
Path dependency and  a historical institutionalist perspective are not only elucidating for the spe-
cific path leading to the WFD and MSFD, but also at superior levels: while the Union is a project 
under construction, with rising numbers of Member States and often slow policy procedures, its 
basic principles are still changing steadily. Examples include the changes of the Treaties and of 
the voting rules. At the same time, however, some aspects of the European Union, such as the 
distribution of competencies between the different EU institutions in policies adopted under pri-
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mary law, remain unchanged. The adjustment to new developments can be hindered by these 
principles, and detours have to be sought if the objective is supposed to be maintained. The results 
can have inconsistent traits: in case of the MSFD, one innovative feature is the regional focus in 
regulating the European seas and the requirement for the Member States to cooperate on a region-
al basis in various ways. However, at an institutional level, regions play only a marginal role; 
competences in the policy making or implementation process cannot be transferred to regional 
levels of any kind whatsoever. Because these institutional features cannot be changed (despite the 
fact that the decision to frame them in a specific way was taken decades ago), regional bodies 
cannot be introduced in the course of a new policy - although today. their existence would be de-
sired and considered to be useful. Hence, the historical view on the EU institutions is also signifi-
cant for the second article, which deals with the regional elements of the MSFD. 
 
2.2 Regional measures in EU ocean policies and multi-level governance 
 
???? ?????????????? ?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Marine 
Pollution Bulletin 67 (2013, 66-74), analyzes the regional measures introduced in the EU Com-
mon Fisheries Policy and the MSFD. In both policies, regions play important roles. In the CFP, 
regional measures were only recently introduced, whereas in the MSFD, regions were an essential 
element since the very beginning. While the purpose and objectives of the two polic???? regional 
measures vary, it is interesting to note that to both one of the oldest and one of the newest EU 
ocean related policies, regional elements are introduced. This raises the question whether regions 
will play a more pronounced role in future EU policies; and if yes, what the effects of regional 
measures on the existing institutional framework of the EU are. Do regions become institutional-
ized entities within the CFP and the MSFD, what are the reasons for the introduction of regional 
measures in the two policies, and should the introduction of regional measures be considered to be 
a model for future EU policies? 
 
Each of these questions is linked to specific problems at different stages (such as the institutional, 
societal or policy level), and can be analyzed in context of different theoretical concepts, such as 
Theory of Institutions, of European integration, or discourse theory. As a starting point for all 
??????? ?????????? ???? ??????? ?????? ???????? on a comprehensive survey of the existing and 
planned regional measures of the two policies. The main objective of this paper is to provide 
guidance on the questions whether regional measures in the CFP and the MSFD aim at the same 
goals, and whether they indicate an emerging new level of policy making or policy implementa-
tion. This would in turn affect the existing distribution of competencies between the European 
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institutions. In order to approach these questions, the distribution of competencies in the two poli-
cies is reviewed, the purposes for introducing regional measures are analyzed, as well as the exact 
formulations concerning the tasks and responsibilities of regional entities.  
Although the analysis of the CFP and the MSFD accounts for the majority of the paper, links to 
theoretical discussions are also examined. From a political science perspective, the topic would 
deserve and require more detailed theoretical consideration. However, the journal in which the 
paper was published had a different, if not opposite perspective, and would have preferred to ex-
clude the theoretical references completely. Thus, in order to be able to leave them in the paper, 
they had to be brief. Therefore, the short paragraphs are rather a starting point for further analyses. 
There are different links for such analyses, as several scientific approaches address regions and 
different forms of regional actions. To list a few examples: 
 
? The concept ??? ?????????? is not unknown to theoretical discussions in the context of the 
EU. However, it is usually used in context of economic development. The so-????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
nation state. The reasons for its evolution and rising importance is explained by a number 
of diverse factors, including the increasing globalization of markets, a rising regional 
identity, and spatially, rather than nationally based production systems (see Keating et al., 
2003: 7).  
? A number of studies also exist on innovation activities across European regions (e.g. 
Cantwell, Iammarino, 2003), leading to increased regional awareness and structures.  
? Other scholars focus in their analysis on new modes of governance with a regional focus. 
????? ?????????? ???????????? ?????????? ?? ??????????? ?????? ????????? ???????????? ???????
sub-national levels to fulfill specific tasks on their behalf (see e.g. Frey, 2003).  
 
Regions in the context of the MSFD and the CFP, however, are based on an entirely different un-
derstanding. Instead of an economic perspective on regions, in ocean policies, they are oriented at 
transboundary ecosystem contexts, and foresee measures to be based on these spatial units. This 
framing of regional measures also calls for a new understanding of regional action, actors and 
underlying purposes, ???????????????????????common p??????????????????????.  
In case of the MSFD, the description of regional measures is not unambiguous, and leaves the 
Member States with considerable discretion regarding the scope of commitment to transboundary 
activities. This commitment to regional measures might be rather neutral, increased, or kept to a 
minimum. As the Directive provides a framework for conducting regional measures, regional 
cooperation might intensify during the implementation process, but Member States could just as 
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well prefer to follow a more national approach, and avoid common regional measures whenever 
possible. In turn, this means that the development of regional measures should be closely fol-
lowed, and that the topic promises to remain interesting for future research.  
The pronounced role of regions in the CFP and the MSFD could lead to the assumption that re-
gions are about to overtake important tasks in interest communication and promotion and that 
regional levels will perform certain functions in the policy process. For political theory, this 
would be a strong indication for an emerging multi-level governance system.  
The multi-level governance (MLG) approach is considered to be ????????? ????????????????????
themes of research in political science ? ???????? et al 2010) and the root of numerous scientific 
debates (see Piattoni 2009; Wälti 2010). Developed in the 1990s, it addresses new forms of gov-
ernance at subnational and regional levels. The roots of the approach lie in the study of structural 
policy in the EU, where ???????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
nested governments at several territorial tiers ? supranational, national, regional and local - as the 
result of a broad process of institutional creation and decisional reallocation that has pulled some 
previously centralised functions of the state up to the supranational level and some down to the 
local/regional level??????????????: 392). This change towards a stronger involvement of regional 
interests in the EU policy process is supposed to constitute the conversion towards a multi-level 
governance system. ????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????nal 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Therewith, 
MLG turns against the supranationalist view (Stone Sweet, Sandelholtz 1997) that EU integration 
is driven by international institutions as well as the intergovernmentalist view (see Scharpf 2000; 
Moravcsik 1998), which perceives states as main promoters for further integration. Instead of only 
the national and the supranational level sharing political powers and competences, also regional 
actors are supposed to be actively involved in the process. As a consequence, this would lead to a 
new, non-hierarchical distribution of power relations (Peters, Pierre 2001; Bache, Flinders 2005) ? 
with, in case of the EU, the Member States and the Commission as the main disadvantaged par-
ties. Some scholars even predict the process to be culminating in withering perspectives for the 
????????????????????????????Scharpf 2000; Crespy et al 2007). 
  
One reason for regions claiming more influence and participatory rights in the EU policy process 
is assumed to be rooted in their position in the Member States. At the national level, regions play 
different roles across the EU, but especially in cases like the German or Austrian Länder, they 
enjoy a number of rights in terms of self-governance mechanisms and independence within cer-
tain defined limits. Concerning the EU decision-making process and the ongoing process of Euro-
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pean integration, regions fear that these rights could become obsolete, and their roles could be 
diminished to merely implementing what has been decided at higher, thus supranational and na-
tional, levels. In order to remedy this feared loss of importance, regions are said to actively seek to 
influence the input side of the policy process as well (see Weatherill, 2005).  
In this understanding of regions, the MLG approach neglects the viewpoint that a stronger empha-
sis of regional framings can also be of external origin, instead of an internal strive for more visi-
bility and recognition at EU level. In case of ocean related policies, parallels between the promi-
nent position of regions and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) are 
obvious: probably being the most important source of international law on the usage and protec-
tion of the oceans, UNCLOS provides a legal framework which is supposed to be specified by the 
states (see Art. 207 (1) ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
taking into account characteristic regional features ? ??????????????. 207 (3-4)). This passage 
shows that regional fits of ocean policies are not unique features of European governance, but that 
they are derived from a broader international context. The term regional in this case refers to a 
geographically-defined area of marine waters covering the waters of different states (see also 
Barnes and Metcalfe, 2010), instead of a geographically-defined, most often subnational area, 
which partly covers the (land-based) territory of one or more states. The promotion of regional 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????as following UNCLOS' re-
gional approach, which defines the states concerned and also the content and scope of their har-
monization efforts.  
This regional fit has little in common with the assumptions of MLG scholars, as their scope of 
coordination is functionally limited, and coordination in marine policy does not occur as a means 
for increased interest representation. Instead, marine regions can be characterized as entities 
which define coordination and cooperation between a certain number of sovereign states within a 
given framework and limited to specific issues. In this understanding, regions do not overtake 
functions which otherwise states would perform, but define areas in which coordination with other 
states should be promoted. 
Thus, in case of the CFP and the MSFD, the picture of a power sharing coexistence of actors from 
national, supranational and regional levels cannot be confirmed. Despite the fact that regions play 
an important role in both policies, newly created regional institutions taking over functions and 
competences in the policy making and policy implementation process do not exist. ??????????????
???????????? also clearly shows the limitations of regional involvement set by the Treaty and 
the according distribution of competencies. Further, it highlights that the leeway for regional par-
ticipation is shaped by previous developments in the two policy fields.  
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Despite the fact that the influence of regions in the policy process is and will remain limited, it 
should still be noted that the revaluation of regions in the CFP and the MSFD could lead to a 
raised regional awareness at EU level and more permeability of regional interests to the suprana-
tional level. However, the reasons for (possible) increased regional awareness vary: MLG expects 
the changes to happen because regions have a genuine interest in them, whereas in case of the 
CFP and the MSFD, regional measures are introduced by European actors. In this case, the empir-
ical observations turn the theoretical assumptions upside down: tasks are to certain extends delib-
erately delegated to other, mostly subordinate, levels by the European Commission, instead of 
regions gaining importance due to their strive for more influence at supranational.  
 
Does this mean that the MLG concept is wrong? Not necessarily. The ??????????finding that re-
gional levels become more prominent parts of the policy process can certainly be confirmed in 
case of ocean policies. However, it seems that a central question of MLG should be turned 
around: instead of asking how regional actors manage to gain influence at the EU level, it should 
be asked what the interest of European actors is in engaging regional levels in the policy process. 
Possible answers could include that they are trying to reduce the complexity of far-reaching poli-
cies by reducing the number of actors involved, which would be a functional argument. Or, more 
optimistically, that the EU is trying to do justice to regional specifics in light of growing number 
of Member States and the according rising ecosystem diversity in the EU.  
 
2.3 Coordination and cooperation in ocean policies: the co-management concept 
 
After the analysis of the content of the MSFD in the first paper and its regional elements in the 
second, the third paper focuses on the ???????coordination mechanisms. Because the Directive 
leaves the Member States with considerable freedom in the implementation phase (see van Hoof, 
van Tatenhove, 2009), the elements referring to the inclusion of the national level in the policy 
process deserve special attention. Taking the worldwide turn towards integrated regulation of 
oceans into account, the paper compares the MSFD to the US National Ocean Policy. The US and 
the EU face similar challenges in distributing authority between national and subnational units 
(US) and ???? ?????????????? ?????????? ?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Com-
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paring the two shows that the stages in the policy process aiming at promoting coordination be-
tween supranational and national units vary.30 
The starting point of the paper was the question how fragmentation in ocean policies can be over-
come, which many authors (and the European Commission) perceive to be the biggest obstacle to 
marine protection and conservation (see Borja, 2006; Frank, 2007; Juda, 2007; Long, 2011; 
Fletcher, 2007; SRU, 2003; COM(2005)504 fin.)31. Overcoming fragmentation covers two dimen-
sions (see Juda, 2011): the horizontal dimension describes the cooperation and coordination at the 
same level of governance, thus the supranational level: the logics of different policy approaches 
from different Directorate Generals have to be integrated into a coherent framework. The second 
dimension spans different levels of governance involved in marine policy making and implemen-
tation (compare also to Underdal, 1980). It includes the supranational and the Member State level, 
as the Member States play an important role in the decision-making, as well as in the implementa-
tion of the MSFD. This dimension can be considered  particularly important for the success of the 
MSFD because of its dual supranational and regional construction: the intent of the MSFD is to 
define common objectives at the supranational level, but it leaves further planning, assessments 
and execution of measures to the Member States cooperating at regional level (see 
COM(2005)504 fin.). This means that if cooperation between the EU and the Member State level 
is poor, then the implementation of the MSFD is also likely to be deficient. For this reason, the 
efforts to enhance and promote cooperation and coordination between the supranational and the 
Member State level deserve special attention. One way to look at these processes is to understand 
them as shared management between the two levels. 
 
A promising tool to analyze joint management systems is the co-management approach. It seeks 
to examine cooperation in managing common pool resources and the sharing of responsibility 
between two or more social actors (see Berkes, 2008; Carlsson / Berkes, 2005; Borrini-
Feyerabend et al., 2000; Singleton, 2000). Jentoft describes co-??????????? ??? ?? ???????????????
and participatory process of regulatory decision-???????????????????????????????????????????? the 
importance of involving resource users throughout the development and implementation of new 
regulatory approaches is emphasized. The concept has a distinct empirical focus and was first 
used in the late 1970s, although authors stress that corresponding arrangements of formal power 
sharing in managing resources already occurred around the last turn of the century (Berkes, 2008; 
Jentoft 2003). It should be noted that the approach is in several terms rather eclectic, or, as Berkes 
                                                 
30
 For the sake of clarity, this paragraph focuses on the EU procedures. The according developments in the NOP can be found 
in the third paper. 
31
 Accordingly, achieving coherence and integration of policies and legislative measures are prominent aims of the MSFD 
(MSFD, Art. 1 (4)). 
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(2007) calls it, varied, complex and dynamic. Accordingly, the definitions of the practices of co-
management vary considerably. Some authors describe the exchange of information or of goods 
and services as co-management (see Carlsson / Berkes, 2005), some as a communicative and col-
laborative process ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????l-
?????? ???????????????????? ?????????? ???? ?????????? ?????????????? ?????????? ???? ????????????
(Noble, 2000: 69). Neither is there a general agreement on the actors or levels co-management is 
referring to. Opinions span from the state, the government, and communities or user groups (see 
Berkes, 2008). One reason for the heterogeneity of the co-management concept certainly lies in 
the fact that most literature draws conclusions from empirical cases. As each of them has different 
specifics and different actors involved, from each case, different insights are drawn (see Jentoft, 
2003). On the one hand, this diversity can contribute to the perception of the approach as arbi-
trary, and thus as ranking its explanatory power as rather low (Pinkerton, 2003). On the other 
hand, if co-management is used as an analytical grid, there is a wide range of possible applica-
tions. Accordingly, examples can be found all over the world and include fisheries in Japan, 
Bangladesh and Norway, forest management in Kenya, management of protected areas in Austral-
ia, or wildlife management in Alaska and Canada (see Berkes, 2008; Pomeroy et al., 2001; 
Berkes, 2007; Pinkerton, 1989; also Wilson et al, 2003; Pomeroy et al., 2001). Although often 
applied in studies of small-scale communities, co-management is not limited to this context. Ab-
stracting from the different specifics of the empirical cases to their commonalities, the approach is 
used to analyze arrangements between a centralized policy making level and sub-centralized lev-
els implementing a regulation.  This understanding makes co-management accessible to the con-
text of the European Union and the United States, and any governance system in which central-
ized and decentralized levels are involved in policy making and implementation. However, in 
order to create added value compared to a mere description of situations of shared management, a 
core of common characteristics defining effective co-management should be used. So far, ab-
stracting from case studies to superior levels is not a central aim of the literature on co-
management. Therefore, describing such characteristics and applying them to the concrete case is 
a main concern of the third paper.   
 
Recently, co-management received enhanced ??????????? ???? ????? ????????????? ??????? ???? ??????-
???????????????????????? ???????????????????32, different co-management efforts in Alaska,33 or 
?????????????????????????????????????-???????????34. While some scholars see the origin of the 
                                                 
32
 See http://www.pir.sa.gov.au/fisheries/home/policy_for_the_co-management_of_fisheries_in_south_australia 
33
 See Report of the Marine Mammal Commission ? Review of Co-management efforts in Alaska, available at 
http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov/protectedresources/agreements/mmc_comgmtrev2008.pdf. Last access 12/07/2014 
34
 http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/youth/coe_youth/co_management_en.asp 
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increasing use of co-management in a general trend towards deregulation and privatization 
(Plummer and Fitzgibbon, 2004), others phrase the development more positively by highlighting 
the importance of user participation for managing dynamic ecological systems (Armitage et al., 
2007). Instead of the top down command-and-control approaches of centralized governments, 
perceived to be ill suited to respond to fast changing conditions of resource management, co-
management scholars see merits in participatory arrangements between resources users or com-
munities and the government (Armitage et al., 2007; Jentoft, 2003; see also Lenschow, 2007). The 
benefits of such arrangements include the more equitable governance of resources, providing 
mechanisms for conflict resolution and better enforcement of regulations (see Jentoft et al., 1998; 
Pinkerton, 1989). The last point deserves special attention in context of analyzing the MSFD. As 
the implementation is still at early stages, statements on the progress of implementation are neces-
sarily preliminary.35 The co-management approach, however, assumes that a participatory design 
of the decision-making phase will benefit the implementation of new legislation: the inclusion of 
decentralized actors before the adoption is supposed to enhance the legitimacy of a new policy, 
which is likely to have positive effects on the compliance (see Fletcher, 2007). 
 
3. Concluding remarks - Towards an integrated marine environmental poli-
cy? 
 
?????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????This Directive aims at over-
coming the existing sectoral approach in marine governance, which contributes to the declining 
state of the marine environment (see COM(2005) 505 final). It is in line with currently evolving 
approaches around to world which aim to protect the marine environment, at a broader under-
standing of marine environmental interaction and promoting cross-sectoral policies (see Borja et 
al., 2010). The EU faces the challenge of integrating sector-specific policies which are also an-
chored in different institutions, while at the same time taking into account the considerable differ-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????hat the Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive constitutes a paradigm shift in the thinking of marine environmen-
tal policy in the EU, and could develop to be a role model for the future regulation of ecosystems.  
Key aspects of the (MSFD) examined in this study include a thorough analysis of the content of 
the Directive, its challenges and novel elements; an examination of the regional measures in the 
MSFD, their effects on the institutional interplay of the EC as well as on the distribution of com-
petencies in the implementation process of the Directive; and finally, an analysis of the coordina-
                                                 
35
 Although the European Commission keeps track on the different implementation steps required by the MSFD. They can be 
found online at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/marine/eu-coast-and-marine-policy/implementation/scoreboard_en.htm. 
However, an overall assessment of the implementation efforts of the Member States can only be done when the GES is sup-
posed to be achieved, which is in 2020. 
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tion mechanisms between the supranational and Member State level in the decision-making pro-
cess and possible effects on the implementation process. 
Because of the important innovative elements of the MSFD, this study explicitly focuses on a 
sound empirical understanding of the Directive and its background. With their empirical focus, 
the papers add important insights to the field of EU ocean policies, an area not very well re-
searched in political science so far.  Core lessons of the three parts of the work include: 
 
? The policy context at EU level is still to be considered work in progress. While overall, a 
coherent, integrated approach is envisaged, currently, the MSFD and the Integrated Mari-
time Policy are two approaches with similar aspirations, but different mandates, goals and 
legal forms. Environmental and economic framings compete for consideration.  
? While regional measures are prominently introduced in the MSFD, their practical meaning 
will still have to be negotiated in the implementation of the Directive. Dividing the Euro-
pean seas in marine regions constitutes a novel approach to regulating the EU marine en-
vironment; yet, the required cooperation and coordination between the Member States and 
their regulatory measures leaves them with considerable discretion in defining the scope 
of regionally common measures. For the existing distribution of competences between su-
pranational and Member State levels, these regional elements have little effects. They do 
not alter existing institutions, nor do they assign new responsibilities to regional levels. 
These levels do not exist per se, but constitute the sum of regional coordination between 
the Member States within one marine region. Their scope thus depends on the Member 
?????????????????Regional measures can only occur within the limits of the given institu-
tional framework, and target an additional level in the policy process, mainly responsible 
for better coordination of existing measures. They are also supposed to contribute to a bet-
ter fit of the policy to the marine ecosystems, as they can be tailored to specific conditions 
in different parts of the ecosystem. 
? One major factor for the success of the MSFD is the cooperation between the supranation-
al and the Member State levels. As the requirements ?????????????????????????????????o-
operation are limited in the MSFD, binding force for regional actions of the Directive 
mainly derives from common procedures during the decision-making processes. Whether 
these will suffice, or whether they will have to be supported by other bodies will remain to 
be seen during the implementation phase. In this regard, the role of existing regional bod-
ies should be closely followed, as they could be involved in carrying out important coor-
dinative functions. 
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The MSFD as an example for a very encompassing EU environmental Directive shows that the 
EU follows a procedural, dual approach. While at the supranational level, a common framework 
for procedures is defined, specific goals and measures are to be defined at and by Member State 
levels. The ????????????? ????? ??? ?????????? ?????????????????? ?? ????????? ??????? ???????????
instead of fill???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
large parts of the way policy goals are defined and achieved lies in their hands (see Salomon, 
2009). This does not necessarily mean that the Member States become more independent from the 
supranational level. The regional element of the MSFD could develop some binding force, partly 
adding to the role of the Commission ? or rather, as a tool to achieve common, regional approach-
es. This way, regional levels could balance the discretion transferred to the Member States by 
assigning them important tasks in the further definition of goals and actions, as the requirement 
for regional cooperation aims at ensuring regional coherence and the promotion of commonly 
defined regional goals. This dual structure can also be understood as ??????????????????????????s-
tion how common European policies can be adopted while at the same time taking into account 
the varying regional disparities in an enlarged Europe. In practice, this so far seems to remain 
wishful thinking though. In its report on the first phase of the implementation of the MSFD, the 
??????????? ??????? ????? ???????? ???????? ??????????? ??? ????? ?????????????? ??????? ???? ???? ?????
they set out to achieve it shows overall limited ambition, often fails to take into account existing 
obligations and standards and lacks coherence across the Union, even between neighbouring 
countries within the same marine region???COM/2014/097 final: 2). 
 
While this thesis is one of the early contributions in the field from a political science perspective, 
the adoption of the MSFD was likewise only the first step towards more protected oceans in the 
EU. The further development of the MSFD should be closely followed. Important topics for fu-
ture research include: 
 
? How will the ??????????????????????????????????? Relatedly, how will the coopera-
tion / coordination with existing regional conventions develop? The MSFD could ben-
efit from the knowledge and existing coordinative and administrative structures of 
these conventions and benefit from their work (collected data etc.), but while the 
MSFD mentions them, the relation between them will have to be defined in the com-
ing  months or years. 
? A second point circles around the question how the MSFD will be positioned vis-à-vis 
related existing European policies, such as the CFP, the Habitats Directive, but also 
the Common Agricultural Policy. In order to achieve the goal (and if only rudimen-
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tarily) of good environmental status, the MSFD would have to prevail to varying ex-
tents against some of the goals of these policies, and support others. How the different 
goals will be negotiated will remain an interesting question for the next years. 
? A further question to explore on is the external dimension of the MSFD. This refers to 
two sub-questions: first of all, the European seas are not entirely enclosed by Member 
States, so the question is how neighboring states, such as Russia, will be involved in 
the processes to achieve good environmental status. Second, as different states world-
wide are working on similar policies and goals, it will be interesting to see whether 
(and if yes which) links between the different policies will develop and how they 
could contribute to better protected oceans worldwide. 
? Finally, the effects of the MSFD on theoretical debates should be analyzed. With more 
insights on the implementation process and according influence on the dynamics be-
tween regional, national and supranational levels, these effects will become more ob-
vious and will possibly require adjustments, amendments, or more radical changes of 
existing political theories. 
 
Lastly, it should be asked whether the MSFD can fulfill its claim and will contribute to a more 
integrated European marine environmental policy. Based on this thesis, the answer is ambivalent. 
On the one hand, it becomes clear that institutionally, the sectoral division could only partly be 
overcome. Important related policies, such as the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common 
Fisheries Policy first and foremost, are not formally integrated in the marine protection frame-
work. Also, the regional approach seems rather weak and could, due to its lacking clear agenda, 
remain a paper tiger. Five years after the adoption of the MSFD, the Commission is aware of the 
lacking coherence of the implementation not only across, but also within marine regions and so-
ber???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-????????????????????
???? ???? ??? ?????????? ??????????? ?????? (COM(2014) 97 final: 7). Mainly these two points 
speak against an integrated European marine environmental policy. However, an important effect 
of the MSFD will surely be that the Member States are forced to think in the same categories and 
to frame marine environmental policies similarly due to the eleven descriptors used to describe the 
characteristics of the good environmental status. Apparently, many Member States struggle to 
cope with the foreseen implementation process, also because of the very different starting points 
concerning e.g. the available data across the marine regions (see COM(2014) 97 final: 6). Taking 
into account the considerable differences with regards to the socio-economic situation and politi-
cal priorities, the databases and the work of existing regional sea conventions, a similar scenario 
was to be expected. Despite the undertaken measures to streamline the implementation process 
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and to enhance the efforts undertaken by the Member States, such as infringement procedures, a 
good environmental status of the European seas by 2020 seems unlikely. However, it can be 
hoped that the actions carried out so far and according data collected will not disappear in the 
?????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
policy framework. Path dependency could once again play in the hands of EU environmental pol-
icies ? the huge institutional and financial investments already carried out in the policy process 
could lead to following the path set out by the MSFD and hopefully eventually lead to better pro-
tection of our oceans. 
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Abstract
Coastal states increasingly recognise the need to consider the interplay between different exploi-
tation and use activities and their effects on the marine environment. Some states have adopted 
programmes to establish “integrated ocean policies” which aim at promoting a coordinated gov-
ernance of the different activities and interests related to the seas. This article describes the hur-
dles and challenges the European Union faces in developing and implementing its “Integrated 
Maritime Policy”, particularly focussing on its most developed branch, the “Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive”. By providing a detailed insight into this supranational ocean manage-
ment framework, including an elucidation of its strengths and weaknesses, this analysis will 
contribute to the world-wide legal discourse on integrated ocean policies. 
Keywords 
ocean policy; Marine Strategy Framework Directive; Integrated Maritime Policy (IMP); good 
environmental status
Introduction
Throughout the last decades, various international conventions, national pro-
grammes and scientific reports have highlighted the need to consider the 
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Errors remain the entire responsibility of the authors.
T. Markus et al. /
60 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 26 (2011) 59–90
interplay between different exploitation and use activities and their effects on 
the marine environment.1 In response, governments from all over the world 
have increasingly adopted programmes to establish “integrated ocean policies”.2 
In the 1990s, Brazil launched its National Maritime Policy; Australia and 
Canada followed. In the new millennium, Japan introduced its Basic Act on 
Ocean Policy, Norway presented a Maritime Strategy, and in the USA a Com-
mittee on Oceans Policy was established to look at these questions. New Zea-
land is also in the process of adopting an “Ocean Policy”.3 The underlying 
rationale of all of these initiatives is that use and conservation conflicts in the 
seas cannot be solved by sector-by-sector approaches; rather, the new approach 
is to adopt holistic policies that allow for a comprehensive and coordinated 
governance of the different activities and interests related to the seas.4
The European Union (EU or the Community) follows this international 
trend towards a more integrated approach to ocean governance with its devel-
opment of an “Integrated Maritime Policy” (IMP). This article aims at explain-
ing integration efforts under the EU’s IMP, focusing on its most developed 
branch, the European Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD), which 
constitutes the environmental pillar of its new integrated policy. This submis-
1 See, e.g., Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 and Section IV of the Johannesburg Plan of Implemen-
tation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development by the United Nations Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED), available at: <www.un.org/esa/sustdev/agenda
21text.htm>; Art. 10 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) emphasises the signifi-
cance of biological biodiversity; several meetings of the Conference of the Parties specified this 
provision in terms of marine and coastal biodiversity, available at: <http://www.cbd.int/
convention/>; L. Juda, ‘The European Union and Ocean Use Management: The Marine Strat-
egy and the Maritime Policy’ (2007) 38 Ocean Development & International Law 259—282; 
D. Caron and H. Schreiber , ‘Bringing New Law to the Ocean Waters’, in D. Caron and 
H. Schreiber (eds.) Bringing New Law to the Ocean Waters (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Lei-
den, 2004) 3–27. For a classic text on this topic, see, A. Underdahl, ‘Integrated Marine Policy: 
What? Why? How?’ (1980) 4 Marine Policy 159–169.
2 L. Juda, ‘Changing National Approaches to Ocean Governance’ (2003) 34 Ocean Develop-
ment & International Law 161–187.
3 Reports on national policies of Brazil, Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, USA and New 
Zealand are available at: <http://ioc3.unesco.org/abelos/>; J. Vince and M. Haward, ‘New 
Zealand’s ocean governance: Calming turbulent waters?’ (2009) 33 Marine Policy 412–418.
4 Recently the European Commission has characterised some of these new policy frameworks 
by stating that “they have all decided to develop an overall policy that allows a comprehensive, 
coordinated approach, ensuring sustainable development of the different sea resources and 
activities”, Commission of the European Communities (EC), Communication from the Com-
mission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions: Guidelines for an Integrated Approach to Maritime Policy—
Towards best practice in integrated maritime governance and stakeholder consultation, COM(2008) 
395 final, Brussels, 26 June 2008 at 5.
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sion also describes the challenges faced by the EU and its Member States in 
developing their integrated ocean policy and the difficulties encountered in 
implementing these measures.
The EU’s Need for an Integrated Approach to Ocean Policies
At present, legislation at the international, EU and national levels appear to 
be unequipped to resolve use and conservation conflicts in EU waters.5 First, 
substantial knowledge gaps exist regarding the condition of the seas and the 
effects of anthropogenic pressures. Monitoring and evaluation programmes 
are regarded as incomprehensive and uncoordinated.6 Second, existing regimes 
governing marine environmental conservation can be characterized by gaps in 
the rules and a lack of overall coordination. Although the Community and 
Member States have some rules in place that contribute to the protection of 
the marine environment, e.g., by restricting and minimizing specific inputs,7 
such measures mostly target very specific problems in certain sectors or policy 
areas and do not specifically aim at marine environmental conservation.8 Pres-
sures from underlying sectoral groups and interests mean that marine envi-
ronmental protection objectives are chronically neglected.9 For example, 
5 See definition of “marine waters” in Art. 3(1) of the MSFD.
6 Commission (EC), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Thematic Strategy on the Protection and Conservation of the Marine Environment, 
COM(2005) 504 final, Brussels, 24 October 2005 at 4 [hereinafter ‘COM(2005) 504 final’]; 
Commission (EC), Communication from the Commission to the Council: Fishing Opportunities 
for 2008—Policy Statement from the European Commission, COM (2007) 295 final at 5 [here-
inafter ‘COM(2007) 295 final’].
7 W. Erbguth and S. Schlacke, Umweltrecht (3rd ed. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2010) para. 15(11) 
et seq.; Rainer Wolf, ‘Ressourcennutzung und Ressourcenschutz in der Ausschließlichen Wirt-
schaftszone (AWZ)’ (2008) 98 Umwelt- und Technikrecht—Jahrbuch des Umwelt- und Technik-
rechts 2008 93–146; A. Proelß, Meeresschutz im Völker- und Europarecht (Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin, 2004); moreover, the Commission (EC), Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament: Towards a Strategy to protect and conserve the marine 
environment, COM(2002) 539 final, Brussels, 2 October 2002 at 9 et seq. [hereinafter 
‘COM(2002) 539 final’].
8 V. Frank, The European Community and Marine Environmental Protection in the International 
Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2007) at 90–92; COM(2005) 504 final 
at 3–4; R. Wolf, ibid.
9 O. Lell and C. Steudte, ‘EG und Meeresumweltschutz unter besonderer Berücksichtigung 
der geplanten Wasserrahmenrichtlinie’, in: D. Czybulka (ed.) Naturschutz und Rechtsregime im 
Küsten- und Offshore-Bereich (Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2003) 49–77; T. Markus, European Fis-
heries Law—From Promotion to Management (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 2009) at 
17–26, 70 et seq. 
T. Markus et al. /
62 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 26 (2011) 59–90
measures adopted under the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common 
Fisheries Policy primarily aim at guaranteeing and stabilizing production and 
not at protecting marine ecosystems.10 The third reason why EU and national 
laws are ineffectual in resolving use and conservation conflicts in EU waters is 
that there is a lack of coordination between Community and international 
measures.11 For instance, existing marine protected areas (MPAs) in the North 
and Baltic Seas, which were adopted under international agreements and 
national legislation, are currently deemed to be largely incoherent or incom-
prehensive.12
There has also been lack of coordination at the national level. Coastal 
nations increasingly develop spatial and sectoral planning instruments for 
their territorial seas and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). However, most of 
these instruments have not been coordinated with the actions taken by neigh-
bouring states. Questions also arise regarding whether existing spatial and 
sectoral planning instruments, which were primarily designed to address land-
based problems, really offer adequate solutions to the use and conservation 
conflicts at sea.13 Fourth, another problem seems to be that conservation 
measures are significantly restricted in scope and grant a very limited level of 
protection to the marine environment.14 Finally, regulations concerning non-
material inputs and their environmental impacts (e.g., thermal, electromag-
netic, light or sound) are non-systematic and yet deficient.15 In sum, the law 
governing marine use and conservation issues in EU waters currently lacks a 
master plan for balancing and coordinating environmental protection and 
other uses.
10 Markus, ibid., at 17–22, 72–79; see also T. Markus, ‘Making Environmental Principles 
Work under the Common Fisheries Policy’ (2010) 19 European Energy and Environmental 
Law Review 132–144; R. Froese and A. Proelß, ‘Rebuilding fish stocks no later than 2015: will 
Europe meet the deadline?’ (2010) 11 Fish and Fisheries 194–202.
11 COM(2005) 504 final at 3–4.
12 P. Birnie, A. E. Boyle and C. Redgwell, International Law & the Environment (3rd ed., 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at 747; A. Gillespie, Protected Areas and International 
Environmental Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007) at 107, 122.
13 F. Douvere and C. Ehlers, ‘New perspectives on sea use management: Initial findings from 
European experience with marine spatial planning’ (2009) 90 Journal of Environmental Man-
agement 77–88.
14 R. Wolf, op. cit., supra note 7 at 137.
15 K. Scott, ‘Sound and Cetaceans: A Regional Response to Regulating Acoustic Marine Pol-
lution’ (2007) 10 Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 175–199 at 179; S. J. Dolman, 
C. A. Weir und M. Jasny, ‘Comparative review of marine mammal guidance implemented 
during naval exercises‘(2009) 58 Marine Pollution Bulletin 465–477.
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The MSFD in the Broader Context of the EU’s Maritime and Fresh Water 
Policy
The EU is currently in the process of developing its IMP. The IMP is described 
in the Green Paper entitled “Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union: 
a European Vision for the Oceans and Seas”, which was presented by the 
European Commission on 7 June 2006.16 The Green Paper advances the idea 
that all activities significant for the seas should be subjected to a cross-sectoral 
management. It calls for an effective coordination and integration of marine 
policy areas at all levels.17 Following a one-year consultation period, the Green 
Paper was followed by the Bluebook,18 which proposed certain goals, such as 
sustainable development of economic growth, employment and marine envi-
ronmental conservation. The Bluebook is supplemented by an action plan 
that sets out additional Community measures to promote an integrated 
marine policy, including establishing the “European Maritime Days”, the cre-
ation of a roadmap for developing marine spatial planning, etc.19
The IMP incorporates the MSFD as its “environmental pillar”.20 However, 
it is important to note that the structure and legal status of the MSFD is quite 
different from that of the IMP. While the MSFD is a binding directive, the 
IMP at this stage merely constitutes a bundle of declarations of intentions and 
16 Commission (EC), Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Par-
liament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Towards 
a future Maritime Policy for the Union—A European Vision for the Oceans and Seas, COM(2006) 
275 final, Volume I, Brussels, 7 June 2006.
17 See COM(2002) 539 final at 3 et seq.
18 Commission (EC), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: An 
integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union, COM(2007) 575 final, Brussels, 10 Octo-
ber 2007.
19 See Commission Staff Working Document: Accompanying document to the Communication 
from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee of the Regions An Integrated Maritime Policy for the European Union—Impact Assess-
ment Summary, SEC(2007) 1280, Brussels, 10 October 2007; Commission (EC), Report from 
the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Progress Report on the EU’s integrated Maritime 
Policy, COM(2009) 540 final, Brussels, 15 October 2009; see also Commission (EC), Com-
mission Staff Working Document—Accompanying document to the Report from the Commission to 
the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the 
Committee of the Regions: Progress Report on the EU’s Integrated Maritime Policy, SEC(2009) 
1343 final, Brussels, 15 October 2009 [hereinafter ‘SEC(2009) 1343 final’].
20 MSFD, Recital 3; see also L. Juda, ‘The European Union and the Marine Strategy Frame-
work Directive: Continuing the Development of European Ocean Use Management’ (2010) 
41 Ocean Development & International Law 34–54 at 44.
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administrative actions. Both measures also emphasise different policy objec-
tives. The main reasons for these differences are that a) the MSFD is simply 
older than the IMP and b) that the development of the MSFD was assigned 
to the European Commission’s Directorate General of the Environment, 
whereas the IMP was assigned to the Directorate General for Maritime Affairs 
and Fisheries (DG MARE). While the latter’s focus is primarily on promoting 
the marine economic sector in reviving the Lisbon Strategy, the DG Environ-
ment concentrates on environmental protection.21 In order to avoid contra-
dictory policies between the MSFD and IMP, the Commission established a 
“Steering Group of Commissioners”, a “Maritime Interservice Policy Group”, 
and a “Member States Expert Group”. These committees promote the devel-
opment of joint and coherent decision-making, monitor the day-to-day prog-
ress of the IMP and enhance information exchange between national public 
servants.22 
To better understand the MSFD’s development and content one must look 
to the Community’s fresh water policy, which has undergone developments 
similar to the EU’s ocean policies and has significantly influenced the shape 
and structure of MSFD measures.23 The EU’s water policy began in the early 
1970s as sectoral regulations, which mainly addressed fresh water-related 
issues. By the end of the 1980s, the Community had adopted over 30 relevant 
directives.24 However, water policy at this time lacked consistency due to com-
partmentalized organisation and a missing comprehensive legal framework. 
In 2000, the Water Framework Directive (WFD) was adopted as a new 
approach to water policy. It aimed at overcoming the patchwork of laws and 
integrating the existing regulations.25 For the first time under the Communi-
ty’s environmental policy, legislation aimed at protecting (fresh) water as a 
21 J. Edler, ‘Vom Grünbuch zum Blaubuch—Eine integrierte Meerespolitik für die Europäische 
Union’, in G. Schernewski, H. Janßen and S. Schumacher (eds.), Coastline Reports 12: Coastal 
Change in the Southern Baltic Sea Region (EUCC—The Coastal Union, Rostock, 2009) 
25–36.
22 SEC (2009) 1343 final at 5.
23 For example, the concept of “good environmental status” under the MSFD is quite similar 
to the concept of “good surface water status”, “good groundwater status”, and “good ecological 
status” of the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for the Community action in the field 
of water policy, OJ L 327, 22.12.2000; see also Juda, op. cit., supra note 20 at 37.
24 F. Barth, ‘Die neue Wasserrahmenrichtlinie der Europäischen Union—Chance oder büro-
kratisches Hemmnis für die Europäische Wasserpolitik?’ (1997) 49 (5) Wasser und Boden 
7–9.
25 Commission (EC), Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: European Community: Water Policy, COM(96) 59 final, Brussels, 21 February 
1996. 
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whole, thus promoting an ecological approach.26 In practice, the content of 
water policy measures, particularly the WFD, is also highly relevant to the 
implementation and interpretation of the MSFD.27 The WDF and MSFD 
share a close connection in terms of content, objectives and regulatory design, 
and together they aim to manage ecosystems that are highly interdependent. 
Given this context, the MSFD may eventually be seen as the next step towards 
ecosystem-oriented management of the Community’s water resources. 
The Marine Strategy Framework Directive
Formation
In November 2002, as a part of the Community’s 6th Environmental Action 
Programme,28 the Commission published the Communication “Towards a 
strategy to protect the marine environment”.29 In the Communication, the 
Commission analyses the present condition of the marine environment, the 
status and development of relevant sectors, and existing relevant political and 
legal measures under Community law. In March 2003, the European Council 
of Ministers expressly asked the Commission to present a “Thematic Strategy 
for the protection of the marine environment” by May 2005 at the latest.30 At 
the same time, an extensive public consultation process took place through 
the establishment of working groups to deal with topics such as “targets”, the 
“ecosystem approach”, “monitoring” and “dangerous substances”. Confer-
ences in Køge (4–6 December 2002) and Rotterdam (11–12 November 
2004), as well as extensive consultations, were held. Questions of coordina-
tion and cooperation between the future Marine Strategy and regional instru-
ments and institutions were discussed at the international level, especially 
between the Commission and the secretariats of regional conventions (e.g., 
26 The geographical scope of the WFD will be explained in more detail below.
27 See, e.g., below on “geographical and substantial scope”.
28 Environment Action Programmes are launched according to Art. 175(3) of the EC Treaty. 
Decision No. 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2002 
laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, OJ L 242, 10.9.2002; 
see also the Commission (EC), Communication from the Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions on the Mid-term review of the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, 
COM(2007) 225 final, Brussels, 30 April 2007.
29 COM(2002) 539 final.
30 Council Conclusion—Towards a Thematic Strategy to Protect and Conserve the Marine Envi-
ronment, 4 March 2003, Doc. No. 7164/03 at 3–4.
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OSPAR, HELCOM, BSC, MEDPOL, etc.).31 Based on these efforts, the 
Council issued final instructions to the Commission regarding the content 
of the strategy.32 The Council requested that the Commission specifically 
consider eco-systematic, socio-economic and regional aspects as well as to 
keep in mind existing Community law on the protection of the marine 
environment. 
On 24 November 2005, the Commission published its “Thematic Strategy 
on the Protection and the conservation of the marine environment”. This 
strategy consisted of a central Communication by the Commission,33 an 
impact assessment34 and a first draft of the directive’s proposal for a Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive.35 Statements and Communications were pro-
vided by the European Economic and Social Committee,36 the Council of the 
Regions,37 the Council,38 the European Parliament (over 80 amendments after 
31 European Commission, EU Marine Strategy—The story behind the Strategy, (Office for Offi-
cial Publications of the European Communities, Luxembourg, 2006) at 17–20.
32 Council of the European Union, 2632nd Council Meeting, Environment, Brussels, 
20 December 2004, 15962/04 (Presse 357).
33 COM(2005) 504 final.
34 Commission (EC), Commission Staff Working Document: Annex to Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Thematic Strategy on the Protection and 
Conservation of the Marine Environment and Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council establishing a Framework for Community Action in the field of Marine Envi-
ronmental Policy (Marine Strategy Directive)—Impact Assessment, SEC(2005) 1290, Brussels, 
24 October 2005 [hereinafter ‘SEC(2005) 1290’].
35 Commission (EC), Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a Framework for Community Action in the field of Marine Environmental Policy 
(Marine Strategy Directive), COM(2005) 505 final, Brussels, 24 October 2005; cf. hereunto 
M. Rossi, ‘Eine Strategie zum Schutz der Meeresumwelt?’ (2007) 93 Umwelt- und Tech-
nikrecht—Jahrbuch des Umwelt- und Technikrechts 2007 81–104; M. Salomon, ‘The European 
Commission proposal for a Marine Strategy: Lacking substance’ (2006) 52 Marine Pollution 
Bulletin 1328–1329; A. Borja, ‘The new European Marine Strategy Directive: Difficulties, 
opportunities, and challenges’ (2006) 52 Marine Pollution Bulletin 239–242; German Advi-
sory Council on the Environment (SRU), The European Commission Proposal for a Marine 
Strategy: Shying European Responsibility?, Comment on Environment Policy No.5, 2006; Juda, 
op. cit., supra note 1.
36 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a Framework for Community 
Action in the field of Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy Directive), OJ C 185, 
8.8.2006.
37 Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing a framework for Community Action in the field of Marine Envi-
ronmental Policy (Marine Strategy Directive) and on the Communication from the Commis-
sion to the Council and the European Parliament—Thematic Strategy on the Protection and 
Conservation of the Marine Environment, OJ C 206, 29.8.2006.
38 Council of the European Union, 2757th Council Meeting, Environment, Luxembourg, 
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the first reading, 63 after the second)39 and the Commission.40 On 17 June 
2008 the European Parliament and the Council finally adopted the Marine 
Strategy Framework Directive.
Position in the EU’s System of Marine Environmental Law
The MSFD’s main goal is to establish a framework within which the “Mem-
ber States shall take the necessary measures to achieve or maintain good envi-
ronmental status in the marine environment by the year 2020 at the latest”.41 
Regarding existing Community and Member State legislation on the protec-
tion of the marine environment, the MSFD only states that it “shall contrib-
ute to coherence between [. . .] the different policies, agreements and legislative 
measures which have an impact on the marine environment”.42 In addition, 
the MSFD aims at “ensur[ing] the integration of environmental concerns”.43 
It also states that to achieve its goals, a “transparent and coherent legislative 
framework is required” and that this judicial framework in turn should pro-
vide an “overall framework for action” that “enable[s] the action taken to be 
coordinated, consistent and properly integrated” with “action under other 
Community legislation and international agreements”.44 Therefore, the MSFD 
is not an extensive codification of existing marine protection regulations, nor 
23 October 2006, 13989/06 (Presse 287) at 18 et seq.; Council of the European Union, 2773rd 
Council Meeting, Environment, Brussels, 18 December 2006, 16164/06 (Presse 349) at 7; 
Council of the European Union, 2816th Council meeting, General Affairs and External Rela-
tions, Brussels, 23 July 2007, 11911/07 (Presse 170) at 17; Council of the European Union, 
2866th Council Meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, 8850/08 (Presse 113) at 34.
39 Session document of the European Parliament, Doc. No. A6–0373/2006 (after 1st read-
ing); Session document of the European Parliament, Doc. No. A6–0389/2007 (after 
2nd reading).
40 Commission (EC), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament pursu-
ant to the second subparagraph of Article 251 (2) of the EC Treaty concerning the Common position 
of the Council to the adoption of a European Parliament and Council Directive establishing a 
Framework for Community Action in the field of Marine Environmental Policy (Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive), COM(2007) 456 final, Brussels, 27 July 2007 [hereinafter ‘COM 
(2007) 456 final’]; Commission (EC), Opinions of the Commission pursuant to Article 251 (2), 
third subparagraph, point (c) of the EC Treaty, on the European Parliament’s amendments to the 
Council’s common position regarding the proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council establishing a Framework for Community Action in the field of Marine Environ-
mental Policy (Marine Strategy Framework Directive), COM(2008) 5 final, Brussels, 10 January 
2008.
41 MSFD, Art. 1(1).
42 MSFD, Art. 1(4).
43 Ibid.
44 MSFD, Recital 9.
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does it instantaneously modify any existing laws or impose any comprehen-
sive obligations on the Member States.45 Its regulatory ambition remains 
highly restricted, and can be understood as a supplementary Community legal 
framework within which existing and future Community and Member State 
conservation measures are to be developed and enhanced.46 
Purpose and Basic Structure
The MSFD requires Member States to take the necessary measures “to achieve 
or maintain good environmental status in the marine environment by the year 
2020 at the latest”.47 Member States are required to develop and implement 
marine strategies to protect and preserve the marine environment, prevent its 
deterioration or, where practicable, restore marine ecosystems.48 The strategies 
shall also be developed to prevent and reduce inputs in the marine environ-
ment, with a view to phasing out pollution so as to ensure that there are no 
significant impacts on or risks to marine biodiversity.49 National marine strat-
egies must apply an ecosystem-based approach to the management of human 
activities50 and coordinate such efforts at the regional or sub-regional levels.51 
The Community’s role in this process is limited to guiding the strategic devel-
opment that takes place at the national level by providing a temporal, proce-
dural and substantive framework. The MSFD only assigns coordinative and 
(somewhat restricted) controlling competences to the Commission.52
Member States have to take six procedural steps according to an “action 
plan”, which is further subdivided into two phases: a) preparation and b) 
establishing programmes of measures.53 The preparation is comprised of four 
procedural steps:
•  Initial assessment of the current environmental status in accordance with 
Article 8 of the MSFD (by 15 July 2012)
45 See particularly restrictions in Arts. 13(5), 14(1) to (4) and 15(1) to (2) of the MSFD.
46 See Recital 11 of the MSFD: “Each Member State should therefore develop a marine strat-
egy for its marine waters which, while being specific to its own waters, reflects the overall 
perspective of the marine region […] concerned.“ 
47 MSFD, Art. 1(1).
48 According to Art. 1(2)(a) of the MSFD.
49 According to Art. 1(2)(b) of the MSFD.
50 MSFD, Art. 1(3).
51 MSFD, Art. 5(1) to (2) and Art. 6.
52 See also caveat in Recital 43 of the MSFD.
53 MSFD, Art. 5(2).
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•  Determination of good environmental status in accordance with Article 9 
of the MSFD (by 15 July 2012)
•  Establishment of a series of environmental targets and associated indica-
tors, in accordance with Article 10(1) of the MSFD (by 15 July 2012)
•  Establishment and implementation of a monitoring programme for 
ongoing assessment and regular updating of targets, in accordance with 
Article 11(1) of the MSFD (by 15 July 2014).
Setting up programmes of measures is comprised of two procedural steps:
•  Development of a programme of measures designed to achieve or main-
tain good environmental status, in accordance with Article 13(1) to (3) 
of the MSFD (by 2015)
•  Entry into operation of the programme in accordance with Article 13(10) 
of the MSFD (by 2016).
Where the status of the sea in a marine region is “so critical as to necessitate 
urgent action”,54 Member States shall devise a plan of action, which includes 
an earlier entry into operation of programmes of measures, as well as possible 
stricter protective measures.55 The provision on the development of the marine 
strategies in the MSFD is followed by a number of rules on exceptions,56 coor-
dination57 and reporting obligations,58 public consultations and information, 
and the updating of national strategies. Finally, the MSFD establishes provi-
sions on the adaptation of the Annexes of the MSFD (every six years),59 as 
well as provisions for the regulation of methodological standards and techni-
cal formats for applying the Annexes.60 The Annexes, for example, comprise: 
qualitative descriptors for determining good environmental status (Annex I), 
indicative lists of characteristics, pressures and impacts on marine waters 
(Annex III), as well as an indicative list of characteristics to be taken into 
account for setting environmental targets (Annex IV).
54 The meaning of the phrase ‘where the status of the sea is so critical as to necessitate urgent 
actions’ must be interpreted in the light of the initial assessment and the definition of ‘good 
environmental status’ under Arts. 3(5), 8, and 9 MSFD, as well as in the light of the interpre-
tation of Art. 14(1) to (4) MSFD, particularly the terms “significant risk” under Art. 14(4) 
MSFD, see below.
55 MSFD, Art. 5(3).
56 MSFD, Art. 14.
57 MSFD, Arts. 15 and 16.
58 MSFD, Arts. 18, 20 and 21.
59 MSFD, Arts. 17 and 24(1).
60 MSFD, Art. 24(2).
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Geographical and Substantive Scope
The wording of the MSFD does not explicitly reveal its geographical and sub-
stantive scope, and this leads to questions regarding the definition and scope 
of its rules, particularly in relation to other existing (secondary) Community 
laws. According to Article 2(1), the MSFD applies to “to all marine waters as 
defined in Article 3(1)”. Article 3(1)(a) and (b) of the MSFD defines marine 
waters as a) “waters, the seabed and subsoil on the seaward side of the baseline 
from which the extent of territorial waters is measured extending to the out-
most reach of the area where a Member State has and/or exercises jurisdic-
tional rights, in accordance with the UNCLOS” and b) “coastal waters as 
defined by Directive 2000/60/EC, [. . .], in so far as particular aspects of the 
environmental status of the marine environment are not already addressed 
through that Directive or other Community legislation”.61 Thus, in principle, 
the MSFD applies to the territorial waters, EEZs and adjacent continental 
shelf (if relevant)62 of Member States. It also applies to their coastal waters 
within the meaning of Article 2(7) of the WFD to the extent that they are not 
subject to regulation by the WFD or other regulations.63 Article 2(7) of the 
WFD defines “coastal waters” as “surface waters on the landward side of a line, 
every point of which is at a distance of one nautical mile on the seaward side 
from the nearest point of the baseline from which the breadth of territorial 
waters is measured […]”. For example, Arts. 1 and 2(1) and (7) of the WFD 
extend the WFD’s general geographical scope to the “one nautical mile 
zone” as well as the entire territorial sea in respect of the chemical status.64
61 lanks inserted by the authors, see Art. 3(1)(a) and (b) of the MSFD. The MSFD does not 
apply either to the waters of neighbouring countries and sovereign territories listed in Annex II 
of the treaty nor in the French overseas departments and administrative units, see Art. 3(1)(a) 
MSFD.
62 “Regulations [as institutional acts adopted on the basis of the Treaty], apply in principle to 
the same geographical area as the Treaty itself. Respective acts must, however, at least implic-
itly, apply their geographical scope to the areas in question.” See Case 61/77, Commission v. 
Ireland, [1978] ECR, paras. 45–46.
63 Italics have been inserted by the authors: See Art. 2(7) of the WFD, Directive 2000/60/EC, 
OJ L 327, 22.12.2000. See also R. Barnes and D. Metcalfe, ‘Current Legal Developments—
The European Union’ (2010) 25 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 81–91 
at 82.
64 Art. 2(1) WFD states that “surface water means inland waters, except groundwater; transi-
tional waters and coastal waters, except in respect of chemical status for which it shall also include 
territorial waters.” Italics have been inserted by the authors. According to the Commission, the 
MSFD should also have been applicable to the transitional waters of the WFD, see COM(2007) 
456 final at 10.
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Article 2(1) of the MSFD declares that the MSFD takes a transboundary 
approach, which means that its territorial scope considers areas beyond Com-
munity waters: “[t]his Directive shall apply to all marine waters as defined in 
Article 3(1), and shall take account of the transboundary effects on the quality 
of the marine environment of third States in the same marine region or sub-
region”. Of course, this does not imply an extraterritorial extension of the 
MSFD’s territorial scope. Article 2(1) of the MSFD simply indicates that the 
Directive shall “take account” of the transboundary effects on the marine 
environment of third States. Accordingly, Member States are obliged to coor-
dinate and collaborate within the Community as well as (trans-) regionally 
when compiling their marine strategies (in particular, by including Russia).65 
In addition to these procedural coordination duties, the MSFD obliges the 
Member States to “consider the implications of their programmes of measures 
on waters beyond their marine waters in order to minimise the risk of damage 
to, and if possible have a positive impact on, those waters”.66 Taking into 
account the general duties under UNCLOS,67 this provision requires that 
Member States ensure at a minimum that they do not cause damage or threats 
of damage, or transfer damage to areas in the high seas.68
Although some topics have been expressly excluded from the MSFD, the 
wording of the policy does not clearly indicate its substantive scope. One 
might argue that the scope is determined by the MFSD’s regulatory purpose, 
which is to oblige the Member States to develop and implement strategies that 
enable them to achieve good environmental status by 2020. The policy does 
not aim at a comprehensive joint codification of existing measures for the 
protection of the marine environment, nor does it attempt to alter them. 
Accordingly, the Member States must take into account relevant Community 
law when designing their programmes of measures.69 Where these programmes 
include spatial protection measures, legislation must adequately cover those 
areas identified under measures such as the Habitats Directive or the Birds 
Directive, as well as any relevant international agreements.70
The MSFD also expressly excludes a number of areas from its substantive 
scope. It does not apply to “activities the sole purpose of which is defence or 
65 See MSFD Art. 5(2), Art. 6(1) and (2), Art. 3(9), Recitals 13 and 20. Although the MSFD 
is in general not applicable in Member States without marine waters, they shall, nonetheless, 
be integrated in coordination where appropriate. See Recital 15 and Art. 6(2) of the MSFD.
66 MSFD, Art. 13(8).
67 See Art. 192 et seq. of the 1982 United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (LOSC).
68 MSFD, Recital 17.
69 MSFD, Art. 13(2).
70 MSFD, Art. 13(4) and (5).
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national security”.71 Furthermore, measures regulating fisheries management 
can only be taken in the context of the Common Fisheries Policy. 72 In addi-
tion, the Directive does also not address the regulation of discharges and emis-
sions resulting from the use of radioactive material, which falls within the 
sphere of Articles 30 and 31 of EURATOM. 73 
The hierarchy of norms and the competences set out in Community law74 
suggests that the existing rules from areas such as agricultural policy or sea 
traffic75 may not be modified by the Member States’ programmes. This is 
reflected in the MSFD’s Articles 15(1) and (2): “Where a Member State iden-
tifies an issue which has an impact on the environmental status of its marine 
waters […] linked to another Community policy or international agreement, 
it shall inform the Commission accordingly and provide a justification to 
substantiate its view.” The Commission “reflects” the Member States’ notifica-
tion and recommendation under Article 15(2) “as appropriate” when present-
ing related proposals to the European Parliament or the Council.76
The following sections will examine more closely the different procedural 
steps and legal requirements that address the action plan’s development and 
implementation. 
The Initial Assessment
Member States are to make an initial assessment of their marine waters in 
respect of each marine region or sub-region by 15 July 2012.77 The marine 
regions are defined in the MSFD as the Baltic Sea, the North-east Atlantic 
71 MSFD, Art. 2(2), Art. 13(4) and (5).
72 MSFD, Recital 39. In relation to the Fisheries Policy, a contradiction seems to arise. Mem-
ber States ought to consider fish populations in determining the good environmental status 
according to Annex I No. 3. On a subordinate level of measures, this contradiction remains 
insignificant against the background of Art. 15(1) and (2), as well as Recital 39. On the gener-
ally existing conflict of jurisdiction between fisheries policy and environmental policy, see 
T. Markus, op. cit., supra note 9 at 51–64.
73 MSFD, Recital 39.
74 See Arts. 2 and 3 of the Treaty on the Functoining of the Eruopean Union (TFEU); J. Bast 
and A. von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union’s Vertical Order of Competences: the Current 
Law and Proposals for its Reform’ (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 227–268; G. de 
Búrca and B. de Witte , ‘The Delimitation of Powers Between the EU and its Member States’, 
in: A. Arnull and D. Wincott (eds.) Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) 201–222.
75 Agricultural policy is generally based on Art. 43 of the TFEU rules concerning sea traffic on 
the basis of Art. 100 Par. 2, see Proelß, op. cit., supra note 7 at 351 et seq.
76 MSFD, Art. 15(2); see also Art. 13(5) MSFD.
77 MSFD, Art. 5(1) and (8).
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Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea.78 In executing their obliga-
tions, the Member States must take due account of the fact that their marine 
waters form an integral part of these regions by considering the diverse condi-
tions, problems and needs of these areas.79 In order to take into account the 
specificities of a particular area, the Member States can choose to implement 
the Directive by reference to subdivisions at the appropriate level of the marine 
waters referred to in Article 4(1) and (2) of the MSFD.80 The initial assess-
ment also involves determining whether a further subdivision is useful for 
ecological, biological, morphological, or utilization-oriented or spatial plan-
ning reasons.81 
The initial assessment must provide an analysis of the essential features, 
characteristics, and the current environmental status of the waters in question. 
In addition, it should include an investigation of the predominant pressures 
and impacts, including any human activity, as well as an economic and social 
analysis of the use of those waters.82 The analysis of essential features and char-
acteristics, as well as the current environmental status, of the waters must take 
account of the definition of the “environmental status” in Article 3(4) of the 
MSFD and the indicative lists in Annex III Table 1 MSFD. “’Environmental 
status’ means the overall state of the environment in marine waters, taking 
into account the structure, function and processes of the constituent marine 
ecosystems together with natural physiographic, geographic, biological, geo-
logical and climatic factors, as well as physical, acoustic and chemical condi-
tions, including those resulting from human activities inside or outside the 
area concerned.” The analysis must also be based on the indicative lists of ele-
ments set out in Annex III Table 1, which mention physical, chemical, bio-
logical and other features.
The review of the predominant pressures and impacts should be based on 
the indicative lists set out in Annex III Table 2, and cover the qualitative and 
quantitative mix of the various pressures, as well as any discernible trends. 
Furthermore, there must be an examination of the main cumulative and 
synergetic effects and any relevant assessments that have been made under 
78 MSFD, Art. 4(1).
79 MSFD, Recital 10.
80 MSFD, Art. 4(2).
81 See, e.g., Analyse des Bundesamts für Seeschiffart und Hydrographie, Umweltbericht 
zum Raumordnungsplan für die Ausschließliche Wirtschaftszone (AWZ) der Nordsee 
(Ostsee), available at: <www.bsh.de/de/Meeresnutzung/Raumordnung_in_der_AWZ/
index.jsp>.
82 MSFD, Art. 8(1)(a,b and c). 
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existing Community legislation. Annex III Table 2 lists 18 different pressures 
and impacts of a physical, chemical, hydrological and acoustic nature.83
The Member States are then required to draw up an economic and social 
analysis of the distinctive use of the waters and the costs of deterioration of the 
marine environment. The MSFD does not provide illustrative or indicative 
lists to facilitate this. However, the Commission and the European Environ-
mental Agency have substantial experience with such analyses and methodical 
knowledge; data and preparatory work from various “impact assessments” in 
the fisheries or environmental area can be made available to the Member 
States if requested.84 
Both from a practical and logical perspective, selecting or developing uni-
form evaluation criteria and methods precede the initial assessment. These 
criteria constitute the basis (or “epistemic frame”) of the assessment of the 
current environmental status within the meaning of Article 8(1)(a) of the 
MSFD. The criteria, which are based on the initial assessment, are also essen-
tial for determining good environmental status under Article 9(1) of the 
MSFD.85 The selection or development of methods for the initial assessment 
should therefore consider the requirements of Article 9 of the MSFD, which 
contains a list of Descriptors in Annex I. At present, the Member States 
develop assessment criteria and methods for the initial assessment, as well as 
for the description of good environmental status. This is done partly in coop-
eration with each other, and partly with institutions like the Joint Research 
Centre, the International Council for the Exploration of the Seas (ICES) and 
OSPAR.86 However, it must be noted that information on marine water and 
scientific knowledge about assessment criteria currently differ significantly 
between Member States.
The MSFD also deals with the problem of reviewing the consistency of the 
initial assessment criteria.87 The appraisals should take into account the “rele-
vant provisions of existing Community legislation, in particular Directive 
2000/60/EC” for coastal, transitional and territorial waters. Additional mea-
83 MSFD, Art. 8(1)(b).
84 See, e.g., European Commission SEC(2005) 1290, op. cit., supra note 35; Bundesrepu-
blik Deutschland, Operationelles Programm Europäischer Fischereifond, CCI-Nr. 2007/DE 
14 FPO 001, 7. 12. 2007.
85 See also Recital 1 and Annex Part A No. 9 of Draft Commission Decision “of . . . 2010 on 
criteria and methodological standards on good environmental status of marine waters”, 
D009576/02, not officially published yet.
86 More on that in the next subparagraph.
87 MSFD, Art. 8(2) and (3).
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sures, such as the Nitrate Directive,88 Sewage Directive,89 Bathing Water 
Directive90 and Habitats Directive91 will also be important in this respect. The 
coordination measures set out in Articles 5 and 6 of the MSFD will also pro-
mote the application of coherent evaluation methods within the entire marine 
region or sub-region.92 Although the MSFD provides some guidance in this 
area, Member States are confronted with enormous challenges in finding con-
sistent assessment criteria.93 For example, the WFD primarily takes into 
account biological components for its status analysis; the MSFD lists biologi-
cal and other components, and thus is broader in scope than the WFD.94 
Moreover, the MSFD requires an analysis of distinct anthropogenic pressures 
and impacts.95 The WFD groups the ecological status of surface waters into 
five classes, while the MSFD only refers to two classes.96 Such differences must 
be considered when assessing the status of coastal waters, where there is an 
overlap in the scope of the MSFD and the WFD.97 Eventually, a method-
ological approach is to be created that guarantees that methods and assess-
ment criteria under the MSFD meet the requirements of the WFD and other 
relevant Directives.98
Determining the Good Environmental Status
The pivotal aim of the MSFD is that the Member States achieve good envi-
ronmental status as defined in its Article 3(5). According to Article 9(1) of the 
MSFD, Member States shall describe “a set of characteristics for good envi-
ronmental status” for their marine regions by reference to the initial assess-
ment. This description should be based on the “qualitative descriptors listed 
88 Council Directive 91/676/EEC of 12 December 1991 concerning the protection of waters 
against pollution caused by nitrates from agriculture sources, OJ L 375, 31.12.1991.
89 Council Directive 91/271/EEC of 21 May 1991 concerning urban waste-water treatment, 
OJ L 135, 30.5.1991.
90 Directive 2006/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 February 2006 
concerning the management of bathing water quality and repealing Directive 76/160/EEC, 
OJ L 64, 4.3.2006.
91 Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats and 
of wild fauna and flora, OJ L 206, 22.7.1992.
92 MSFD, Art. 8(2) and (3).
93 See opinion of the Federal Environment Agency on the proposal of a Marine Framework 
Directive as part of the European Marine Strategy from 24. 10. 2005 (unpublished).
94 MSFD, Annex III, Table 1.
95 MSFD, Annex III, Table 2.
96 The MSFD only refers to the environmental status and the good environmental status.
97 See above under ‘territorial and substantial scope’.
98 As required by Art. 8(2) and (3) of the MSFD.
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in Annex I“ and consider the indicative lists in Annex III Table 1, as well as 
the pressures and impacts of human action mentioned in Annex III Table 2. 
Article 3(5) of the MSFD puts forward a highly ambitious definition of “good 
environmental status”: 
[T]he environmental status of marine waters where these provide ecologically 
diverse and dynamic oceans and seas which are clean, healthy and productive 
within their intrinsic conditions, and the use of the marine environment is at a 
level that is sustainable, thus safeguarding the potential for uses and activities by 
current and future generations.
This definition is complemented by additional criteria that require, e.g., that 
ecosystems “function fully“ and that anthropogenic inputs “do not cause pol-
lution effects“.99 In the end, however, the content of the words “good environ-
mental status” will be determined by the Member States themselves, based on 
the somewhat unclear descriptors set out in Annex I. The MSFD provides 
further guidance on this issue by requiring the Member States to apply an 
ecosystem approach.100 According to Article 1(3) of the MSFD, the purpose 
of the ecosystem approach is to 
ensur[e] that the collective pressure of such activities is kept within levels com-
patible with the achievement of good environmental status and that the capacity 
of marine ecosystems to respond to human-induced changes is not compromised, 
while enabling the sustainable use of marine goods and services by present and 
future generations.
To ensure coherence, consistency and comparability, the criteria and method-
ological standards for determining good environmental status are to be har-
monised in accordance with the so-called Comitology procedures (regulatory 
procedure).101 In late May 2010, the Commission proposed the “Decision on 
criteria and methodological standards on good environmental status of marine 
waters”.102 The Decision specifies the criteria for assessing the extent to which 
good environmental status is being achieved in relation to each descriptor 
listed in Annex I of the MSFD. Explanations and definitions are based on 
assessments by task groups set up by ICES and the Joint Research Centre, as 
 99 See Art. 3(5)(a) and (b) of the MSFD.
100 MSFD, Art. 3(5) subparagraph 2.
101 MSFD, Art. 9(3) and Art. 25(3).
102 Draft Commission Decision “of 2010 on criteria and methodological standards on good 
environmental status of marine waters” (not in the Official Journal yet). 
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well as consultations with the secretariats of regional seas conventions.103 
Although the Decision clarifies most of the descriptors for good environmen-
tal status, the Commission also notes that there is “substantial need to develop 
additional scientific understanding” for others.104 In principle, Member States 
are required to consider each of the criteria and related indicators listed in the 
Commission Decision’s Annex, “in order to identify those which are to be 
used to determine good environmental status”.105 If, on the basis of the initial 
assessment, it is their view that it is not appropriate to use one or more of 
these criteria, they are required to provide a justification to the Commission.106 
Three of these descriptors will be explained in greater detail below in order to 
provide examples of the approach under the Commission Decision, as well as 
to highlight some problems associated with it.
Descriptor 1 of Annex I of the MSFD requires that 
[b]iological diversity is maintained. The quality and occurrence of habitats and 
the distribution and abundance of species are in line with prevailing physio-
graphic, geographic and climatic conditions. 
The Draft Commission Decision states that an assessment is required at sev-
eral ecological levels, i.e., species, habitats and ecosystems. The species assess-
ment should consider species distribution (range, pattern, area covered), 
population size (abundance and/or biomass) and population condition 
(demographic characteristics or genetic structure). The habitat assessment 
should take into account habitat distribution (range, pattern), extent (area, 
volume, where relevant), and condition (typical species and communities, 
relative abundance and/or biomass, as appropriate, as well as physical, hydro-
logical and chemical conditions). The ecosystem analysis includes an assess-
ment of the ecosystem structure (i.e., composition and relative proportion of 
103 See Recitals 2 and 5 of the Draft Commission Decision; see also JNCC, Marine Strategy 
Framework Directive Newsletter, available at: <www.defra.gov.uk/marine/pdf/environment> 
(August 2009). With regard to evaluation methods and procedures existing prior to the adop-
tion of the MSFD, see, e.g., D5 “eutrophication”: OSPAR Commission, Ecological Quality 
Objectives for the Greater North Sea with Regard to Nutrients and Eutrophication Effects (2005); 
D3 “commercial fish stocks”: see, e.g., ICES, Report of the ICES Advisory Committee on Fishery 
Management, Advisory Committee on the Marine Environment and Advisory Committee on Eco-
systems—Book I (ICES, Copenhagen, 2007); D 10 “marine litter”: OSPAR Commission, 
Marine Litter in the North-East Atlantic Region (2009); see also Marine Conservation Society 
(MCS), Beachwatch 2007—The 15th Annual Beach Litter Survey Report, Ross-On-Wye 2008, 
available at: <www.adoptabeach.org.uk> (Stand: August 2009).
104 Draft Commission Decision, Recital 3.
105 See Art. 1 and Annex Part A, No. 8 of the Draft Commission Decision.
106 Annex Part A, No. 8 of the Draft Commission Decision.
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ecosystem components for both habitats and species). Eventually, these crite-
ria will provide a broad framework for the assessment of ecosystems. Method-
ologies and characteristics of species, habitats and ecosystems are to be 
determined by the Member States.
Descriptor 3 of Annex I of the MSFD requires that “[p]opulations of all 
commercially exploited fish and shellfish are within safe biological limits, 
exhibiting a population age and size distribution that is indicative of a healthy 
stock”. The Commission Decision refers to three important indicators of the 
health of the population: fishing pressure, reproduction capacity of fish stocks, 
and population age and size distribution. Fishing pressure is to be determined 
by two additional indicators: fishing mortality and catch/biomass ratio. Fish-
ing mortality is defined in the Draft Decision, which states that “achieving 
good environmental status requires F values [(mortality rate)] are equal or 
lower than F-MSY, the level capable of producing Maximum Sustainable 
Yield”—and an even lower mortality for mixed fisheries. Where information 
on fishing mortality rates is not available, the catch/biomass ratio yielding 
MSY can be taken as an indicative reference. ”The value for the indicator that 
reflects F-MSY needs to be determined by scientific judgment [. . .].” Alterna-
tively, Member States may base their assessment on the reproductive capacity 
of stocks or population age and size distribution. While the primary indicator 
for the reproductive capacity is the spawning stock biomass “that would 
achieve MSY under a fishing mortality equal to F-MSY”, the secondary indi-
cator, i.e., the “biomass index” requires that there is a “high probability that 
the [respective] stock will be able to replenish itself under the existing exploi-
tation conditions”. The final criteria for an indicator, i.e., “population age and 
size distribution”, are basically built on the idea that “healthy stocks” are char-
acterized by high survival of old, large individuals (proportion of large fish, 
mean maximum length, 95 percentile of the fish length distribution observed 
in research vessel surveys, size at first sexual maturity). The criteria with respect 
to fish stocks are quite specific and appear to be very complex and difficult to 
implement.107 In certain instances, the implementation process may be hin-
dered by the fact that there are insufficient data available to apply them. For 
example, in 2007 only 29 of 126 Total Allowable Catches (TACs) set under 
the Common Fisheries Policy were based on full scientific assessment.108
Descriptor 2 of Annex I of the MSFD is concerned with the introduction 
of energy, including underwater noise. It requires that the introduction is at 
levels “that do not adversely affect the marine environment”. The Commis-
107 See also, Markus, op. cit., supra note 10.
108 COM(2007) 295 final at 5.
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sion explains that additional scientific and technical progress is required to 
support the development of the criteria related to this descriptor in order to 
determine the “impact on marine life”. At present, the “main orientations for 
the measurement of underwater noise have been identified as a first priority in 
relation to assessment and monitoring.” Accordingly, Member States are 
required to assess and monitor different sounds based on criteria with respect 
to distribution in time and place, which are set out in the Draft Decision.109
These three examples show that some of the criteria remain unclear (e.g., 
energy and sound), while others are more clear but quite general (e.g., biodi-
versity), and others are specific but appear to be very complex and difficult to 
implement (e.g., fish stocks).110 The Commission’s Draft Decision offers 
Member States alternative criteria, as well as the possibility to “opt-out” of 
certain criteria where these are deemed inappropriate based on initial assess-
ment and provided that justification is given to the Commission. Given the 
differences in ecosystems throughout the EU, as well as the complexity of 
some of the criteria (e.g., fish), this flexible approach seems appropriate. On 
the other hand, descriptors must be comparable. For implementation pur-
poses, even where the criteria are relatively precise for certain descriptors, there 
may be insufficient data available to apply them. The MSFD and Draft Com-
mission Decision both note these challenges and propose that an adaptive 
management strategy be used to circumvent this problem.111 The Commis-
sion also emphasizes the need to develop scientific knowledge about the func-
tioning of the oceans.112 On the whole, the Member States appear to have a 
large amount of discretion in determining good environmental status. This 
discretion provides room for political value judgments.113 Eventually, success 
will thus depend on how the Member States value the marine environment, 
109 For current developments, see International Council for the Exploration of the Seas 
(ICES), Report of the Ad-hoc Group on the Impacts of Sonar on Cetacean and Fish (AGISC), 
Copenhagen, 2005; Marine Mammal Commission (Advisory Committee on Acoustic Impacts 
on Marine Mammals), Report to the Marine Mammal Commission, Washington D.C., 2005; 
National Research Council (NRC), Marine Mammal Populations and Ocean Noise: Determin-
ing When Noise Causes Biologically Significant Effects, (National Academic Press, Washington 
D.C., 2005).
110 See also Markus, op. cit., supra note 10.
111 See particularly Art. 12 of the MSFD. 
112 See also Commission (EC), Communication from the Commission to the Council, the Euro-
pean Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: 
A European Strategy for Marine and Maritime Research—A coherent European Research Area 
framework in support of a sustainable use of oceans and seas, COM(2008) 534 final, Brussels, 
3 September 2008.
113 L.D. Mee and others, ‘How good is good? Human values and Europe’s proposed 
Marine Strategy Directive’ (2008) 56 Marine Pollution Bulletin 187–204.
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such as which pressures and risks they will deem acceptable, and whether they 
will be able to implement and apply the chosen criteria.
Determination of Environmental Goals
The Member States are to establish a comprehensive set of environmental 
targets and associated indicators for their marine waters for each marine region 
by 15 July 2012, in order to guide progress towards achieving good environ-
mental status.114 These should take into account existing environmental tar-
gets at the national, Community or international levels, as well as the indicative 
lists set out in Table 2 of Annex III and the characteristics listed in Annex IV. 
Annex VI is particularly useful as it specifies these obligations and makes var-
ious requirements regarding the definition of environmental targets. For 
example, the Member States must define measurable goals and associated 
indicators that allow for monitoring and assessment.115 They shall also specify 
the resources needed to achieve the goals, formulate targets with a timescale 
for their achievement and pay due consideration to social and economic 
concerns.116 
Establishing and Implementing Monitoring Programmes
The Member States are to establish and implement coordinated monitoring 
programmes on the basis of the initial assessment by 15 July 2014 for the 
ongoing assessment of the environmental status, and in accordance with the 
requirements in the indicative lists in Annexes III and the environmental tar-
gets laid down in Article 10 of the MSFD.117 The monitoring programmes 
should be compatible within marine regions and build upon the relevant 
assessment and monitoring provisions laid down in Community legislation 
and international agreements.118 Within three months of their establishment, 
the Member States are required to notify the Commission of their monitoring 
programmes.119
114 MSFD, Art. 10.
115 MSFD, Annex IV, No. 3(b).
116 MSFD, Annex IV, Nos. 5, 6 and 9.
117 MSFD, Art. 11(1).
118 Ibid., subparagraph 2.
119 MSFD, Art. 11(3).
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Assessment of Preparatory Measures by the Commission
At the end of the preparation phase, Article 12 of the MSFD provides that the 
Commission will assess the Member States’ determinations of the good envi-
ronmental status, the environmental targets and the monitoring programmes 
on the basis of “whether, in the case of each Member State, the elements noti-
fied constitute an appropriate framework to meet the requirements of this 
Directive”. According to Article 12 of the MSFD, the Commission “shall 
consider the coherence of frameworks within the different marine regions or 
subregions and across the Community.” The Commission’s reference points 
appear to be rather vague. Accordingly, Article 12 of the MSFD does not 
assign the Commission the authority to direct; it can only advise the Member 
States to adopt modifications that it considers to be necessary.
Programmes of Measures (Development and Entry into Operation)
Member States are required to identify the measures that need to be taken in 
order to achieve or maintain good environmental status by 2015 at the latest.120 
In doing so, they must consider the kinds of measures mentioned in Annex VI 
(e.g., input and output controls, spatial and temporal distribution controls, 
etc.). They shall also take into account certain relevant measures under Com-
munity legislation.121 When drawing up the programme of measures, Mem-
ber States must give due consideration to sustainable development and, “in 
particular”, to the social and economic impacts of the measures envisaged.122 
Furthermore, it is explicitly mentioned in the MSFD’s recitals that those mea-
sures should be devised on the basis of “precautionary principle and the prin-
ciples that preventive action should be taken, that environmental damage 
should, as a priority, be rectified at source and that the polluter should pay”.123 
Member States should also ensure that measures are cost-effective and techni-
cally feasible, and carry out impact assessments, including cost-benefit analy-
ses, prior to the introduction of any new measure.124 In addition, programmes 
of measures must include spatial protection measures, contributing to coher-
ent and representative networks of MPAs.125 Member States must notify the 
Commission and any other affected Member State of their programmes of 
120 MSFD, Art. 13(1).
121 MSFD, Art. 13(2).
122 MSFD, Art. 13(3).
123 MSFD, Recitals 27 and 44.
124 MSFD, Art. 13(3).
125 MSFD, Art. 13(4).
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measures, within three months of their establishment.126 Member States must 
also ensure that the programmes are made operational within one year of their 
creation (by 2016).127
The Commission will assess whether the Member States’ programmes con-
stitute an appropriate framework that meets the requirements of the MSFD.128 
As with the determination of good environmental status, as well as environ-
mental targets and monitoring programmes, the Commission only checks for 
coherence of measures within the different marine regions, across the Com-
munity and with the requirements in the MSFD. It may provide “guidance” 
to the Member States on any modifications it considers necessary.129
Where a Member State identifies an issue which has an impact on the envi-
ronmental status of its marine waters and which cannot be tackled by mea-
sures adopted at national level, or an issue which is linked to another 
Community policy or international agreement, it must inform the Commis-
sion accordingly and provide a justification to substantiate its view.130 The 
Commission can, “as appropriate”, reflect Member States’ initiatives when 
presenting legislative proposals to the European Parliament and to the Coun-
cil. This provision aims at maintaining the existing order of competences, 
particularly in the areas of fisheries and agricultural policies.131 The problem is 
that, in principle, the Community has an exclusive competence in the area of 
fisheries management and shares competences with Member States in the area 
of environmental policy. For example, where fishery activities are to be 
restricted in the interest of marine conservation (for whose protection Mem-
ber States may be competent or even obliged under Community law), Mem-
ber States may do so only in accordance with Community fisheries law.132 In 
order to safeguard Community competences in the area of fisheries, the MSFD 
has opted for a cooperative solution.133
126 MSFD, Art. 13(9).
127 MSFD, Art. 13(10) and Art. 5(2)(b)(ii).
128 MSFD, Art. 16.
129 Ibid.
130 MSFD, Art. 15.
131 See above under ‘geographical and substantial scope’.
132 R. Churchill and D. Owen, The EC Common Fisheries Policy (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010) at 192–193, 263–266; Markus, op. cit., supra note 9 at 51 et seq.
133 Ibid.; see also Commission Guidelines for the establishment of the Natura 2000 networks 
in the marine environment, available at: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/nature/natura
2000/marine/index_en.htm>.
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Exceptions
According to Article 14(1)(a) to (e) of the MSFD, Member States may iden-
tify instances where the environmental targets or good environmental status 
cannot be achieved through measures taken by the Member State134 or cannot 
be achieved within the scheduled time.135 Exceptions are, inter alia, permitted 
where an action or inaction exists for which the Member State concerned is 
not responsible, or where natural causes or force majeure hinder the achieve-
ment. In addition, they can be justified where “modifications or alterations to 
the physical characteristics of marine waters brought about by actions taken 
[by the Member States themselves] for reasons of overriding public interest 
which outweigh the negative impact on the environment” exist.136 The latter 
exception, for example, might apply to the planning and establishment of 
off-shore wind farms or off-shore gas pipelines which, in turn, may contribute 
to a reduction of greenhouse gases.137 The Member State concerned must 
unambiguously identify such instances in its programme of measures and sub-
stantiate its view to the Commission. Nevertheless, the Member States are 
required to take appropriate ad hoc measures that continue to pursue the envi-
ronmental targets and prevent further deterioration in the status of the marine 
waters.138
In addition to the exceptions laid down in Article 14(1), Article 14(4) of 
the MSFD contains a broad “general exception”. In principle, Member States 
are obliged to adopt all of the preparatory measures and prepare and imple-
ment programmes of measures. However, they are not required “to take spe-
cific steps where there is no significant risk to the marine environment, or 
where the costs would be disproportionate (taking account of the risks to the 
marine environment), and provided that there is no further deterioration.”139 
134 MSFD, Art. 14(1)(a) to (d).
135 SFD, Art. 14(e) and Recitals 29 to 32.
136 Brackets were inserted by the authors. See also MSFD, Recital 30.
137 It should be noted that a similar exemption exists in Art. 4(7) of the WFD. However, 
Art. 4(7) of the WFD creates more stringent and clearer criteria under which exemptions are 
possible. Against this background, it may be assumed that Art. 14(1)(d) MSFD grants Mem-
ber States a wide margin of political discretion, providing them with greater latitude to argue 
that the exemption in Art. 14 MSFD applies to their situation and that the environmental 
target or good environmental status cannot be achieved in every respect.
138 MSFD, Art. 14(1) subparagraph 3.
139 Italics have been inserted by the author. For cost reasons, the exception was added because 
some Member States were of the opinion that the goal of achieving environmental status 
potentially impinges on the proportionality principle; see Commission of the European Com-
munities, Report from the Commission on subsidiarity and proportionality (15th report on Better 
Lawmaking, 2007), COM(2008) 586 final, Brussels, 26 September 2008 at 9.
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Only the initial assessment is excluded from the general exception. If a  Member 
State decides against taking any measures, it must provide the Commission 
with the necessary justification to substantiate that decision, “while avoiding 
that the good environmental status is permanently compromised”. It should 
be noted that the German and the French version of the Directive refer to 
“erhebliche Gefahr” or “risque important”, respectively. However, these terms 
are not necessarily congruent with the English understanding of the legal term 
“significant risk”; they are likely to refer to different degrees of or potential for 
damage. More fundamentally, it is unclear what would constitute a “signifi-
cant risk”. Possible examples could include oil-tanker collisions, submerged 
WWII bombs, sunken submarines, etc. However, would fish stocks that fall 
outside of safe biological limits also constitute a significant risk? In addition, 
it appears to be somewhat contradictory that Article 14(4) requires that “the 
good environmental status is [not] permanently compromised”, but at the 
same time demands that “that there is no further deterioration” to the marine 
environment.140 This could mean that the current environmental status has to 
be maintained while potential measures may be postponed to a later date. 
At present, the extent to which the Member States will make use of this 
opt-out option is unclear. However, the “opt-out potential” of Article 14 is 
quite substantial and appears to contradict the purpose of the MSDF: thus it 
has the potential to erode the MSDF’s positive impacts.141 When the Member 
States present their programmes of measures—by 2015 at the latest—it will 
eventually be shown what effect the opt-out clause will have.
Public Participation and the Commission’s Reporting Obligations 
Member States must ensure that all interested parties are given early and effec-
tive opportunities to participate in the implementation of the Directive.142 
Therefore, Member States are required to publish a summary of all of the ele-
ments of their marine strategies and the related updates and make these avail-
able to the public for comment.143 In addition, information and data related 
to the Marine Strategy must also be made available to the Commission and 
the European Environment Agency.144
140 We thank Dr. Harald Ginzky from the German Federal Environmental Agency for making 
us aware of this contradiction.
141 See R. Barnes and D. Metcalfe, op. cit., supra note 63 at 82; J. Falke, ‘Neue Entwicklungen 
im Europäischen Umweltrecht’ (2009) Zeitschrift für Umweltrecht 505–509.
142 MSFD, Art. 19(1).
143 MSFD, Art. 19(2).
144 MSFD, Art. 19(3).
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The Commission faces extensive reporting duties under the new policy. For 
instance, it is required to publish a first evaluation report on the implementa-
tion of the MSFD within two years of receiving information provided by the 
Member States on their programmes of measures.145 Furthermore, the Com-
mission must report on any progress achieved in the establishment of MPAs 
by 2014.146
Coherence, Coordination, and Harmonisation
In addition to achieving good environmental status, the MSFD intends to 
“contribute to coherence between, and aim to ensure the integration of envi-
ronmental concerns into, the different policies, agreements and legislative 
measures which have an impact on the marine environment.”147 The legal 
framework required for achieving these objectives should provide an overall 
course of action and ensure that it is “coordinated, consistent and properly 
integrated with action under other Community legislation and international 
agreements.”148 The question arises, however, whether the MSFD’s provisions 
meet these objectives. Measures that aim to promote coherence, coordination 
and harmonisation remain nonbinding to a large extent. Although the MSFD 
requires that the Member States consider existing regulation (duty to aim at 
consistency)149 and to coordinate themselves regionally (duty to aim at 
coordination),150 it largely fails to provide clear guidance and concrete rules 
on how to implement these obligations. Accordingly, the policy grants the 
Commission a more limited advisory mandate for responding to the notifica-
tions of Member States made in accordance with Articles 9(2), 10(2) and 
11(3), 13(9).151
Some concerns remain in terms of implementation. First, for several rea-
sons that are not entirely clear, the Member States seem to have disparate 
interests regarding the implementation of the MSFD, and, as a result, their 
willingness to cooperate might suffer. A weak commitment to cooperation, 
in turn, might substantially undermine the operation of the MSFD. The sec-
ond implementation issue concerns the coordination of the marine environ-
mental policies with other policy sectors that are primarily governed by the 
145 MSFD, Art. 20(1).
146 MSFD, Art. 21(1).
147 MSFD, Art. 1(4), Recital 9.
148 MSFD, Recital 9. 
149 See Art. 8(2), Art. 1(1) subparagraph 2; Art. 13(2 and 4) of the MSFD.
150 MSFD, Recital 1 and Art. 3(9), Art. 5(2), Art. 6, Art. 8(3). 
151 See Arts. 12 and 16 of the MSFD.
T. Markus et al. /
86 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 26 (2011) 59–90
Community: it could be problematic that Member States only have the right 
to draw up initiatives which might not lead to concrete action beyond the 
national level. If a Member State identifies issues which have an impact on the 
marine environment and cannot be tackled by adopting national legislation, 
the only action they can take is to provide supporting information to the 
appropriate Community organ or international entity in the hope that this 
cause will be taken up. This criticism is particularly relevant to the areas of 
fisheries and agricultural policy, as these areas are significant for marine envi-
ronmental protection.152 As it stands, the success of the Member States’ envi-
ronmental initiatives remain under the auspices of the responsible DG of the 
Commission, the Council in its specific departmental composition, or the 
competent international body. The question may be raised whether such an 
approach can help in the near future to overcome those sectoral approaches 
that the MSFD actually intends to overcome.153
Instruments
The MSFD does not introduce any concrete conservation measures at Com-
munity or national levels. It only demands that Member States add spatial 
protection measures to their programmes of measures,154 which are to be 
devised according to the list in Annex VI.155 For instance, these measures are 
to regulate the extent or quality of human activities or limits of disturbance of 
ecosystems. Furthermore, Annex VI mentions “measures that influence the 
where and the when an activity is allowed to occur”. In addition, the MSFD 
proposes instruments for improving tracing of contamination, as well as for 
setting economic incentives.
Implementation Requirements
Member States must bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with the Directive by 15 July 2010.156 This 
means that they integrate the Directive into their national laws and give effect 
to them. Two points may guide this process. First, the MSFD primarily aims 
152 MSFD, Arts. 13(5) and 15(1 and 2).
153 On the sectoral approach of the Fisheries Policy, see Markus, op. cit., supra note 9 at 
17–26.
154 MSFD, Art. 13(4); “Given the wide sweep of the proposed IMP, with its attention to the 
multitude of uses of marine space, [. . .] maritime spatial planning has become a focal point of 
attention in EU institutions”, see Juda, op. cit., supra note 20 at 444.
155 MSFD, Art. 13(1) subparagraph 2. 
156 MSFD, Art. 26(1).
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at protecting the marine environment. Second, its scope and objectives, struc-
ture, and system of indicators closely relate to and must be aligned with those 
of the WFD and other Directives concerned with fresh water. Both aspects 
could support the integration of the MSFD into the water laws of the Mem-
ber States. However, such a code appears to be too complex to handle in 
practice. Accordingly, the MSFD should be transposed into a stand-alone 
national marine environmental framework law, which explicitly refers to all of 
the relevant provisions in the Member State’s water and nature protection and 
planning codes. Finally, by 15 July 2010, the Member States are required to 
designate an authority (or more) for each marine region or subregion to imple-
ment the MSFD.157
Evaluation
The following two sections will highlight the challenges for implementing the 
EU’s integrated ocean policies, particularly its most developed environmental 
pillar, the MSFD. In addition, some critical remarks will be made.
Implementation
The EU and its Member States must surmount several hurdles on their way to 
an integrated ocean policy, i.e., the EU’s IMP. First, an initial assessment must 
provide a sufficient and shared understanding of the status of the marine envi-
ronment, the pressures to which it is exposed, the state of regulation and 
finally the relevant interests and policy objectives within the different sectors. 
To this end, Member States must develop a “common language” or a shared 
“epistemic frame”. This means that scientific concepts for describing the 
marine environment have to become congruent. This alone creates major dif-
ficulties. Looking at the complex set of descriptors and indicators listed in 
Annexes I, III and IV of the MSFD, Member States face a major challenge in 
coming up with a coherent implementation concept that makes use of these 
benchmarks when defining good environmental status and establishing envi-
ronmental targets, etc. A common understanding of the legal terminology is 
also required when interpreting the measures set out in the IMP and MSFD. 
The complexity of the political process has meant that important legal con-
cepts remain vague. For example, the understanding of “significant risk” may 
differ between Member States. 
157 MSFD, Art. 7(1).
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To overcome these hurdles, it might be worth assigning the development of 
descriptors and indicators and specific questions regarding the implementa-
tion of the MSFD to a scientific body associated with the Commission. This 
is usually done within the context of other Community policies that also rely 
heavily on scientific advice.158 A second barrier to an integrated oceans policy 
is the significant number of different legal requirements that exist under EU 
and international law. It is necessary that the EU and its Member States take 
into account the wide range of legal concepts and obligations, as well as the 
substantial and territorial scope of existing legislation (as well as implementa-
tion criteria) when implementing the measures set out in the IMP and MSFD. 
This ultimately requires a coordination of efforts, particularly for actions 
planned and taken in different sectors. Third, the competence order under 
(primary) Community law must be respected. Although the Member States 
decide for themselves what they consider to be good environmental status, 
some issues can only be regulated at EU level (e.g., fisheries). In that sense, 
interests may collide and must be balanced appropriately—particularly by the 
Council—on fisheries and agriculture.159 Ultimately, establishing scientific 
concepts and coordinating efforts on a number of different governance levels 
requires a large amount of good will from Member States and the relevant 
sectors involved. In the end, it will not be possible for a single Member State 
or sector to achieve good environmental status by acting alone.
Critical Remarks
It may be argued that IMP and MSFD have achieved very little with respect 
to the goal of integrating and harmonising existing Community and national 
law on the protection of the marine environment. At present, the IMP is basi-
cally in the process of developing and structuring coordination and commu-
nication between sectors. Indeed, the MSFD does not impose any concrete 
environmental conservation standards or instruments.160 The objectives, tar-
gets, implementation concepts and even assessment criteria remain vague and 
require further specification during the implementation process. As a result, 
there is an imminent danger that protection requirements will ultimately vary 
across the different marine regions. At the same time, provisions that foster 
158 See, e.g., Arts. 22, 24, 28, 29 et seq. of Regulation (EC) No. 178/2002 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2002 laying down the general principles and 
requirements of food law, establishing the European Food Safety Authority and laying down 
procedures in matters of food safety, OJ L 31, 1.2.2002.
159 See Case C-127/02 Waddenzee [2004] ECR I-7405.
160 MSFD, Recital 43.
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coherence, coordination and harmonisation, including the Commission’s 
competences, are underdeveloped. Regarding the integration of different pol-
icy areas at the Community level, Member States are merely invited to submit 
proposals to the Commission and Council to be considered for future legisla-
tive action “as appropriate”. For these reasons, it remains to be seen whether 
the MSFD will, e.g., contribute in the short term to resolving the long-term 
crisis under the Common Fisheries Policy.161 Moreover, even though Member 
States are required to eventually achieve good environmental status, they have 
been left a wide margin of discretion regarding their individual level of com-
mitment. This applies to the determination of good environmental status and 
to the establishment of environmental targets and programmes of measures. 
In addition, the MSFD has included a number of broadly drafted exceptions 
in Article 14. Member States are only obligated to act where there is a signifi-
cant risk to the marine environment. Against this background it seems ques-
tionable whether the MSFD goes beyond the scope of the existing conservation 
requirements in EU and international law. Furthermore, when setting envi-
ronmental targets and drawing up programmes of measures, Member States 
are allowed to consider social and economic conditions.162 In the light of the 
sustainability principle anchored in primary law this seems to be appropriate. 
However, it is to be hoped that the discretionary margin opened up by this 
provision does not lead to a devaluation of ecological interests.163 In addition, 
the question arises as to whether it would have been appropriate to require 
that the Member States give greater consideration to the environmental status 
of the High Seas.164 At present, the MSFD does not oblige the Member States, 
as flag states, underwater-mining nations, and as sources of pollution whose 
effects are felt far from their origin, to approach the question of High Seas 
conservation systematically. Finally, the MSFD provisions do not explicitly 
refer to the precautionary principle as a legal requirement; only the recitals 
mention that the Member States must base their programmes of measures on 
the precautionary principle.165 Given the substantial knowledge gaps  regarding 
161 Critical already to the proposal of the MSFD, see Rossi, op. cit., supra note 37, at 101–102; 
L. van Hoof and J. van Tatenhove, ‘EU marine policy on the move: The tension between 
fisheries and maritime policy’ (2009) 33 Marine Policy 726–732.
162 MSFD, Annex IV No. 9, Art. 13(3).
163 See, e.g., Markus, op. cit., supra note 10; or, more generally, see G. Winter, ‘A Fundament 
and Two Pillars: The Concept of Sustainable Development 20 Years after the Brundtland 
Report’, in: H.C. Bugge and C. Voigt (eds.) Sustainable Development in International and 
National Law (Europa Law Publishing, Groningen, 2008); see also Juda, op. cit., supra note 23 
at 42.
164 As defined under the LOSC.
165 MSFD, Recitals 27 and 44.
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the effects of anthropogenic pressures on the marine environment, the omis-
sion of this as a requirement is unfortunate.
Conclusions
By 15 July 2012 at the latest, the Member States will have prepared their ini-
tial assessment, description of good environmental status, the definition of 
environmental targets and associated indicators, as well as established and 
implemented a monitoring programme. At present, they are in the process of 
carrying out the initial assessment, which requires that they examine existing 
evaluation criteria or develop new ones. The adoption of the criteria and 
methodological standards for determining good environmental status at Com-
munity level may be seen as a first step in this regard. One crucial challenge is 
to establish consistency among the various methodologies, techniques and 
evaluation systems that are applicable under the different EU measures. It also 
seems that the timeframe might be unrealistic, as many Member States doubt 
that a timely implementation can occur. There is also a lack of data on specific 
marine regions, and this poses enormous financial and temporal challenges 
for some Member States. 
Realistically, the MSFD must be seen for what it is: “not the end, but rather 
another step, in an ongoing process of policy evolution [. . .]”.166 The best case 
is that the MSFD, as a part of the IMP, initiates a dynamic process in the 
development of an integrated marine management programme. In particular, 
it likely that the MSFD will play an important role in the development of the 
methodological standards and assessment criteria. More importantly, given 
the Member States’ initial unwillingness to adopt a far-reaching directive 
(which was partly due to the implementation difficulties with the WFD), the 
MSFD can also be regarded as a promising first step towards an integrated 
ocean policy. It remains to be seen, however, what the Member States are 
eventually willing to commit themselves to within their programmes of mea-
sures which will be published in 2015.
166 Juda, op. cit., supra note 23 at 45.
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EU ocean policies increasingly incorporate regional measures. Under the long standing Common Fisheries
Policy, such measures aim at improving and reforming existing policy, either by taking into account
region specific social or ecologic requirements or by establishing procedures and institutions to achieve
a regional fit. By contrast, the EU’s emerging integrated Marine Environmental Policy was designed to
draw heavily on regional procedural and institutional mechanisms from the outset. The developing regio-
nal measures raise the question whether they contribute to improving institutional structures governing
the use and conservation of EU waters. This article analyzes the existing and future regional measures of
the two policies and their varying purposes and scopes. It develops a typology for categorizing the regio-
nal aspects and examines the effects of regional measures on EU institutions and the theoretical EU inte-
gration debate.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
EU legislature increasingly recognizes that ‘one size fits all solu-
tions’ cannot adequately address special requirements and situa-
tions throughout the 27 Member States with their varying
interests and needs, e.g. taking into account different socio-eco-
nomic and ecologic conditions. Accordingly, the EU has adopted
bespoke measures in the last decades which are more sensitive
to regional conditions and requirements. Such measures may vary
largely in purpose, function, and scope and are either directed at
specific regional areas or establish institutional mechanisms facil-
itating regional interests within EU policy making and implemen-
tation. They include, for example, transboundary coordination and
cooperation requirements for different groups of Member States or
stakeholders composed on the basis of a regional fit.
This raises the question of how the developing notion of ‘regio-
nal measures’ fits into the existing institutional and legal architec-
ture of the EU, particularly with a view to the distribution of tasks,
competences and obligations. It may also be asked whether the
emerging regional arrangements insert an additional layer of
institutionalized decision making or implementation to the EU’s
institutional setup. The answer to this question also contributes
to the theoretical discussion on EU integration, which will briefly
be outlined in the last section of the paper.
We use the examples of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and
the Marine Environmental Policy (MEP), as in both, regional mea-
sures play an increasingly important role. The respective measures
are described and analyzed in depth. Both policies are distinct in
terms of age, content, and the degree of integration. The CFP is
one of the oldest and most integrated EU policies and mainly con-
centrates on managing and allocating fishing opportunities among
Member States. By contrast, EU Marine Environmental Policy is
just emerging, yet quite disintegrated, based on shared competenc-
es and aims at environmental conservation. Despite these funda-
mental differences, both of these policies increasingly make use
of regional measures and concepts in a systematic way. While
regionalization is currently being seriously discussed within the
ongoing reform process of the CFP, it has already become a core as-
pect of the EU’s more recent Marine Environmental Policy, partic-
ularly within its most comprehensive piece of legislation, the
Marine Strategy Framework Directive (MSFD). Regional measures
under both policies are based explicitly on the rationale of ecosys-
tem requirements and a variety of socio-economic conditions
throughout the EU. The increasing recognition of varying regional
needs should also help to overcome persistent deficits in EU policy
making and implementation. Moreover, it is now assumed that
policies which are more sensitive to specific regional conditions
are simpler, cheaper and more effective – technically, economically
as well as ecologically.
The paper proceeds as follows. After outlining the content and
major governance challenges of the Common Fisheries Policy and
the Marine Environmental Policy, the purpose and scope of regio-
nal measures in the two policies will be thoroughly examined.
Based on this descriptive part, an analysis follows, starting with a
typology according to the content, procedure and degree of institu-
tionalization of the different regional measures. A short summary
on the development of the CFP and the MSFD helps understanding
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the different regional framings. In a last step, the potential impacts
on the EU political system as well as on the multi-level governance
approach are discussed.
2. Content and governance challenges of the Common Fisheries
Policy and the Marine Environmental Policy
Governing the oceans depicts a major challenge for the EU. The
problems include the interconnected nature of marine ecosystems,
their fluctuating resources, the transboundary effects of human
activities in the sea, as well as the lack of a comprehensive inte-
grating framework for various existing sectoral marine conserva-
tion measures. The CFP and the emerging MEP are examples of
two different regulatory approaches in the field. On one side they
share their geographical scope, the marine ecosystem. To a limited
extent, they also serve the same objective, i.e. to prevent the dis-
ruption of the ecological equilibrium by destructive (fishing) prac-
tices (Com (2001) 143:4). On the other side, though there may be
overlap between fisheries management and environmental protec-
tion, both have their own distinctive scope and content.1 The quite
different regulatory backgrounds and scopes will be described in the
following section in greater detail.
2.1. The Common Fisheries Policy
In general terms, the CFP is concerned with the sustainable
exploitation of living aquatic resources. This concern requires the
EU to take a broad range of political and legislative actions in a
range of policy areas. Measures can be grouped into three catego-
ries: fisheries management, structural policies, and market organi-
zation. To manage stocks sustainably, the EU in particular limits
fishing opportunities and apportions the available resources
among its Member States, who then allocate their share to their
own fishing industry (Art. 20 (3) Reg. 2371/02). Regarding struc-
tural policies, the EU provides funding to support the fishing sector
in adapting its production capacities to correspond to available re-
sources, all the while promoting efficient production ((EC) No.
1198/06). To organize the market in fisheries products, the EU
takes measures to match supply and demand as well as to stabilize
markets to mitigate the effects of an unstable supply of fisheries
resources ((EC) No. 104/2000; see also COM (2011) 416 final). All
of these actions are based on the provisions on agriculture and
fisheries in Arts. 38–44, and Art. 355 of the Treaty on the Function-
ing of the European Union (TFEU).2 Based on this competence, the
EU also supports the implementation of management, structural,
and market measures by adopting a complex system of control
and enforcement measures, and by negotiating and concluding inter-
national agreements. Overall, the TFEU assigns extensive legislative
powers to the EU in the area of fisheries policy. The EU particularly
holds an ‘exclusive competence’ to regulate the conservation of mar-
ine biological resources.3 Besides, although its legislative powers in
the areas of structural policies and market organization are not
exclusive (but shared), they are far reaching (see Art. 4(2)(d) TFEU;
see also Markus, 2009: 37–38). While legislative powers of the EU
are substantial, executive powers primarily lie with Member States,
who implement, control and enforce the CFP law (Long and Curran,
1998; see also Churchill and Owen, 2009; Markus, 2009).
Although the CFP is one of the longest-standing and most inte-
grated, it is at the same time one of the most criticized of the EU’s
policies (Churchill and Owen, 2009). Despite continued efforts to
improve the CFP, its failure to manage stocks at economically
and environmentally sustainable levels has continued to threaten
the functioning and legitimacy of EU fisheries legislation for almost
three decades. In April of 2009, the Commission issued a Green Pa-
per on the Reform of the CFP in which it once again assessed and
evaluated the CFP’s major governance challenges (COM
(2009)163 final). The Commission identified five central structural
failings: persistent overcapacities (too many vessels for too few
fishes), imprecise policy objectives (no clear rules guiding the leg-
islature management), flaws within the decision-making system
(basically all management decisions are decided by the overly
politicized Council), a lack of responsibility in the industry (lack
of stakeholder involvement), and a persistent culture of non-com-
pliance (particularly the weak control and enforcement by Member
States) (COM (2009)163 final: p. 8; Markus and Salomon, 2012;
Payne, 2000).
2.2. Marine Environmental Policy
Marine Environmental Policy is a relatively new regulatory
field for the European Union. Despite the fast development of
the EU’s general environmental policy, the protection of the mar-
ine environment has long played a minor role. Respective mea-
sures had primarily been adopted in different sectoral policies
and under varying institutional settings (with different legal
bases, different competences, and different actors). These policies
primarily include the CFP, the Common Agricultural Policy, the EU
Transport Policy, the EU Fresh Water Policy and even the Internal
Market (COM(2002) 539 final). To this day, a broad set of second-
ary legislation has been adopted under such policies. Measures
have targeted marine pollution from land-based sources, waste
discharges, shipment of radioactive substances, vessel source pol-
lution, as well as the protection of marine ecosystems from fish-
ing activities (Frank 2007; Markus et al., 2011). In contrast to the
CFP, these measures are based on a set of different TFEU4
provisions.
However, the development of a Marine Environmental Policy
has gained momentum since the adoption of the Marine Strategy
Framework Directive (MSFD) which now constitutes the central le-
gal instrument that integrates and develops existing marine envi-
ronmental protection law.5 Its main goal is to establish a
comprehensive framework within which ‘Member States shall take
the necessary measures to achieve or maintain good environmental
status in the marine environment by the year 2020 at the latest’
(MSFD, Art. 1(1)). To achieve its goals, a ‘transparent and coherent
legislative framework is required’ which enables coordinated, con-
sistent and properly integrated action with ‘action under other Com-
munity legislation and international agreements’ (Recital 9, MSFD).
1 This is also recognized within the jurisdiction of the ECJ, see Case C-405/92,
Mondiet v. Armement Islais [1993] I-6133, para. 24; for other policy areas see, Case
62/88 Greece v. Council [1990] ECR I-1527, paras. 5-23; Case C-336/00, Huber [2002]
I-7699, paras. 29-37; see particularly Case C-164-165/97, Parliament v. Council
[1999] ECR I-1139, paras. 8-20.
2 Until the enactment of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the relevant articles
were Arts. 32–38 TFU – particularly Art. 37(2), third paragraph as well as Art. 299(1)
and (2).
3 See Arts 2 (1) and 3 (1) (d) TFEU; see also Case 804/79 Commission v. United
Kingdom [1981] ECR 1045 para. 1; Case 141/78 France v. United Kingdom [1979] ECR
2923 para. 1 (summary); Case 405/92 Mondiet [1993] ECR I-6133 para 12.
4 According to the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the choice of the legal basis must
be founded on objective elements and open for judicial review by the ECJ. Where a
measure is adopted to pursue two or even more objectives, the ECJ refers to its
‘‘centre of gravity theory’’, i.e. Art. 192 is the correct legal base where the main
emphasis of a measure lies on environmental protection. Where it lies on agriculture,
fisheries or the free movement of goods, other TFEU provisions, legislative procedures
and competence orders apply, see Case C 155/91 Commission v. Council [1993] ECR I-
939, paras. 5-21; Case 165/87, Commission v. Council [1988] ECR 5545, para. 5; Case
176/03, Commission v. Council [2004] ECR I-11671, para. 51; Cases 188-190/80,
France, Italy and United Kingdom v. Commission[1982], ECR 2545, para. 6.
5 It is the most developed part of the EU’s emerging IMP and is widely referred to as
its ‘‘environmental pillar’’, see MSFD, Recital 3; see also Markus et al. (2011) and Juda
(2010).
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Integrated marine environmental protection is challenged by
various factors. First, substantial knowledge gaps exist regarding
the condition of the seas and the effects of anthropogenic pressures
(incomprehensive and uncoordinated monitoring and evaluation
programmes) (COM(2005) 504 final: 4 and COM(2007) 295 final:
5). Second, existing regimes governing marine environmental con-
servation can be characterized by gaps in the rules and a lack of
overall coordination (rules in place mostly target very specific
problems in certain sectors or policy areas and do not specifically
aim at marine environmental conservation) (Frank, 2007;
COM(2005) 504 final: 3–4). Third, there is a lack of coordination
between Community and international measures (COM(2005)
504 final: 3–4) (conservation measures adopted under interna-
tional agreements and national legislation are often incoherent
and incomprehensive (Birnie et al., 2009: 747; Gillespie, 2007:
107, 122). The same accounts for the coordination between neigh-
boring states. Fourth, it is widely acknowledged that conservation
measures are often significantly restricted in scope and grant a
very limited level of protection for the marine environment.
3. Regional instruments under the Common Fisheries Policy
and the emerging Marine Environmental Policy
In both the CFP and the MEP, regional elements are introduced
increasingly. This subsection tries to evaluate the purposes, con-
tent, and structure of these measures. It will also make clear that
regionalisation strategies are developed in order to overcome some
of the different governance challenges outlined above.
3.1. The purpose behind regional measures
The increasing adoption of regional measures is based on vary-
ing rationales within the two distinct policies. However, it seems
that they are mainly introduced in order to achieve better imple-
mentation by more coordinated actions at a regional level.
In its Green Paper on the Reform of the CFP (Green Paper), the
Commission highlights the need to develop regional elements
therein, particularly by shifting certain aspects of policy making
and implementation to regions. The Commission identifies a fun-
damental flaw within the CFP’s decision-making system and con-
siders it to be at least partly responsible for the bad state of
fisheries resources and the overall sector. It explicitly states that
under the existing management regime ‘all decisions are taken in
Council at the highest political level’ and that the Council of Fish-
eries Ministers ‘decid[es] on each and every detail of the imple-
mentation of the policy’ (COM(2009) 10). This distribution of
decision-making power can simply be explained by the wish of
the Member States to retain the authority deciding how much
and under what conditions (particularly costs) fish may be caught
by their respective industries.6 Accordingly, the Green Paper
proposes a ‘sea change’ with regard to decision-making and bases
its demand on the following arguments (COM(2009) 10–11): First,
the persistent political conflict in the Council must be mitigated.
Second, due to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU Parliament
should increasingly participate in CFP decision-making. If the system
of ‘micro management at the highest political level’ was to be
maintained, decision-making would become even more cumbersome
than it already is. Third, in the view of the Commission, delegating
decision-making away from the highest level would make the
system simpler and cheaper. Finally, shifting power and discretion
for implementation would make policy more ‘sensitive for specific
local conditions and give the industry more responsibility in shaping
their own destiny’.
In the course of the legislative procedure establishing the MSFD,
the Commission had identified three primary reasons to include a
regional approach in its regulatory system. The Commission’s main
argument was that marine ecosystems are transboundary and can-
not be adequately governed, managed and protected by separate
and fragmented national jurisdictions. According to the Commis-
sion, particularly unilateral national approaches are ‘doomed to
fail’ (SEC (2005) 1290: 6). Yet, the Commission recognizes that
overly prescriptive regulations at the EU level would render impos-
sible the recognition of regional features and requirements (COM,
2005, 504: 6). Therefore, the Commission states that ‘appropriate
co-ordination and co-operation between countries bordering sea
regions’ is required (COM (2005) 11).
A second reason for introducing regional measures into the MEP
was that the EU and the Member States had traditionally relied on
international conservation organizations, i.e. regional sea conven-
tions such as OSPAR and HELCOM, to protect their marine environ-
ment. Also the Commission, in describing the status of the marine
environment and the conservation efforts undertaken so far,
explicitly stated that the excellent work of many of these conven-
tions contributed to improving marine protection (COM (2005)504
final). The perception of regional sea conventions as adequate fora
for cooperation and coordination in marine environmental policies
for governing regional seas led to the intention to structure their
developing MEP accordingly. In addition, it was hoped that a dupli-
cation of work could be avoided, that inconsistent outcomes and a
lack of coordination could be overcome, and that control and
enforcement could be improved (COM (2005) 505 final).
Third, during the development of the MSFD it became clear that
Member States were unwilling to support the adoption of a com-
prehensive regulation at EU level which would eventually restrict
their possibilities to act autonomously in the area of marine envi-
ronmental law. Instead, the Commission had to propose an ap-
proach that would balance these Member States’ interests with
the needs for transboundary marine environmental protection.
Accordingly, the MSFD only proposed common objectives and
principles defined at EU level, and the establishment of ‘European
Marine Regions’ as management units for implementation, on the
basis of hydrological, oceanographic and bio-geographic features
(COM (2005) 504). The Commission considered the choice of
adopting a broad and general ‘strategy framework directive’ as a
flexible approach which allows respecting the subsidiarity princi-
ple. The proposal could thus be interpreted as a compromise be-
tween leaving marine environmental policies in the Member
States responsibility entirely and an overly prescriptive uniform
EU legislation.
Clearly, the motives for introducing regional measures in the
two policies vary. While in the case of the CFP, regionalisation ad-
dresses specific governance failings of a well established and inte-
grated common policy, regional measures within the MEP should
be interpreted as a strategy that allows common and coordinated
actions of groups of Member States in the complex policy area of
marine environmental conservation.
3.2. Existing and future regional measures under the Common
Fisheries Policy and the Marine Environmental Policy
The following section comprises an analysis of the design, the
tasks, and the function of regional measures in the two policies
areas. In a first step, the competence order of the two policies will
be examined in order to clarify the scope for potential regional
measures. A detailed analysis of the present and futures aspects
of the CFP and the MSFD follows.
6 For a good illustration of Member States’ interests, see Churchill and Owen (2009)
and Lequesne (2004).
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3.3. Distribution of tasks under the Common Fisheries Policy
Based on its competences under primary law, the EU (then EEC)
adopted a comprehensive CFP in 1983 (EEC) No. 170/83).7 Ever
since, its primary objective has been to keep exploitation at sustain-
able levels.8 To this end, the EU currently limits fishing opportunities
by adopting total allowable catches (TACs) (see, for example, the an-
nual TAC regulation for 2010 (EU) No. 23/2010), effort limitations
((EC No. 1954/03, EC No. 1415/04),9 technical, control and enforce-
ment measures (e.g., (EC) No. 1224/2009). Annually, the EU appor-
tions the available resources among its Member States. In the area
of structural policies, the EU has established detailed conditions un-
der which aid may be granted to the EU’s fisheries sector. EU struc-
tural funds are provided for adapting production capacities to
correspond to the available resources, increasing the competitive-
ness of the sector, creating socioeconomic stability and social cohe-
sion within different fishing regions, and promoting environmental
friendly fishing ((EC) No. 1198/06).10 Under the market organization,
the Community grants financial aid to the sector to stabilize prices
and markets to mitigate the effects of an unstable supply of fisheries
resources ((EC) No. 104/00). Finally, the Community controls the
implementation of CFP measures by Member States (system of ‘dual
vigilance’, Long and Curran, 1998. pp. 62).
Member States still hold certain decision-making, administra-
tive and legislative powers under the CFP. As they make use of such
powers, they must respect existing EU law as well as the objectives
of the CFP. First of all, Member States determine the methods for
distributing the fishing opportunities assigned to them by the EU.
In this respect, they are free to pursue their own political and reg-
ulatory aims. Member States may also take so-called ‘emergency
measures’ in their territorial seas and Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs). Besides, Member States have the right to take measures
for the conservation and management of fisheries resources within
twelve nautical miles of their baseline.11 In addition, for vessels
flying their flag and subject to certain conditions, Member States
may unilaterally adopt conservation measures for stocks in their
territorial seas and EEZs. They may also restrict fishing in their
territorial seas to vessels that ‘traditionally fish in those waters from
ports on the adjacent coasts’.12 With regard to market organization,
Member States can support producer organizations which, in turn,
implement catch plans, promote the concentration of supply and
stabilize prices (see Art. 5 (1) Reg. 104/2000). As far as structural
policies are concerned, Member States are primarily responsible
for the implementation of Community structural measures and the
determination of how aid is concretely allocated (principle of ‘shared
responsibility’).13 In addition, given that the EU has hardly entered
into regulating non-commercial and fresh water fisheries to this
day, Member States remain widely competent to do so. Finally,
Member States implement, control and enforce EU law.
3.4. Present and future regional aspects of the Common Fisheries Policy
Early on, the CFP has recognized ‘region specific’ management
interests, either based on economic or conservation considerations.
Such regional considerations have also found their way into fisher-
ies management rules. First, recognizing the geographical distribu-
tion of stocks, fishing opportunities (quota) are frequently assigned
to specific areas that subdivide Community waters, i.e., the
so-called ICES-areas.14 Second, different management instruments
apply to different marine regions. Since 1983, specific access restric-
tions apply to specific areas, for example, to the so called ‘Shetland
Box’, an area around the north of Scotland, the Shetland and Orkney
Islands. In addition, special effort regimes have been developed for
large marine areas in the Northeast Atlantic and waters close to
Ireland since the 1990s, e.g. the so called ‘Western Waters’ and the
‘Irish Box’.15 Moreover, a growing number of technical regimes has
been designed to meet the conservation needs of specific marine re-
gions: the North Sea and Atlantic ((EC) No. 850/1998), the Baltic Sea
((EC) No. 2187/05), the Mediterranean ((EC) No. 1967/06), and the
Antarctic ((EC) No. 600/04).
Since 2002, regional approaches under the CFP have also been
developing at an institutional level. As an example, the Commis-
sion increasingly relies on the policy advice of the so-called ‘Regio-
nal Advisory Councils’ (RACs).16 These advisory bodies have been
established so that the CFP may benefit from the knowledge and
experience of fishermen and other stakeholders, and to ‘take into ac-
count the diverse conditions in Community waters’. They have been
referred to as the CFP’s first ‘‘formal attempt to generate a network of
multi-national, multi-interest advisory organizations with a strong
regional focus’’ (Sissenwine and Symes, 2007). RACs have been
formed for the Baltic Sea, the Mediterranean, the North Sea, North-
WesternWaters, South-Western Waters, pelagic stocks and the ‘high
seas/long distant fleet’ ((2007/222/EC); (2007/206/EC); (2006/191/
EC); (2005/668/EC); (2005/606/EC); (2004/774/EC). The RAC execu-
tive committees give annual reports, and develop annual strategic
plans and recommendations for the process leading up to the adop-
tion of management measures (Arts. 4(2), 7(3), 10 of Decision 585/
04). In addition, the Council established the ‘Community Fisheries
Control Agency’ (‘Agency’) for control and enforcement, in April
2005 (EC) No. 768/2005). Its main objective is to ‘organise opera-
tional coordination of fisheries control and inspection activities by
Member States and to assist them to cooperate so as to comply with
the rules of the CFP in order to ensure its effective uniform applica-
tion’ (Art. 1 of Reg. 768/05). The Agency shall, at the request of the
Commission, coordinate control and inspection activities by Member
States [..] by establishing joint deployment plans (Arts. 8, 9 and 2(d)
and (e) of Reg. 768/05), which set out ‘operational arrangements for
the deployment of available means of control and inspection’ (Art.
2(c) of Reg. 768/05). Among different objectives, deployment plans
shall also ‘organise the use of human and material resources with
7 Structural and market organisation measures have existed since 1970, see
Markus, 2009, Chapter 4.
8 See the objectives of the three successive basic regulations since 1983: Art 1 of
Reg. 170/83 (see fn. above); Art. 2 of (EEC) No 3760/92; Art. 2 of Reg. 2371/02.
9 Important effort limitations are also laid down in the ‘recovery plans’ under Art. 5
of Reg. 2371/02, see, e.g., Council Regulation (EC) No 423/04.
10 See Markus, 2010; see also Churchill, Owen, 2009. pp. 505-554. Regarding
environmental friendly fishing within the EEF-Regulation, see Art. 25 (6) (c), (d), (7),
(8); Arts 30 (2) (a–c) and 35 (1) (d); Arts 37 and 38; Arts 40 (3) (d), (f); Arts 43 (2) (c),
44 (1) (b) and (f); Arts 30 (2) (d), (4) (d) and 38 (2) (c) of Reg. 1198/06.
11 These measures may, in principle, apply to all fishing vessels, see recital (11) of
Reg. 2371/2002.
12 See Art. 17(1) of Reg. 2371/02. The principle of free access is also limited by
Community measures listed in Arts. 4 to 10 of Regulation 2371/02Art. 17(2)
subsequently provides an exemption to the exemption, granting fishermen from
other Member States fishing rights in accordance with the maintenance of
neighbourhood relations or traditional fishing rights as laid down in Annex I of
Regulation 2371/02.
13 Prior to 1993, in many cases, the Commission itself decided on individual aid
applications, see, for example, Case 514/93, Cobrecaf and other v. Commission, [1995]
ECR, II- 621.
14 See annual TAC regulations at http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/fishing_rules/tacs/
index_en.htm ICES areas can be viewed at www.ices.dk. In principle, EU fishers have
‘free access’ to all ‘Community Waters’. The ‘principle of free access’ has been adopted
in 1970, see Art. 2 of (EEC) 2141/70. It presents an attempt to incorporate the primary
law ‘principle of non-discrimination’ into the CFP, see Markus, 2009. p. 48. At present,
it is laid down in Art. 17(1) of Reg. 2371/02. The term ‘Community Waters’ are defined
in Art. 3(a) of Reg. 2371/02.
15 See Arts. 3, 4 and 6 of Reg. 1954/03. Such areas equal ICES areas V, VI, VII, VIII, IX
and X, and CECAF division 34.1.1, 34.1.2. and 34.2.0. On the development, see Markus,
2009. pp. 79–81.
16 For a comprehensive analysis see also Long, 2010. The 2001 Green Paper also
suggested a number of different policy option for increasing stakeholder involvement,
including a system of regional or zonal management, COM(2001) 131 final: 11.
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regard to the periods and zones in which these have to be deployed,
including the operation of teams of Community inspectors from
more than one Member State [. . .] and [. . .] take account of [. . .] spe-
cific regional or local constraints’ (Art. 10(d), (e) of Reg. 768/05).
Since 2007, joint campaigns have been carried out under the
Agency’s auspices with a view to inspecting cod fisheries in the
Baltic Sea and in the North Sea and Western Waters, Tuna fisheries
in the Mediterranean, and those fisheries regulated under the North-
east Atlantic Fisheries Commission and the Northwest Atlantic Fish-
eries organization, thus increasing regional Member States
administrative cooperation.17
Igniting a substantial CFP reform, the Commission issued a
Green Paper on the Reform of the CFP in April 2009. In this Green
Paper, the Commission proposes to continue institutionalizing
regional approaches. To start, it states that the current decision-
making system encourages short-term economic considerations at
the expense of long-term economic, environmental and social sus-
tainability of EU fisheries (COM(2009)163 final: pp. 8, 10). It then
considers different options to mitigate this structural failure, such
as relying on specific regional management solutions, which would
be subject to Community standards and control, but would be
implemented by the Member States (COM(2009)163 final: p. 10).
The Green Paper adds: ‘For instance, decisions on certain principles
and standards such as fishing within [maximum sustainable yield
levels], adapting fleet capacity to available resources or eliminating
discards could remain at Community level, but it would then be
left to Member States to regulate their fisheries within these Com-
munity standards’ (COM(2009)163 final: pp. 10). Organizing dele-
gation at the level of marine regions would be preferred, as isolated
Member State actions are considered unable to manage shared fish
stocks and ecosystems which cover wide geographical areas
(COM(2009)163 final: pp. 10, 11). Therefore, Member States’ coop-
eration would be necessary in order to develop the setups required.
The Commission also refers to the role of the RACs, whose role
would most likely be enhanced under the new set-up – however,
policy decisions would remain the remit of the European bodies
(COM(2009)163 final: p. 11).
In the aftermath of the Green Paper, the Commission issued a
reform package in July 2011, including particularly the proposal
for a new basic regulation (COM(2011) 425 final; COM(2011) 416
final; COM(2011) 424 final). The reform efforts thus target the
most central elements of the CFP. In the context of the ongoing re-
form process, the topic of ‘‘regionalisation’’ gained substantial
momentum. The Proposal for a reformed basic regulation particu-
larly foresees the adoption of four concrete measures to promote
regionalisation. First, Member States will receive the competence
to adopt conservation measures to specify the so called multiannu-
al plans and technical regulations adopted at the EU-level (Art. 17
and Art. 21 Commission Proposal). Second, the Commission shall
be empowered to ‘change the areas of competence, to create new
areas of competence for Advisory Councils [formerly Regional
Advisory Councils] or to create new Advisory Councils’ (Art. 52(2)
Commission Proposal). It shall also consider adopting acts concern-
ing the ‘composition and functioning of Advisory Councils’ (Art.
54(4) Commission Proposal) and establishing an Advisory Council
for Aquaculture and an Advisory Council for the Black Sea (Recital
18 Commission Proposal). Third, Member States are required to
coordinate their scientific activities with other Member States
regarding data collection and research (Art. 37 and Art. 38 Com-
mission Proposal). Fourth, in the area of market organization, the
legal framework for producer and inter-branch organizations
(Art. 6 to Art. 8 and Art. 14 to 16 of COM(2011) 416 final) as well
as associations of producer organizations (Art. 12 to 13 Commis-
sion Proposal, COM(2011) 416 final) shall be developed substan-
tially (see Recital 14, Art. 17(b), Art. 18(c), Art. 20, 21
Commission Proposal, COM(2011) 416 final; Markus and Salomon,
2012; Long, 2010).
3.5. Distribution of tasks under the EU’s Marine Environmental Policy
As with the fisheries policy, the scope of the EU’s Marine Envi-
ronmental Policy is determined by the TFEU. The TFEU, however,
does not expressly refer to the protection of the marine environ-
ment. Articles 191 to 193 of the TFEU on the environment merely
provide that Union policy on the environment shall contribute to
preserving, protecting and improving of the environment, region-
ally or even worldwide. Art. 191(1)’s and Art. 192(2)’s broad refer-
ence to global or regional geographical areas implies that basically
all areas of the environment are included in the scope of the Article
(Krämer, 2007: pp. 1–4). Accordingly, the EU may in principle
adopt marine environmental measures according to the require-
ments laid down in Art. 192 TFEU. When measures to protect the
marine environment are based on Art. 192 TFEU, Art. 4(1) and
(2)(e) TFEU provide that the environment is a policy area in which
the EU and the Member States share legislative competences. How-
ever, to this day, measures contributing to the protection of the
marine environment have been adopted in a wide range of EU pol-
icies and based on a set of different TFEU provisions such as Arts.
43, 91, and 114 TFEU. This has been done in accordance with the
integration principle as laid down in Art. 11 of the TFEU.
In the field of marine environmental protection, the MSFD can
be considered as the most advanced instrument. It follows a genu-
ine conservation purpose, which aims at bringing the European
marine environment into good environmental status by 2020,
thereby making use of regional measures.
As Member States are responsible for further defining the broad
framework for action provided at EU level, their tasks are quite
extensive. They shall take appropriate measures to achieve good
environmental status by developing marine strategies for their
marine waters. They consist of an initial assessment, the definition
of good environmental status, the setting of environmental targets
and the establishment and implementation of a monitoring pro-
gramme. In a second step, programmes of measures shall be devel-
oped and entered into operation. Further requirements include
obligations to inform the Commission on possible subdivisions of
marine regions, the results of initial assessments, environmental
targets, and monitoring programmes. If Member States notice that
action linked to fields of another Community policy or an interna-
tional agreement is desirable, they are entitled to make appropri-
ate recommendations (recital 41 MSFD) to the Commission
which ‘shall respond to any such recommendation . . . and, as
appropriate, reflect the recommendations when presenting related
proposals to the European Parliament and to the Council’ (Art. 15
(2) MSFD).
These provisions suggest that Member States are relatively self-
determined in transforming the MSFD into national law. Feedback
from the Commission is basically restricted to the following three
cases: first, to providing ‘guidance on possible necessary modifica-
tions’ (recital 28 MSFD); assessing ‘whether . . . the elements noti-
fied constitute an appropriate framework to meet the
requirements of this Directive . . .’ and providing guidance on nec-
essary modifications (Art. 12 MSFD). Lastly, the Commission ‘shall
consider the coherence of programmes of measures’ (Art. 16
MSFD). Other than that, the Commission mainly holds duties for
publishing data (Art. 20 Par 1 and 2, Art. 21 MSFD; Recital 37
MSFD). Only in one case, reactive intervention from the Commis-
sion is required: if measures at the national level cannot prevent
issues that have an impact on the environmental status of marine
17 See Decision No 09-II-04 of the Administrative Board of the CFCA, available at
http://cfca.europa.eu/pages/docs/admin_board/WP2010.pdf.
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waters or if it is linked to other Community policies or interna-
tional agreements (Art. 15 Par. 1 and 2 MSFD). The Commission
shall respond to these issues within six months, and ‘reflect the
recommendations when presenting related proposals to the Euro-
pean Parliament and to the Council’ (Art. 15 Par. 2 MSFD). Prospec-
tively, the Commission may also amend the MSFD’s technical
annexes III, IV and V ‘in the light of scientific and technical pro-
gress’ (Art. 24 MSFD) and ‘lay down criteria and methodological
standards to be used by the Member States and to adopt specifica-
tions and standardized methods for monitoring and assessment’
(recital 48 MSFD. Art. 9 par. 3 MSFD; see also Markus, 2013).
3.6. Present and future regional aspects of the Marine Strategy
Framework Directive
References to regional levels had been a key feature of the MSFD
at early stages in the development of the Directive already. In its
first Communication, the Commission emphasized the regional
diversity of marine ecosystems (COM (2002) 539 final), and the
first proposal for the MSFD considered regional aspects as an inte-
gral part of the policy (COM (2005) 505 final). A division of respon-
sibilities was considered key: ’the need for a dual EU/regional
approach, the setting-up of Marine Regions as management units
for the implementation of the Strategy and the need for coopera-
tion between Member States . . . are at the center of the proposed
Directive’ (COM (2005) 505 final: 3f.). Thereby, hydrological,
oceanographic and bio-geographic features provide the basis for
marine regions (COM (2005) 505 final: pp. 4f.), including the Baltic
Sea, the North-East Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea and the
Black Sea and can be further split in sub-Regions in order to take
into account the specificities of particular areas.
Derived from this geographical definition, measures based on a
regional understanding pervade throughout the MSFD. Respect for
regional specifics shall characterize almost every measure to be
carried out by the Member States. They include methodologically
consistent initial assessments of the marine waters, the develop-
ment of coordinated monitoring programs for the environmental
status in their marine waters, and the development of Marine
Strategies, which shall include a programme of measures for
achieving good environmental status (Art. 13 (1) MSFD). The
implementation of these strategies ‘between Member States . . .
sharing the same marine region or subregion . . . is envisaged in or-
der to ensure regionally coherent measures for achieving the
objectives of the MSFD, and the competent authorities for the
MSFD’s implementation are to be designated by the Member States
within one marine (sub)region. Lastly, in the Member States’ noti-
fications to the Commission about the assessment of the marine
waters and the determination of a set of characteristics for good
environmental status, marine (sub-)regions shall be respected also.
In turn, the Commission shall consider coherence between the
Member States’ actions within different marine regions (Art. 16
MSFD and Art. 12 MSFD).
The MSFD’s strong regional focus is further emphasized by
involving regional sea conventions (Art. 3 (10), Art. 6 (2) MSFD)
for ‘the purpose of establishing and implementing marine strate-
gies . . .’ (Art. 6 (2) MSFD). Member States shall use the mechanisms
and structures of regional conventions to coordinate their actions,
and the conventions shall support preparing assessments in order
to ensure coherency (Art. 8 (3) a) MSFD). Furthermore, they serve
as consultants to the Commission (Art. 9 (3) MSFD). Overall, regio-
nal sea conventions shall be ‘. . . given early and effective opportu-
nities to participate in the implementation of this Directive’ (Art.
19 (1) MSFD).
4. The emerging concept of regions within the Common
Fisheries Policy and the Marine Environmental Policy
The following section will reflect and analyze the different pur-
poses, functions, forms and expected impacts on the EU’s political
and institutional system of regional measures included or dis-
cussed under the CFP and the MEP.
4.1. The different purposes of regional measures under the CFP and
MEP
When comparing the regional focus of the two policies, sub-
stantial differences become apparent. It seems that in the CFP,
the first and foremost intention for regional action is to mitigate
conflict in the decision-making phase through functional delega-
tion of specific tasks to regional arrangements. More discretion in
the implementation process would also allow policies to consider
specific regional conditions. This suggests that regional measures
can be considered as a reaction to flaws in the policy process,
and because they are purpose-driven, their design and functions
are quite specific.
In contrast, the regional measures of the MSFD have a different
background. The starting point for the regional deliberations is the
intention to adequately protect transboundary marine ecosystems.
This requires a broad range of actions. Instead of specifying them at
the EU level, this task is delegated to the Member States and their
coordination at a regional level. The regional references in the
MSFD are therefore rather broad and cross-cutting, and leave the
Member States with considerable discretion in their further defini-
tion. Instead of mitigating existing flaws as in case of the CFP, the
introduction of regional aspects seems to be a requirement for the
Member States’ approval of the new ambitious policy.
4.2. Types of measures under the Common Fisheries Policy and the
Marine Strategy Framework Directive
In the following section, a typology is drawn up in order to bet-
ter understand the impact different regional measures can develop
on the EU political system. Thereby, the content, procedure and de-
gree of institutionalization are considered. Institutional setups are
deemed important in particular, because we assume that the more
institutionalized regional measures are, the more likely they are to
affect the existing division of tasks between European bodies and
potentially they even add an evolving regional layer in the Euro-
pean political system. Institutions can be understood as stable, pat-
terned and predictable interactions among actors, which are able
to affect individual behavior (Stone Sweet and Sandholtz, 1997).
The characteristics of institutions can range from informal and
quite voluntary forms of cooperation to more formal, mandatory
and enforceable requirements.
The CFP’s management measures are composed of quantitative
restrictions (total allowable catches and effort limitations) and
technical regulation on when, where and how to fish. All of these
management and conservation measures are adopted centrally
by the Council (or by the Council and Parliament) in Brussels for
varying marine areas (so called ICES-Areas), aiming at taking into
account the specific regional management requirements of the
stocks and the marine environment as well as the economic inter-
ests of Member States fisheries interests ((EC) No. 1954/2003)18.
That means that some decisions adopted under the CFP take into
consideration region-specific needs and interests and are then
implemented by the Member States. The process, however, does
18 S e e h t t p : / / e c . eu r opa . eu / g o v e r n an c e / impa c t / p l a nned_ i a / d o c s /
2013_mare_002_technical_measures_en.pdf.
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not include special regional coordination or articulation of regional
interests to the supranational level outside the regular legislative
procedure.
In contrast, the Agency, as an EU administration which shall
support better implementation of control and enforcement obliga-
tions, fosters joint implementation actions by Member States on a
regional fit. This goal is to be achieved by developing ‘‘joint devel-
opment plans’’ and thus fostering the joint administrative imple-
mentation of control and monitoring campaigns among Member
States in specific regions. Accordingly, one may speak of an institu-
tionalized procedure assigned to a EU body, drawing up ‘regional
cooperative administrative actions’ at Member States level.
Quite differently in character, the RACs’ main goal is to gather
knowledge on a regional basis and communicate it to the Commis-
sion. They are public legal entities, composed of a more or less
fixed group of stakeholders operating on a regional basis. Their
interactions and procedures follow a legally prescribed pattern;
their tasks, responsibilities and also limits of action are clearly de-
fined (Arts. 31 – 32, Reg. 2371/02). Although not mandatory, their
function is to advise the Commission and can thus influence the
decision-making processes of the EU.
The MSFD mainly comprises formal and functional regional as-
pects. Regional elements acknowledge the specifics of regional
marine ecosystems by requiring Member States to analyze the sta-
tus quo of specific marine regions and by providing the basis for
cooperative action at regional level (see Symes, 2012). However,
the Directive itself only prescribes a formal procedure, and says lit-
tle about how regional coordination processes should be orga-
nized. Although the importance of regionally coherent action in
order to achieve the goals of the Directive is highlighted, it leaves
the Member States with considerable freedom for defining the
characteristics and procedures of this coordination. An institution-
alized regional forum for interaction is, at least until now, not
planned, and also not wanted by the Member States. This questions
whether regional coordination will evolve in a predictable and sta-
ble way. Taken together, the regional aspects in the MSFD are on
the one hand a fundamental characteristic of this policy, but on
the other hand lack institutionalization.
What we can see are quite different concepts of regionalization
which materialize in varying arrangements in both policies, which
range from simply drawing up region-specific measures under the
regular legislative procedures to more institutionalized, region-
specific coordination and articulation of interests and cooperative
implementation. While in case of the management measures of
the CFP, regional elements are decided upon in a top-down process
by the European institutions and implemented by the Member
States, in case of the Agency and RACs, negotiation and coordina-
tion processes are carried out on a regional basis. The Agency
and RACs thus provide additional for a for policy formulation, or
respectively policy implementation. Concerning the MSFD, regio-
nal measures can be understood as extending the usual policy pro-
cedure by providing a strategic instrument for important parts of
the goal definition and coordination of implementing the Directive.
These processes are delegated to a coordinative regional level in-
stead of being part of the usual supranational negotiation process.
The requirements to work together with other Member States at a
regional level can be perceived to be a first step towards stronger
institutionalization.
4.3. Path dependency: history matters
The framing of regional measures under the CFP and the MSFD
is not only the result of current debates, but is significantly
influenced by prior decisions made in the two policy fields. Their
different development paths either prepared the ground or limited
the further evolution of the regional aspects (see Pierson, 1996).
Considering these developments helps to comprehend the specific
understanding of regional measures and their positions in the pol-
icy process.
The CFP’s ‘‘history of incremental path dependent change’’
(Symes, 2012: p.1) also seems to denote the development of its re-
gional measures. Although recent discussions accompanying the
reform of the CFP seem to favor a stronger emphasis of regions,
the scope for introducing according measures is limited because
of the provisions of primary law. The TFEU states that the EU has
an exclusive competence concerning the ‘‘conservation of marine
biological resources under the CFP’’, and shared competences with
regards to the rest of the fisheries (Arts. 2(1), (2), 3(1)(d), 4(2)(d)
TFEU). Furthermore, as stated above, it must be recognized that
regarding EU policies, the Commission has the ultimate right of ini-
tiative and the Council solely owns the right to adopt quantitative
limitations and allocate fishing opportunities to Member States
(Art. 42(3)).19 These decisions go back to an interpretation by the
European Court of Justice of EU law from 1979, and set the frame
in which regionalization could develop. As primary law with a view
to CFP rules it is currently not subject to change, regional measures
will only slowly develop within the scope of these limitations (Long,
2010; Markus and Salomon, 2012). Within the given system, the
possibilities for regional management have been and are severely re-
stricted: regional management can be organized at the EU level
(either by the Council alone or Council and Parliament together or
by the Commission based on delegated acts) or at the Member States
level. Any type of inclusion of non-EU or non-Member States actors
in the legislative process would – due to the Commission’s ultimate
right of initiative – be restricted to giving input in the pre-decision
phase of the process. At the national level, stakeholders may be
granted certain decision-making powers within the boundaries of
the competences assigned to the Member States under secondary
law. The decision as to whether and to what extent these powers
are assigned to stakeholders lies with the Member States (Markus
and Salomon, 2012).
As the MSFD is a much younger policy than the CFP, it could be
assumed that introducing regional measures would be less re-
stricted by prior developments. Yet, its shorter history does not
mean it developed in an institutional vacuum. In fact, the context
of the EU fresh water policy significantly influenced the regional
aspects of the MSFD. Water policy was long characterized by a
variety of sectoral regulations, partly lacking implementation, partly
resulting in inconsistent policy outcomes (Kallis and Nijkamp,
1999). This led to increasing discontent of the Member States
and eventually paved the way for the adoption of theWater Frame-
work Directive from 2000 (2000/60/EC). This Directive postulated a
new governance approach for regulating European rivers and seas
(Lee, 2009). Instead of focusing on different sectoral approaches,
the WFD is oriented on the course of rivers, and requires Member
States to coordinate in protecting their waters. This Directive can
be perceived as a window of opportunity for the development of
the MSFD. The extension of the regulatory framework from fresh
water to salt water appeared to be the logical consequence of the
novel integrated framing of water policies (Frank, 2007). The man-
agement of river basin districts in case of the WFD finds its coun-
terpart in managing marine regions in case of the MSFD. Despite
the similarities, important differences between the two can also
be noted. The WFD demands a detailed implementation procedure,
the so-called Common Implementation Strategy (Hering et al.,
2010; Liefferink et al., 2010), for achieving harmonized outcomes
of the policy. It includes comprehensive indicators for the state
of the environment oriented at the river basin (and thus
19 The right of initiative follows from Art. 17(2) TEU and Art. 293(1) and (2) TFEU in
conjunction with the relevant articles laying down procedure for sectoral policies. For
an exception see, Art. 129(3) and (4) TFEU.
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transboundary) level. Apparently, in case of the WFD, Member
States had underestimated the administrative and coordinative
workload - a neglect they seemed unwilling to reiterate with the
MSFD. Mainly because of this reason, the provisions of the MSFD
concerning the implementation process leave the Member States
with more discretion in implementing the Directive. This back-
ground explains why the regional references are a basic feature
of the MSFD, just like in case of the WFD, but are less detailed
and lack strong institutional quality.
4.4. The impact of regional measures on the EU political system
Introducing regional measures and delegating certain tasks
from EU to regional levels raises the question whether the existing
institutional architecture is subject to change. Therefore, this par-
agraph examines how regional measures fit into the existing distri-
bution of tasks.
The analysis of the CFP’s and the MSFD’s regional measures re-
veals them as an emerging supplementary layer of the European
institutional system. However, they seem to be introduced in order
to help reducing structural deficits, mainly concerning the imple-
mentation and the information-seeking phases of the policy
process (see Newig and Fritsch, 2009). Thereby, they do not resem-
ble uniform bodies, but vary in design and composition. Even in
their most institutionalized forms, the RACs and the Agency, they
do not develop the quality of an actor in the sense of being able
to independently influence European bodies or take over executive
tasks (see Long, 2011; Markus and Salomon, 2012). Similarly, re-
gional measures in the MSFD focus on coordinated action of the
Member States. The existing distribution of tasks between the
European bodies and the Member States is not substantially af-
fected by the introduction of its regional measures. Their lacking
institutional features do not allow them to immediately change
the EU decision-making process, nor do they replace the Member
States in the implementation of the Directive.
In sum, it seems that regional measures are introduced to ade-
quately address regional social or environmental requirements,
provide more input in the decision-making phase or assist Member
States in implementing the policies, however, their roles in the pol-
icy process remain limited at the behest of mainly the Commission
and the Member States. Despite these limitations, the impacts of
the European bodies should not be underestimated. First of all, as
the Agency’s and the MSFD’s regional approaches to implementa-
tion emphasize and encourage the exchange of data, methods
and practices, Member States’ policy and implementation
approaches are likely to converge (Markus, 2013). In this sense,
regions, however they are specifically framed, can be considered
as fora for exchange of information, for coordinative action and
pooling of resources. Through this coordination, a common under-
standing of policy goals and priorities can be developed, which is
likely to lead to mutual learning, trust building, and thus more
coherent outcomes. Better implementation would thus be a second
benefit: smaller numbers of Member States than at EU level decide
on regional measures, which allows the approaches to take specific
requirements into account (Frank, 2007).
On a broader scale, regional foci in the CFP and the MSFD
indicate a gradual shift of governance in ecosystem based policies,
which allows more regional differentiation within a broad and
common European framework. The introduction of regional mea-
sures can also incrementally lead to a more dynamic policy process
through new forms of interaction and new sources of input in the
policy process outside the traditional structures of the EU.
However, so far, it seems rather unlikely that this will also lead
to adjustments of the institutional landscape of the EU.
4.5. Impacts on EU integration theories
The last paragraph briefly discusses how regional measures can
be evaluated in light of the multi-level governance approach.
At first glance, revaluating regions seem to support the claim of
multi-level governance that power relations in the EU become
decreasingly hierarchical (Peters and Pierre, 2001; Bache and Flin-
ders, 2005; Stein et al., 2008) and increasingly shared across insti-
tutions at EU, national, and subnational levels (Hooghe and Marks,
2001). Also, regional measures appear to approve the assumption
that European governance encompasses multiple, functionally dif-
ferentiated stages with network-like structures (Benz, 2003), with
the nation state not as the central actor, but as one institution
among others (Scharpf, 2000; Crespy et al., 2007).
However, a closer look shows a more differentiated picture. Up
to now, regional measures in EU ocean policies do not possess the
formal power to directly shape policies at supranational level, as
MLG would suggest. Therefore, they can be understood as alterna-
tive tools for policy coordination, as they operate outside the tradi-
tional state-dominated channels (Hegland, 2009) – but they do not
replace the functions of any EU body or the Member States. Nor are
they able to pursue their interests directly at the European level
without relying on traditional levels of authority (see Piattoni,
2009). The Member States still play a key role in articulating inter-
est at EU level or at carrying out regional measures decided upon in
the EU policy process. This also means that regional arrangements
are not independently able to shape policy at EU level (Zürn et al.,
2010). Thus, diminishing hierarchies within the EU structure are
also in case of the MSFD not discernable.
In sum, the existing and emerging regional characteristics of the
CFP and the MSFD add to a more network-like structure of the two
policies. Seeking coordination and coherence through exchange of
data, methods and common implementation plans underline this
perception. The resulting structures could lead to increasingly
overlapping competences, shared between national, supranational
and regional levels (Marks et al., 1998). As a consequence, in-
creased permeability towards actors at different levels and their
articulation of interests in the policy process may also be expected.
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This paper explores coordination and cooperation between different levels of governance in the EU
Marine Strategy Framework Directive and the US National Ocean Policy. Both policies aim at overcoming
the previous sectoral organization of the marine policy field by establishing integrated approaches. As in
the EU and the US, competencies in marine policies are shared between different levels of governance,
the proper implementation of the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and the National Ocean Policy to
large parts depends on the common efforts of all levels involved. In this submission, the co-management
approach is used to analyze the coordinative procedures throughout the policy processes in the EU and
the US. It derives four criteria for effective shared management from the literature, which are then
applied to the Marine Strategy Framework Directive and the National Ocean Policy. It appears that the EU
and the US promote different consensus-oriented procedures: while in the EU, they are mainly part of
the decision-making phase, in the US, they are mostly subsequent to the National Ocean Policy’s
adoption.
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1. Introduction
In 2008 and 2010, the European Union and the United States
adopted new marine policy approaches. The main driver to reform
their marine policies was the insight that the existing sector
specific approaches to a large extent contributed to an inadequate
management of the seas (see Crowder et al., 2006; Rosenberg,
2009; Long, 2011; Koivurova, 2009; Borja, 2006; Frank, 2007).
The ocean governance systems on both sides of the Atlantic were
characterized by fragmentation due to a conglomerate of individual
regulative approaches in the marine environment (see Cruz and
McLaughlin, 2008; Crowder et al., 2006; Portman, 2011;
Turnipseed et al., 2009; Fletcher, 2007; Borja, 2006; Maier and
Markus, 2013; Long, 2011). These consisted of a multitude of
different laws, regulations and competences (ibid.). What seemed
to be missing was an overarching institution tomanage the use and
protection of the marine environment in a concerted way, over-
coming the different logics and goals of the existing agencies and
institutions. The result often was duplication of work, and contra-
dicting policy outcomes. The consequences of this sometimes
called “failure of governance” (Lubchenco and Sutley, 2010: 1 485;
Young et al., 2007: 22; Crowder et al., 2006: 617) include declining
fish stocks, transformed food webs, biodiversity loss and polluted
coastlines. In contrast to the former patchwork of regulations, the
Marine Strategy Framework Directive and the National Ocean
Policy aim for a more comprehensive approach with the marine
environment at the center of the policies, instead of individual
sector specific goals.
Besides the horizontally fragmented policies handled in
different institutions and agencies, a vertical distribution of
competencies further complicated the policy processes in the EU
and the US. In the EU, most competencies in the field of marine
policies are shared between the supranational and the Member
State level. On the US side, federal level departments, independent
agencies and state, tribal and local authorities interact regarding
ocean policy development and implementation. This vertical dis-
tribution challenged comprehensive approaches. Therefore, it
seems that joint efforts of the different levels involved are imper-
ative to achieve the intended comprehensive approaches. This
raises the question of how the integration of actors from different
levels is addressed in the two different political systems and if the
measures taken are likely to contribute to more coordination.
Given the relatively short time period since the adoption of the
MSFD (adopted in 2008) and the NOP (the Executive Order was
signed in 2010), literature so far mainly focused on the develop-
ment of the two policies (Juda, 2007; Lubchenco and Sutley, 2010;
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Turnipseed et al., 2009), legal aspects and novel governance ap-
proaches (see Barnes andMetcalfe, 2010; Markus et al., 2011; Maier
and Markus, 2013; Fletcher, 2007; Crowder et al., 2006; also Young
et al., 2007) or, in the case of the EU, on interactions with other EU
policies (Borja et al., 2010; Rätz et al., 2010; van Hoof and van
Tatenhove, 2009). A smaller number of comparative studies ana-
lyzes possibilities for transnational cooperation (Cruz and
McLaughlin, 2008) or compare EU and US ocean policies in a
broader context (Bondareff, 2007). Studies on the cooperative
policy processes are so far absent. This submission seeks to fill
this gap by analyzing the adopted procedures using the
co-management concept. Co-management is a governance
approach in the field of natural resources characterized by shared
power and responsibility between centralized and decentralized
actors (Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2007; Berkes and Folke, 1998). It
stems from the perception that traditional state-centered policies
are likely to fail (Singleton, 2000: 2). While literature emphasizes
that there is a number of different co-management arrangements,
most authors agree that the actors involved include representatives
from the government, e.g. centralized authorities, which can pro-
vide legislation and enforcement, and a community of resources
users, which provide capacities and special knowledge (Carlsson
and Berkes, 2005; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004; Pomeroy,
1995). Insights from this approach suggest that lasting coopera-
tion between these actors requires reliable participative pro-
cedures. The decision-making phase is considered particularly
important. Accordingly, the decision-making processes of theMSFD
and the NOP are primarily in focus of analysis, but also the pros-
pects for lasting cooperation after the adoption of the two policies
is addressed. After giving an overview of the backgrounds and
purposes of the MSFD and the NOP, the co-management concept is
introduced and four characteristics of effective sharedmanagement
are derived from the literature. These are then applied to the policy
processes of the MSFD and the NOP and summarized in a
conclusion.
2. The Marine Strategy Framework Directive and the National
Ocean Policy e development and purpose
2.1. The EU Marine Strategy Framework Directive
On the European side, competences and responsibilities related
to marine management are divided both horizontally (at the
supranational) and vertically (between the supranational and the
Member State level). First, at the supranational level, 18 Directorate
Generals of the European Commission are involved in the regula-
tion of marine affairs, such as the Directorate General Environment,
inter alia concerned with ship dismantling and marine protection
through Natura 2000, or the Directorate General Energy, whose
responsibilities include the promotion of renewable energies.
Furthermore, a number of specialized agencies, such as the
European Maritime Safety Agency, and advisory bodies, like the
Committee of the Regions, are involved in marine policy making or
implementation. Each of these actors following their own logics
and goals, the European Commission itself attested the existing
framework “institutional and legal complexity” (COM (2002) 539
fin: 3).
Second, the vertical division describes the division of compe-
tencies between the supranational and the Member State level. In
ocean management, competencies vary according to their legal
basis. Whereas community legislation exists in some areas, for
example for fisheries management and agriculture, legislation
targeting the environment usually implies shared competences
between the EU and the Member States (COM (2002) 539 fin,
Annex 2; Maier and Markus, 2013; Koivurova, 2009). Thus the
Member States and the EU both have power to adopt and legislate
legally binding acts (see TFEU Art. 2 par. 2 and Art. 4 par. 2). In
addition to the supranational regulations, each coastal Member
State also has individual policies for marine management, for
example, coastal protection or regarding their Exclusive Economic
Zones. Furthermore, international and regional programs and
legislation apply (such as the Law of the Sea Convention or the
OSPAR Convention1). The sectoral coexistence of measures at
different levels, their lack of coherence, the resulting unclear
competencies and waste of resources were considered to be some
of the main weaknesses of the ocean policy framework (COM
(2002) 539:16; Juda, 2007; Bondareff, 2007; Koivurova, 2009).
This was also perceived to result in a declining state of the marine
environment (see COM (2005) 504 final).
Efforts to reform the marine policy sector date back to the year
2002 and the Sixth Community Environment Action Program
(EAP).2 One of its seven thematic strategies focused on the
Protection and Conservation of the Marine Environment, which
launched a policy process finally leading to the adoption of the
MSFD in 2008 (see Long, 2011 or Markus et al., 2011). The goal of
this Directive is to establish a regulation that identifies all human
activities affecting marine ecosystems (see COM (2002) 539 final;
COM (2005) 504 final). Ultimately, a so-called ‘good environmental
status’ in the European seas shall be achieved by 2020 (MSFD, Art.
1(1)). Eleven descriptors, ranging from maintaining biological
diversity to introducing energy in the marine environment, further
describe this status (MSFD, Annex 1).3 Rather than imposing new
obligations on the Member States, the MSFD establishes a frame-
work, which allows coordination, consistency and integration with
other European policies in the field (MSFD, Recital 9).
One peculiarity of the MSFD is the strong role Member States
have in further developing and implementing the Directive. The
legal text itself describes the procedures and the overall goal, but
does not prescribe any concrete measures to be taken (Long,
2011:18). These are largely the responsibilities of the Member
States. They include defining the good environmental status for
specific regional seas, developing programs of measures to achieve
this status, and transnational coordination with other nations
within one marine region (MSFD, Art. 5 (1), (2), Art. 10). Apart from
providing the overall policy framework, the role of the Commission
is limited to mainly coordinative and controlling functions (see
especially MSFD Art. 10 and 20; see also Long, 2011). Because of the
considerable freedom Member States have in implementing the
MSFD, close coordination between the Member States and the
Commission seems to be an essential requirement in order to
achieve coherent implementation of the MSFD.
2.2. The US National Ocean Policy
The US ocean governance framework is comparable to theMSFD
regarding its complexity. Eleven federal agencies are involved in
developing ocean and coastal policy, each having distinct
responsibilities, such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (see U.S. Ocean
Commission, 2004: 47). Authority over ocean related actions is
also vertically divided between the federal, state, local and tribal
levels. In contrast to the EU and its division between supranational
1 See http://www.ospar.org/welcome.asp?menu¼0.
2 These programs in themselves are not legally binding, but should rather be
understood as a means of the EU institutions to articulate broad policy objectives
for the coming years and can be followed by more substantial measures (Long,
2011).
3 As an example for issues considered relevant for coastal management by some
Member States, see O’Connor et al., 2010.
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and Member State responsibilities, in the US, the allocation of
competencies and responsibilities mainly depends on different
zones in which the oceans are divided. The jurisdiction over state
waters extends three nautical miles from the baseline (except
Florida and Texas, whose state waters extend to nine nautical
miles). While states have the right to manage resources in these
zones, the federal government is still entitled to regulate power
generation, commerce, navigation, international affairs and na-
tional defense (Ocean Commission, 2004: 41). Beyond the three
nautical mile zone, federal law applies in general up to the 200
nautical miles, known as the Exclusive Economic Zone. A variety of
different laws and programs at federal, state and local levels further
add to the complex regulatory framework, such as the Magnuson
Stevens Fishery Management and Conservation Act, mainly oper-
ating at the regional level, or the Marine Mammal Protection Act,
which basically designates the federal government the manage-
ment authority for marine mammals. The complex division of
authority, resulting from different overlapping and often
uncoordinated laws has often been the object of criticism (see
Turnipseed et al., 2009; Portman, 2011; Crowder et al., 2006). Also,
the small amount of cooperation across state, federal and local
boundaries hindered ecosystem-based management (see Cruz and
McLaughlin, 2008, Turnipseed et al., 2009; Freestone et al., 2010;
Crowder et al., 2006; Pew Oceans Commission, 2003; McFadden
and Barnes, 2009).
Compared to the EU, the efforts to reform the US approach to
ocean governance have been under development for a longer
period of time (see Cruz and McLaughlin, 2008). Common to them
is the aim to overcome the sector division and to promote
ecosystem-based management approaches (Rosenberg, 2009).
Previously, the US primarily relied on the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration to manage much of its ocean policy
(Stratton Commission, 1969). Only in early 2000, the NOP was
developed in order to coordinate different management activities
across multiple agencies which all had different policy mandates to
fulfill. Under the Obama administration, in 2009 an Interagency
Policy Task Force (hereinafter referred to as Task Force) was created,
which, after holding multiple regional meetings, hearings and site
visits, recommended an integrated and cooperative approach to
ocean management. In 2010, President Obama signed an Executive
Order establishing a National Ocean Policy for the Stewardship of
the Ocean, Our Coasts, and the Great Lakes (Executive Order 13475).
The NOP adopted most of the recommendations of the Task Force.
The comprehensive governance approach is supposed to be
achieved by a strengthened governance structure and increased
interagency coordination, as well as by the inclusion of inter alia
state and local authorities (Interagency NOP Sec. 2b). In contrast to
the MSFD, which is mainly implemented by the decentralized level
(the Member States), the NOP relies on a different model. As fed-
eral, state, tribal, and local actors have authority over different
zones of the oceans, all of them are supposed to be included and to
cooperate in implementing the NOP. The main tool for this
endeavor is Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning (CMSP). CMSP is a
spatial planning process to analyze and allocate the different uses
of the coasts and the ocean (Task Force, 2010; Portman, 2011). The
overall aim is to reduce user conflicts and environmental impacts
and to facilitate different uses in the same area by applying a
comprehensive, ecosystem-based approach.
As in both cases, authority in ocean management is divided
among different governance levels, it seems obvious that the
intended comprehensive approach can only be achieved if the
respective institutions and agencies act in agreement. If the
Member States refuse to correctly implement the MSFD, the ability
of the Commission to intervene is limited. Much the same applies
for the NOP: CMSP as the main tool to implement the policy can
only lead to the desired improved planning processes if federal,
state, tribal, and regional actors all engage in the process. The co-
management approach introduced in the next paragraph provides
a tool to analyze how the MSFD and the NOP manage to involve
actors from different levels in the policy process.
3. Cooperation in policy processes e the co-management
approach
The term co-management is used to describe shared manage-
ment between at least two social actors who negotiate, define, and
guarantee management functions and responsibilities for a certain
area or set of natural resources between themselves (Borrini-
Feyerabend et al., 2007: 1). First used in the context of managing
salmon in the US in the late 1970’s, co-management has been
applied to a variety of cooperative arrangements, such as wildlife-
and forest management (see Berkes, 2009; Berkes, 2008; Plummer
and FitzGibbon, 2004).
The literature on co-management mainly follows an explicitly
empirical approach. Based on the evaluation of case studies on
shared management situations, it evaluates the conditions for their
success, which is understood as lasting coordination and coopera-
tion between the actors involved.
A number of studies suggest that one important factor for suc-
cessful co-management approaches is to establish transparent,
accountable institutionalized procedures (e.g. Berkes and Folke,
1998). However, instead of establishing a new legal framework it-
self, effective co-management is characterized by providing an
arena to negotiate ways to make existing laws more effective
(Jentoft et al., 2009: 35).
In large parts, co-management literature describes individual
cases and specific conditions under which sharedmanagement was
established. For that reason, the number of factors identified for
successful arrangements is almost as high as the number of case
studies itself (see Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004). This entails the
risk of co-management being perceived as rather eclectic and of
little analytical value because of its lacking transferability.
In order to be applicable to EU and US ocean policies, four
characteristics of effective co-management repeatedly mentioned
in the literature are introduced in the following. The purpose is not
to draw up an exhaustive or absolute list, but to present typical
measures that allow a high level of transferability. This seems
necessary in the context of rather untypical broad-scale coopera-
tive systems, such as the EU and the US.4 These measures will be
outlined below, each starting with the expected benefit of the
measure, followed by the requirements for it to become effective.
3.1. Knowledge generation
Empirical studies highlight the importance of including
knowledge from decentralized actors in the decision-making phase
for effective co-management. This allows for making reasonable
decisions and measures adequate to address the problem at hand
(Ostrom, 1990; Berkes, 2009; Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004).
Literature on co-management shows that centralized and decen-
tralized actors often possess specific, yet incomplete knowledge on
complex resource uses, such as fisheries (see Ostrom, 1990; also
Plummer and FitzGibbon, 2004); put together, the respective
strengths can be combined and weaknesses mitigated (Singleton,
4 For example, factors for effective shared management, such as guaranteeing
property rights or the willingness of political systems to share authority, are left
out, because it is assumed that these conditions play a minor role in the EU and the
US.
N. Maier / Ocean & Coastal Management 92 (2014) 1e8 3
Author's personal copy
1998; Berkes, 2009; see also Noble, 2000). It seems important that
decentralized actors have the opportunity to participate early in the
decision-making, and that actors from centralized and decentral-
ized levels are perceived as equal partners (Plummer and
FitzGibbon, 2004). This means that both have similar opportu-
nities for their positions to be considered. With a case study from
Canada, Gadgil et al. (2003) give an example how knowledge from
decentralized actors benefits dealing with environmental change.
In the Hudson Bay Bioregion project, a large-scale hydroelectric
power generation development, the Inuit Community of Sanikiluaq
questioned the government's assessment that no cumulative im-
pacts would arise from different hydro projects that were planned
in the region. The Sanikiluaq people initiated a project collecting
observations from fishers and hunters from different communities
across the region which showed that environmental change
happened with accelerated pace in the region, resulting in detailed
maps and insights that could not have been provided by Western
scientists (Gadgil et al., 2003: 198).
3.2. Learning processes and collective action
A second benefit of effective co-management is that learning
processes can emerge through acquiring common knowledge and
understanding different circumstances. Learning processes allow
for broadening the scope of problems addressed by increasing the
understanding of i.e. ecosystem complexity, and also the ability to
solve problems through the involvement of different actors. A
participatory approach of learning also allows building trust among
the involved actors, which “(.) is a prerequisite for collective
action and social learning” (Berkes, 2009: 1 694). Consequently, a
positive signal for further collaboration can be set (Pinkerton, 1989)
and compliance with regulations adopted by common decisions
can be enhanced (Berkes, 2004). An important requirement for
such learning processes and the building of trust seems to be that
the process follows an institutionalized pattern (Berkes, 2009;
Borrini-Feyerabend et al., 2004). These patterns include the reli-
able and recurring involvement of decentralized levels in the
decision-making phase for new policies. Olson et al. (2007) provide
an example from a Swedish biosphere reserve which shows how
knowledge of ecosystem dynamics developed by linking different
organizational structures. The high biodiversity of the area and its
large groundwater resources was endangered by “a continuing
decline in natural and cultural values” (Olson et al., 2007: 4). By
following a co-management approach, actors from different
institutions at different levels were brought together and started
exchanging their specific expertise and coordinating their views,
resulting in a broader knowledge on ecosystem interaction, build-
ing trust among the different users and developing a common
vision for ecosystem management (Olson et al., 2007, 5).
3.3. Negotiating needs and interests
Third, successful co-management is likely to strengthen imple-
mentation if the actors involved have the opportunity to express
and negotiate their needs and interests early in the decision-
making phase. This does not avoid conflicts among differing posi-
tions. However, “[.] they are brought to a level where decisions
have a better chance of being equitable, appropriate, and accept-
able” (Pinkerton, 1989: 22). Also, recognizing the specific interests
of the actors involved in the decision-making process can give them
a sense of ownership regarding the policy outcome and can lead
them to perceive the regulatory regime as legitimate, which is also
supposed to enhance compliance in the implementation phase
(Young et al., 2007; see also Noble, 2000; Zürn and Joerges, 2005).
Pomeroy (1995) describes a negative example of what can happen
if needs and interests of centralized and decentralized actors are
not negotiated. In Malaysia, where top-down state control of fish-
eries management was dominant when the article was published,
“the fishers were not willing to accept the roles of guardian of
fishery resources or of enforcer of laws and regulations” (Pomeroy,
1995, 156). The new legal framework replaced the traditional
fisheries management approaches which had been supported by
the local communities, and new organizational structures to
include the fishers interests and priorities were not established.
Despite small progress in some respect, apparently severe
enforcement problems persisted (Pomeroy, 1995).
3.4. Coordination and conflict resolution via continuing
partnerships
Fourth, the existence of a cooperative and continuing sphere,
extending beyond the adoption of new legislation, seems charac-
teristic for effective co-management. In this sphere, the actors
involved in the policy process come together and negotiate further
action on a partnership basis (Carlsson and Berkes, 2005; Plummer
and FitzGibbon, 2004). Such network-like structures are meant to
serve as platforms to exchange information and data, and also
provide an arena for conflict resolution (Pinkerton, 1989; Berkes,
2007). Moreover, the continuing and stable involvement of
different actors seems to enhance trust and coordination (see
Noble, 2000). Just as in the decision-making phase, continued and
reliable procedures seem to be a key factor for success in this part of
the policy process (Berkes, 2009). Singleton (2000) describes a
co-management system of salmon fisheries in the Pacific North-
west including American Indian tribes, state, federal and interna-
tional regulatory bodies inwhich continuing conflict resolutionwas
crucial for further cooperation. Once “[v]irtually incapable of
cooperating on even mundane management tasks [.]”, the
involved parties litigated disputes and often depended on courts
and third parties for conflict resolution. Apparently, personal
commitment of different individuals provoked a transformation to
more cooperation, mainly due to the fact that conflicts were to be
resolved at the level they arose. The recurrent meetings and
retreads with state officials, tribal leaders and biologists and the
possibility to discuss their different views within this forum
marked the turning point towards working together (Singleton,
2000: 14).
Empirical studies consider these measures to be important for
effective co-management. However, it should be noted that the
co-management concept does not ignore the influence of the po-
litical environment in which these measures are introduced. It is
assumed that a favorable policy environment which insures that
centralized and decentralized actors have a similar say in the policy
process generally supports functional co-management (Berkes,
2009).
3.4.1. Analyzing the Marine Strategy Framework Directive using co-
management
3.4.1.1. Knowledge generation. In the case of the MSFD, a broad-
based consultation process was an essential part of the policy
process (Long, 2011; Markus et al., 2011). Even before the formal
draft proposal of the MSFD presented by the Commission in 2005,
extensive consultations had been held at the institutional level of
the Member States, including various interest groups, working
groups and third countries sharing marine regions with EU Mem-
ber States (see Long, 2011). Apart from that, different conferences
were held and discussions at the international level took place. In
these consultations, amongst other issues, the application of the
ecosystem-approach was discussed as well as the reasons for the
degrading state of the marine environment (see COM (2005) 505
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final). Based on these reviews, the Commission considered different
options on how to react to these threats (see COM (2005) 504 fin).
The then introduced Proposal for a Directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council establishing a Framework for Commu-
nity Action in the field of Marine Environmental Policy (Marine
Strategy Directive) (COM (2005) 505 final) inter alia included
different requests from the Council based on prior consultations;
also, the mediated positions of different Member States charac-
terized by substantial disagreement concerning the content of the
proposed Directive were incorporated.5
The involvement of the Member States (the ‘decentralized
actors’ in co-management terminology) closely resembles the first
measure identified for successful shared management, the inclu-
sion of knowledge from decentralized actors. The experiences and
views of the Member States were publicly presented and included
in the proposal for the MSFD via various consultation procedures
and conferences, as well as via the Council (see COM (2005) 505
final). It can thus be assumed that knowledge gathering and its
incorporation in the drafts for the MSFD was rather extensive. Also,
the Member States were part of the policy process right from the
start.
Furthermore, the co-management concept emphasizes that
decentralized and centralized actors should be considered equal
partners when it comes to exchanging knowledge. In the EU, the
Commission has the right to initiative, which means it is formally
autonomous in tabling draft legislation (see Rasmussen, 2007). Yet,
Member States get the chance to integrate their interests in the
subsequent formal policy procedure. Especially the transparency of
the procedure in case of the MSFD, achieved by publishing con-
ference reports and the results of consultation procedures, suggests
that the Commission and the Member States can be considered
fairly equitable partners.
3.4.1.2. Learning processes. The consultation procedures, confer-
ences andworkshops of theMSFD and the respective reports can be
assumed to have led to the accumulation of common knowledge
among centralized and decentralized actors. According to the
Commission, overcoming the lack of common knowledge in the
complex marine sectors was one of the main aims of the MSFD (see
COM (2005) 504 final). Apparently, such efforts were urgently
needed. Whereas some Member States have relatively broad da-
tabases on their marine waters, such as riparian states to the Baltic
Sea, others, such as Portugal with its extensive marine waters, have
much less available data (cf. Pihlajamäki and Tynkkynen, 2011;
OSPAR, 2010).
It can be assumed that the participative decisionmaking process
and the extensive consultation phase allowed Member States to
learn from each other as well as to communicate their knowledge
to the Commission. The processes include the exchange of mea-
surement techniques or of data collection and allow for more
comparability between the different approaches. Also, recurring
meetings within the institutionalized decision-making procedure
of the EU are likely to enhance trust between the actors involved.
Thus, it seems likely that learning processes in the sense of effective
co-management developed.
3.4.1.3. Negotiating needs and interests. In the EU, environmental
policy is adopted under the so-called co-decision procedure (TFEU
Art. 192, par. 1). Its main characteristic is the rather extensive inter-
institutional interplay (TFEU Art. 294), whose purpose is to foster
consensus among the actors involved. The European Parliament
and the Council are both involved in the decision-making on new
legislation, which prevents that one of these institutions can adopt
new legislation without the other’s approval (see Farrell and
Héritier, 2003). Altogether, up to three readings may be required
before adopting a proposal from the Commission. Subject to
different voting rules, the Parliament and the Council may, in each
of these phases, amend or adopt respective positions from the other
institution. Conciliation committees are convened if an agreement
cannot be reached; however, if the Parliament and the Council
cannot agree on a common position, the proposal is rejected. In
addition, also the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and
Social Committee have the right to deliver their opinions. This ping-
pong between the different European institutions can lead to
lengthy procedures, but at the same time helps to ensure that every
actor’s interests can be negotiated.
In case of the MSFD, the co-decision procedure took almost
three years and allowed the European Parliament to ask for 117
amendments, 54 of which were agreed upon. Within the Council,
“diametrically opposed positions” (Long, 2011: 8) had to be nego-
tiated. As reported on the ground, some Member States strongly
opposed interference of the EU in marine affairs and a legally
binding Directive; others opted for shorter timeframes; many had
not been in favor of a binding regional approach in the imple-
mentation phase. Despite conflicting interests and discussions over
several years, a common position was finally reached. Apparently,
before the adoption of theMSFD, the extensive negotiations led to a
balancing of the different priorities and needs in a way that the
proposal finally was acceptable for all parties involved. This
suggests that the legislative process and its inter-institutional
interplay seem to fulfill a consensual function and that the
different stages of the process facilitate conflict resolution.
According to the co-management concept, this could also indicate
positive trends towards compliance with the adopted policy.
3.4.1.4. Coordination and conflict resolution via continuing partner-
ships. This requirement for successful co-management goes
beyond the policy-making processes and refers to the design of the
institutional setting in the implementation phase. For this stage,
the MSFD allows for the Member States within one marine region
to coordinate their actions in developing initial assessments,
environmental goals and action plans in order to achieve good
environmental status.
The potential for conflicts in this phase seems rather high, for
example if good environmental status cannot be achieved because
of interactions with other policies, such as the Common Fisheries
Policy or the Common Agricultural Policy e both are assumed to
have strong impacts on the state of the marine environment, but
lack sufficient consideration in the MSFD (Salomon, 2006; Markus
et al., 2011). It remains unclear how such conflicting policy goals
can be dealt with. Likewise, Member States are supposed to
regionally coordinate their actions. But formalized procedures on
how to organize this coordination are not described in the Direc-
tive, nor are there any provisions on how to proceed with Member
States unwilling to cooperate. The few specifications include ref-
erences to regional institutional cooperation structures Member
States within one marine region are supposed to use for estab-
lishing and implementing marine strategies (Art. 6 MSFD). Yet,
clear provisions on the specific roles of the different actors and the
rules of procedures cannot be found in the MSFD.
Obviously, the provisions for this phase do not exactly meet the
requirements for establishing continuing partnerships in the sense
of the co-management concept. By dividing the European seas into
different marine regions and given the intention to develop mea-
sures and goals in a cooperative way throughout these regions, it
seems that a step in the right direction has been made. However,
the vague wording on how the cooperation should be organized5 For examples of the Member States’ differing positions, see Juda (2007).
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and the lack of mechanisms to resolve conflicts questions the
development of lasting coordination.
However, in 2009, one year after the adoption of the MSFD, a
work structure for coordinating the Member States’ measures
required for implementing the Directive was established at EU
level. The so-called Common Implementation Strategy (CIS) is led
by the Marine Directors of the Commission. It comprises a Marine
Strategy Coordination group in which the Member States are rep-
resented, as well as three working groups on different aspects of
the MSFD.6 Their main tasks include data and information ex-
change. This work structure can be understood as a first step in the
direction of continuing coordinating structures, as suggested by the
co-management concept.7 However, as the structure is still nascent,
its reliability needs to be reviewed at a later point in time in order
to come to a conclusive judgment whether it qualifies as a
continuing partnership.
3.4.2. Analyzing the National Ocean Policy using co-management
3.4.2.1. Knowledge generation. The co-management concept
emphasizes the importance of knowledge inclusion from different
levels in the decision-making phase. At first glance, the
preconditions regarding the NOP do not seem ideal for such pro-
cedures because of its legal form. The NOP is an Executive Order, a
decree issued by the US President (Executive Order 13 547; see
Contrubis, 1999). Contrary to the normal legislative procedure,
Executive Orders can be adopted without interference from
Congress or the courts. Their main purpose is to facilitate the
managing of officers and agencies of the executive branch (see
Contrubis, 1999). For these actors, Executive Orders are binding.
Accordingly, the increasing inclusion and participation of actors
from different levels of government are typically not among the
main goals of this type of legislative act.
However, although the NOP is not the result of a formal
participative preceding decision-making procedure, it is, in large
parts, based on the work of the Interagency Policy Task Force. The
Task Force was established by the President with the objective to
develop recommendations for what is called “a comprehensive
national policy [.] to improve stewardship for the oceans” (Task
Force, 2010: 9). Apart from reviewing existing policies and ana-
lyses by the previous Ocean Commissions, the Task Force actively
sought public input, e.g. through over 40 regional public and expert
roundtable meetings (Task Force, 2010; Lubchenco and Sutley,
2010). Inter alia based on the information gathered in these fora,
the final recommendations were developed, most of which were
also adopted in the NOP. This shows that, despite the lack of an
institutionalized participative procedure, the NOP incorporates
knowledge from decentralized actors. However, because the pro-
cess did not correspond to a transparent formal decision-making, it
is hardly possible to evaluate whether the communication between
actors from different levels took place at eye level.
3.4.2.2. Learning processes. This aspect of effective co-management
also refers to the decision-making phase, which in the formal sense
was non-existent in case of the NOP. However, the work of the Task
Force can once again be understood as partly substituting this
phase. It can be assumed that the six regional public meetings the
Task Force hosted contributed to acquiring common knowledge on
a number of topics. During these meetings, experts from different
branches of marine affairs, such as marine recreation, research and
science, and tribal interests, gathered and discussed public
comments.8 It seems likely that these meetings contributed to
understanding different positions and concerns from a variety of
different stakeholders and possibly initiated learning processes.
These include acquiring a common understanding of challenges
specific regions are facing or of interactions between different
sectors that previously were dealt within separate frameworks.
Apart from the public comments, representatives of different
agencies were involved in these public meetings, which suggests
institutional learning.
However, the co-management concept emphasizes the impor-
tance of institutionalized interaction and multiple meetings for
building trust and for strengthening problem-solving capacities via
the involvement of different actors. Although an important step in
the direction of initiating learning processes, the efforts of the Task
Force lack this element. The missing institutionalized interaction
could challenge further collaboration and, eventually, compliance
with the adopted policy. Accordingly, also the opportunity to take
advantage of trust building through participatory procedures for
compliance was not embraced. Again, the reports published by the
commissions aiming at reforming ocean governance surely
contributed to understanding the positions, interests and claims.
However, they cannot replace recurring and reliable meetings and
negotiations in the decision-making phase.
3.4.2.3. Negotiating needs and interests. As the NOP lacked
formalized decision-making procedures, the actors involved in
ocean policies did not have a forum to negotiate their priorities and
interests in an institutionalized setting. Neither did the Task Force’s
work qualify as negotiating interests, as its task was to develop
“recommendations to enhance [the] ability to maintain healthy,
resilient, and sustainable ocean, coasts, and Great Lakes resources
[.]”, not arbitrate between different interests. This lack of nego-
tiation processes seems surprising, as the prior commissions on
ocean policy had already recognized the urgent need for such
procedures. Their suggestions included recommendations on how
to reform the institutional interplay, and on how to increase
cooperation between the different sectors in the policy field
(Lubchenco and Sutley, 2010; Cruz and McLaughlin, 2008). How-
ever, these recommendations were not adopted in case of the NOP
e or rather, they did not apply to this policy, because Executive
Orders do not require institutionalized negotiating processes (see
Contrubis, 1999).
Following the co-management approach, this lack of early
negotiations can have adverse effects on the implementation of a
policy. Especially the planned increased engagement in CMSP could
be a problem in the implementation phase. As reported on the
ground, CMSP is often perceived as a useless interference from the
federal level into state affairs and as a result causes delays in
decision making (see also Task Force Final Recommendations,
2009:43). Despite these concerns, CMSP is an important part of
the NOP and can be considered its main tool to achieve integrated
cross-sectoral planning. To be successful, CMSP would require close
cooperation between the different levels of governance involved in
ocean policies, i.e. Federal, state, local, regional and tribal author-
ities (see Interagency Ocean Policy Task Force, 2010; Portman,
2011). Involving these actors in formal decision-making could
have brought the different positions closer together, or at least
increased mutual understanding. At the time of writing there is
little indication that an ad hoc-agreement on CMSP can be reached.
It may well be assumed that negotiations will have to be conducted
6 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/marine/implementation_en.htm.
7 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/marine/pdf/minutes_26-27_may_
2011.pdf; http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/marine/pdf/syntesis_spa_
dec2010.pdf; http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/marine/pdf/la_granja.pdf.
8 The transcripts of all public meetings can be found at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/administration/eop/ceq/initiatives/oceans/publicmeetings.
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during the implementation phase. This may delay the imple-
mentation process of the NOP. The co-management concept would
support this assumption by explaining that the missing negotia-
tions in the decision-making phase can lead to a missing sense of
responsibility among the actors charged with implementing the
NOP.
3.4.2.4. Coordination and conflict resolution via continuing partner-
ships. Compared to the EU, the US ocean policy contains more
detailed provisions on the implementation phase of the NOP. This
particularly concerns the states’ involvement in the policy process
after the adoption via a National Ocean Council (NOC). The NOC’s
main task is to facilitate an effective governance structure and to
coordinate actions of executive agencies in the field of ocean and
coastal management (see also Kim, 2012). It is also responsible for
approving regional CMSP plans (Executive Order 13574, Sec. 3;
Portman, 2011). Furthermore, the NOC is charged with establishing
a Governance Coordinating Committee. This Committee’s focus lies
on “inter-jurisdictional ocean policy issues”9 e which, in other
words, means strengthening the coordination between the
different levels of governance (state, tribal and local) involved in
ocean management.
Members of the Council are first and foremost representatives of
Federal Departments, but also include State, tribal, and local
governance officials. This composition is thought to promote
collaboration and a diversity of views (Executive Order 13547, Sec.
7; see also Lubchenco and Sutley, 2010; and Stokstad, 2009).
The NOC closely resembles the continuing cooperative sphere
the co-management concept suggests for successful shared man-
agement. Mainly two arguments support this view. First of all, the
functions and the composition are clearly described in the NOP
(Sec. 4e7, see also Task Force, 2010). Second, the involved actors
meet on a regular basis, get to exchange their experiences and
discuss potential conflict. Following the co-management approach,
both arguments suggest that reliable relationships among the
involved actors can develop and that arising problems can
promptly be discussed in an appropriate forum. So far, the work of
the NOC is in parts assessed positively. At the federal level, the
Council apparently helped to improve interagency coordination on
ocean related issues and to involve those agencies that, despite
close links between their activities and the marine environment,
previously put little effort in ocean management (Joint Ocean
Commission, 2012: 6). Similar progress is reported at the sub-
federal level and on the work of the Governance Coordinating
Committee. However, what still seems challenging is the coordi-
nation between these two bodies. There is criticism on the missing
communication of policy goals and of the means to achieve them
between the Council and the Governance Coordinating Committee.
Also, there seems to be room for improvement concerning the
identification of priorities and needs of regions and states (Joint
Ocean Commission, 2012: 7).
4. Conclusion
The analysis of the coordinative measures and procedures in the
MSFD and the NOP shows that the EU and the US approaches differ
considerably. This is first and foremost due to the different legal
forms and the respective policy procedures. The MSFD, being a
European Directive, requires an elaborate institutionalized proce-
dure, which the NOP, as an Executive Order, does not. However,
taking the accompanying work from different US ocean
commissions into account, it becomes clear that the coordinative
measures do not only constitute of the institutional proceedings of
the NOP, but also include significantly more efforts to involve the
different levels involved in ocean policies.
The co-management concept proves to be a useful tool to
analyze the coordinative procedures and structures introduced in
the MSFD and the NOP and to assess whether these are likely to
result in lasting cooperation. A key advantage of the concept is that
it covers the whole policy process, starting with the generation of
knowledge and exceeding the adoption of a new policy by
emphasizing the importance of an institutionalized forum to
further discuss conflict. Applying this framework to the MSFD
shows that the extensive EU decision-making procedure is likely to
contribute to an integrated policy approach. For the post-adoption
phase, however, experiences from the co-management concept
suggest that more institutionalized procedures are needed in order
to maintain and further encourage coordination and cooperation
and to enable conflict resolution in a reliable way. As the Member
States have substantial discretion in implementing the MSFD, it is
questionable whether the extensive decision-making process can
compensate for the lack of an institutionalized forum to ensure
lasting cooperation.
On the US side, the co-management concept would criticize the
lack of extensive institutionalized decision-making procedures
prior to the adoption of the NOP, even though the work of the prior
ocean commissions included consultations and discussions at
different levels. This suggests that much of the negotiations on the
specific goals and implementation strategies of the NOP are post-
poned to the post-adoption phase, which could delay the imple-
mentation. The establishment of the National Ocean Council,
however, implies the possibility that these discussions take place in
an institutionalized setting, which might have positive effects on
the implementation.
Overall it appears that when comprehensive and integrated
frameworks are envisaged, the design of the processes and pro-
cedures and the inclusion of actors and institutions from different
levels of governance throughout the policy process are essential.
This is especially true in the complex field of ocean policies with its
different sectoral logics and priorities. Here, a first step towards
more integration is to develop a common understanding, to adapt
procedures and to foster cooperation and exchange between the
actors involved. Each following a different path, the MSFD and the
NOP both initiated such processes. In order for these processes to
continue, special emphasis should be put on their further institu-
tionalization, and on pursuing common goals and frameworks for
action.
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